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INTRODUCTION
Predatory pricing poses a dilemma that has perplexed and intrigued the antitrust
community for many years.  On the one hand, history and economic theory teach that
predatory pricing can be an instrument of abuse, but on the other side, price reductions are the
hallmark of competition, and the tangible benefit that consumers perhaps most desire from the
economic system.   
The dilemma is intensified by recent legal and economic developments.  Judicial
enforcement is at a low level, following the Supreme Court’s recent Brooke decision, the first
major predatory pricing decision in modern times.   Indeed, since Brooke was decided in 1993,1
no predatory pricing plaintiff has prevailed on the merits in the federal courts.   At the same
time modern economic analysis has developed coherent theories of predation, contravening
earlier economic writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is irrational.  More than that,
it is now the consensus view in modern economics that predatory pricing can be a successful
and fully rational business strategy; and we know of no major economic article in the last 30
years that has claimed otherwise.  In addition, several sophisticated empirical case studies have
confirmed the use of predatory pricing strategies.  But the courts have failed to incorporate
the modern writing into judicial decisions, relying instead on earlier theory no longer generally
accepted.
Growing market concentration, fueled by the current merger wave, has further
increased the tension between judicial policy and modern economic theory.  Notwithstanding
the low level of judicial support—or perhaps because of the legal vacuum this has
created—government enforcement concern with predatory pricing is at the highest level in
2
many years. The Department of Transportation has recently issued proposed predatory pricing
guidelines, antitrust enforcement agencies have ongoing investigations, and private antitrust
actions have not slackened despite their apparently dim prospects.  Moreover, the growing
importance of intellectual property, challenges predatory pricing rules designed for tangible
goods markets, as illustrated by the Microsoft case where the alleged predatory pricing
involves intellectual property.  It is the thesis of this paper that the dilemma and tensions
confronting predatory pricing enforcement can be resolved and a coherent approach developed
by basing legal policy, at least in part, on modern strategic theory. 
We begin in Part I by describing the uncertain foundations of present policy based on
the judicial belief that predatory pricing is extremely rare or even economically irrational
conduct and the tension this creates with modern economic analysis.  Part II discusses current
enforcement policy, its evolution and culmination in the Supreme Court’s Brooke decision
and, most recently, in proposed government Guidelines for airline predation.  Part III outlines
our proposed strategic approach, setting forth elements to guide analysis in predatory pricing
cases, including rules for prima facie liability and an expanded efficiencies defense.  Parts IV
through VI develop criteria for identifying predatory strategies, which we then apply to
financial market predation in Part IV, to reputation effect predation in Part V, and to cost and
demand signaling in Part VI.  In Part VII we evaluate possible objections and 
counterstrategies.
          One of the first economists to call for judicial evaluation of predatory pricing in light of modern2
strategic theory was Alvin Klevorick.  See Alvin K. Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of
Predatory Pricing, 83 AM ECON. REV. 162 (Papers & Proceedings, 1993).
          See William Inglis, Etc v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 1981)3
(“....anticipated benefits depended on....tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby....reap the
benefits of monopoly power”).  See Luis M.B. Cabral and Michael H. Riordan, The Learning Curve,
Predation, Antitrust and Economic Welfare, 45 J. INDUS. ECON. 155 (1997);  see also JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988); Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers and Incomplete
Information, 18 RAND J. ECON. 165,166 & n.5; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 144 (1978)
Proposal - Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in Airline Transportation Industry Policy, Trade Reg. Rep. ¶50,163
(May 13,1998) [hereinafter DOT Proposal]; cf. Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic
Definition of Predation:  Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981) (contestable market
approach).
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I. THE TENSION BETWEEN CURRENT LEGAL VIEWS AND MODERN ECONOMIC
THEORY
A powerful tension has arisen between the foundations of current legal policy and
modern economic theory.  The courts adhere to a static, non-strategic view of predatory
pricing, believing it to be an economic consensus.  But this is a consensus most economists no
longer accept.  The tension is reflected, however, not so much in the legal rule, which at least
in theory would allow arguments based on modern strategic analysis.  Rather the tension
appears in an extreme judicial skepticism against predatory pricing cases that has led to the
dismissal of almost all cases since the Brooke decision by summary motion.  In order to
understand this judicial skepticism and the tension it creates with modern economics, we must
examine its source, evaluate its merit and appreciate the challenge posed by modern analysis.  2
This requires that we first state what we mean by predatory pricing.
In most general terms predatory pricing is defined in economic terms as a price
reduction that is profitable only because of the added market power the predator gains from
eliminating, disciplining or otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or potential
rival. Stated more precisely, a predatory price is a price that is profit maximizing only because
of its exclusionary or other anticompetitive effects.   The anticompetitive effects of predatory3
          Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, supra note _ , at 8, 52.4
          See Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986).5
          Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226. 6
          See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590.7
          See e.g., Bathke v. Casey’s General Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Matsushita); 8
Vollrath Company v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (also quoting Matsushita).
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226.9
          See John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:  The Standard Oil Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958);10
Roland Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing:  An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105
(1971).
          See Matsushita, 475 U.S., at 574.11
          Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1913).12
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pricing are higher prices and reduced output (including reduced innovation), achieved through
the exclusion of a rival or potential rival. But such a definition does not state an operational
legal rule.   It is therefore necessary to base the legal rule on tractable measures such as cost,4
market structure, and recoupment.
A key premise in developing an enforcement policy for predatory pricing is the
expected frequency and severity of its occurrence.  That   determination necessarily rests on
the   twin guides of empirical evidence and economic theory.  In Matsushita and Brooke the
Supreme Court found that predatory pricing was speculative and “inherently uncertain,”  and5
noted its “general implausibility.”   Moreover, in Matsushita the Court embraced the view that6
a “consensus” of commentators finds that predatory pricing is “rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful,”  and other courts have embraced this  view,  including a later Supreme7 8
Court in the Brooke decision.   The consensus to which the Court referred  rested essentially9
on empirical studies by John McGee and Roland Koller, published in 1958 and 1969;  and the10
Court cited each work explicitly.  11
In his 1958 article McGee analysed the trial record of the 1911 Standard Oil
decision,  a case long held up as the classic example of predation.  The Rockefeller-dominated12
Standard Oil Company was thought to have cut prices below cost to drive out its smaller
          See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 184-86 (1976); James Miller13
III, Comments on Baumol and Ordover, 28 J. L. & ECON. 267 (1985)(predation occurs).
          B.S. Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting:  Notes and Comments, 15 J. LAW & ECON. 129, 140 (1972).14
          See Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 6 J. ECON. &15
MGMT. 679 (1997).
          B.S. Yamey, supra note __.16
5
rivals intending later  to  raise prices and exploit consumers.  McGee found little indication in
the trial record that this had occurred.  More than that, McGee found that  a predatory
strategy by a large firm such as Standard Oil against a much smaller rival would have been
economically irrational in view of the much larger market share over which the predator must
cut price.  Recognizing that the predator cannot sustain such losses indefinitely, the prey will
not be induced to leave the market.  Nor will lack of funds exclude even the smallest prey
since capital markets will step in to supply funds to an efficient producer.  But even if the
predator could drive the prey from the market, the predator would gain little because when it
later attempted to raise price, either the prey or a subsequent purchaser could reopen the failed
plant. 
For a long time McGee's analysis provided the only coherent economic theory of 
predatory pricing. While some resisted McGee's conclusion that predatory pricing was
irrational,  no rival theory emerged.  However, examples of actual predation clearly existed. 13
Among the most notable was the use of “fighting ships” to exclude shipping rivals, as for
example in the famous Mogul Steamship Co. case, as described by B.S. Yamey  and more14
recently by Fiona Scott Morton.   To drive out an intruding rival from the China trade the15
defendant shipping conference quoted rates, which according to Lord Esher in the Mogul case
were “so low that if continued...they themselves could not carry on the trade.”   Conference16
ships were even sent empty to Hankow in order to underbid the upstart shipping line.  
Other striking instances of predation included the use of fighting brands in the match
          B.S. Yamey, supra note __, at 136-37.17
          Id. at 137; see also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).18
          Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 26619
(1986).
          David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly?  The Case of Southern Bell Telephone,20
102 J. POL. ECON. 103, 105, 113 (1994).
          David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887-21
1914 (May, 1997) (NBER Working Paper 6032).
          Balder Von Hohenbalken & Douglas S. West, Empirical Tests for Predatory Reputation, 19 CAN. J.22
ECON. 160 (1986).
          Yim Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of Predatory Pricing:  An Experimental Study of Reputation and23
Entry Deterrence in the Chain Store Game, 25 RAND J. ECON. 72 (1994); see generally, LOUIS PHLIPS,
COMPETITION POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 206-215 (reviewing experimental evidence).
6
industry in both Canada and the United Kingdom whereby the monopolist would introduce a
special brand, locally marketed, to foil new entry, confining sales of the brand to the entrant's
local territory and withdrawing the brand as soon as the entrant left the market or sold out to
the monopolist;   the use of “punitive base points” in the U.S. cement industry, where the17
industry punished a “recalcitrant” firm that failed to follow the industry's cartel pricing system
by making its production centre an involuntary base point with a drastically reduced base
price, adhered to by other sellers;  the setting up of bogus independents, secretly controlled18
by the American Tobacco Company to sell at low prices in the prey's territory to force rivals
to sell out at depressed prices and thereby maintain monopoly;  sustained below cost pricing19
by Southern Bell Telephone in the early 1900's when entry was threatened by independent
telephone companies and further price reduction when entry occurred, combined with other
predatory strategies, preceded Bell's growth to market dominance;  below cost pricing by the20
Sugar Trust between 1887 and 1914  to drive out recent entrants,  locational predation by a21
leading Canadian supermarket chain which built new stores close to entrant's plant, with the
apparent single purpose of forcing losses on entrant as well as its own plant, sustaining the
reputation effect hypothesis;   and an experimental study showing the incentive in markets22
with incomplete information to engage in predation to deter entry.   Finally, a recent23
          Standard engaged in predation against its rivals by becoming what Steve Salop has colorfully termed24
“a cartel ringmaster.”  United served as the enforcer and beneficiary of a cartel among the railroads upon
whose services the oil industry vitally depended.  Standard thereby obtained large advantages over its refinery
rivals, who paid cartel-enhanced prices, while Standard maintained the cartel by agreeing to the high cartel
price, compensated by rebates.  In effect, Standard and the railroads divided the cartel profit, obtained at the
expense of Standard's rivals, who frequently sold out to Standard at distressed prices.  See Elizabeth Granitz &
Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by Raising Rivals' Costs:  The Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1996).
          Roland H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.25
REV. 105 (1971) (drawn from PhD dissertation, Predatory Pricing in a Market Economy (University of
Wisconsin, 1969)).
          See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589- 590; Bork, supra note _, at 155; 3 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT26
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW  ¶723b (1996); Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699. 
          Koller II, supra note _ , at 112.  The 23 cases were selected out of a total of  95 federal cases in which27
the defendant was legally adjudged to have engaged in predation.  The 95 cases were themselves taken from a
total of 123 cases, the author having eliminated without investigation the 28 cases of acquittal.  Id. At 110.
          Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Michael T. Mumford, Does Predatory Pricing Exist?  Economic Theory and28
the Courts After Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 949, 958 (1996); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S.
Cooper, The Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 655,
699-708 (1982).  The empirical study is described in the earlier 1982 article, but the  fact that the data
contradict the Koller study was not made explicit until the recent 1996 article, and probably for that reason 
7
reexamination of the Standard Oil case—the case on which McGee had primarily relied in
rejecting the logic of predation—found that Standard had in fact used predatory tactics,
although not necessarily predatory pricing, against its rivals, but in a far more subtle way than
McGee had imagined .  24
Nevertheless, the force of these examples had to confront the absence of supporting
economic theory.  In addition, Roland Koller’s 1969 Ph.D. dissertation, which he boldly titled,
“The Myth of Predatory Pricing,”  and which has been relied on by the Supreme Court and25
leading commentators such as Areeda & Turner and Robert Bork,   also seemed to provide26
convincing countervailing evidence.  
However, the mythology claim is overdrawn.  Koller found that out of 23 cases where
he judged the legal record to be sufficiently informative, actual predation was attempted in
seven cases (30 percent) and succeeded in only four (17 percent).  But a more recent study by27
Zerbe and Cooper examining the same cases beginning in 1940 and updated to 1982
concluded that predatory pricing was present in 27 out of 40 litigated cases.   Moreover, both28
has been neglected in the legal literature.  See also Edward H. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly
Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375, 436 & n. 232 (1974)
(citing nine cases as involving “clear or highly probable” below cost pricing to discipline or eliminate
competition).
          See infra notes ____.29
          It should be noted that Koller agrees that the American Tobacco case, analyzed in the Burns study,30
represents an  instance of actual predation.  Koller II, supra note ___ at 115.
          While the empirical studies we have cited appear to be striking instances of predatory pricing, one31
cannot entirely rule out an efficiencies justification for these actions, as John Lott has recently argued.  See
JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? (1999).  However, it seems fair to assume that
had any evidence in these careful and often exhaustive studies suggested such a defense, the authors would
have reported it.
          See Koller II, supra note   , at 114-117.32
8
studies were likely to have under-reported predatory pricing, as they limited their investigation
to litigated cases with revealing trial records. The studies therefore excluded: (1) settlements
(including consent settlements with the government) which are likely to be a frequent outcome
in strong cases,  (2) predatory disciplining where no suit is filed because the prey agrees to29
comply with the predatory demand, (3) forced buy-outs where the prey may typically release
antitrust claims, and (4) cases that were not brought because supporting economic theory was
as yet undiscovered or unknown.  By contrast, recent case studies which have found striking
episodes of predatory pricing, such as the Burns study of American Tobacco,  have used30
powerful econometric techniques not employed in earlier, more impressionistic surveys and
some have probed deeply into historical archives, such as Fiona Scott Morton and Genesove
and Mullin.  31
Finally, even if the Koller study had correctly concluded that predatory pricing was
rare in litigated cases this would scarcely be surprising given the populist legal standard that
prevailed in the pre-1969 period he surveyed, following passage of the Robinson-Patman Act
in 1936.  Strikingly, only six of the 23 cases in the Koller sample occurred before 1936 and
these includes two of the four cases in which Koller identified actual predation.   During the32
era of expansive Robinson-Patman Act enforcement, discriminatory price-cutting by a large
          CARLA ANDERSON HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR, 312-313 (2d ed. 1978) (desk book intended for33
company counsel).
          The same limitation applies to JOHN R. LOTT, supra note ___, which is based in part on a data set of34
reported decisions (including some of those in the Koller study), where in 15 of the 21 cases Lott investigated,
the predation began during the pre-1975 populist era.  See id. at 29-30.
9
interstate firm injuring a small local rival, accompanied by evidence of animus or simply
sustained price-cutting, was virtually per se unlawful.  Certainly this was what lawyers were
advising their clients,  and it seems more than likely that such an over inclusive legal rule33
would have deterred most predatory pricing.  That would of course provide no indication that
predation would be rare under a less inclusive legal rule.34
The older economic analysis is challenged in an even more fundamental way by
developments in economic theory over the last 20 years.  Stimulated by the growing number
of observed instances of  predatory pricing and the emergence of modern game theory which
provided the tools to analyze complex strategic situations, economists developed new
economic theories beginning in the early 1980's.  This new body of research challenges the
static framework of perfect information on which McGee had relied.  The new analysis
explains predatory pricing in a dynamic world of imperfect and asymmetric information in
which strategic conduct can be profitable.  Under this analysis the predator seeks to influence
the expectations of an existing rival, a potential rival, or perhaps most striking of all, the prey’s
creditors, to convince the rival that continued competition or future entry into the market will
be unprofitable.  As summarized by Paul Milgrom—
Thus, for example, a firm in an industry with rapid product change might cut prices
sharply in answer to new entry in order to discourage the new entrant from continuing
an active product development program.  Whether the entrant attributes its lack of
profitability to its high costs, to weak market demand, to over-capacity in the industry,
or to aggressive behavior by its competitor, it will properly reduce its estimate of its
future profits.  If its capital has other good uses, this might lead it to withdraw from
the industry.  If not, it may nevertheless be dissuaded from making new investments in
and developing new products for the industry.  At the same time, other firms may be
          Paul Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 937.35
          See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN36
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112, 116-18 (G. Bonnanno & D. Brandolini, eds 1990);
          See generally, Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in37
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig, eds. 1989).
          See infra Part V.38
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deterred from entering the industry.  If any of these things happen, the predator
benefits.35
As this passage suggests, predatory pricing may pose a special threat in rapidly growing, high
technology industries, which often involve intellectual property and continuing innovation.  36
Developing the strategic approach to predatory pricing, economists have formulated
several coherent theories.  In these theories, which include financial market predation and
various signaling strategies, predatory pricing is a rational, profit maximizing strategy.   37
While the formal economic proof of the theories is complex, their intuitions can be simply
described.  The theory of financial market predation challenges McGee’s assumption that the
prey can readily obtain capital under predatory conditions, observing that the providers of
capital use the threat of termination when profits are low as an incentive scheme to induce the
firm to repay its debts.  If predation causes the prey's profits to fall, the banks observe the
decline, but cannot tell whether it is caused by predation or inefficient performance;  and even
if a bank could identify predation, it would be unable to write an enforceable lending contract
contingent on its occurrence.  Under these circumstances, lending to the prey becomes more
risky, and banks or other investors reduce or withdraw their financial support.  38
Similarly, in signaling theories of predation a better informed predator sells at low
price to mislead its rival into believing that market conditions are unfavorable.  Signaling
theories include reputation effect, test market and signal jamming and cost signaling.  In
reputation effect predation a predator reduces price in one market to induce the prey to
11
believe that the predator will cut price in its other markets or in the predatory market itself at a
later time.  In test market and “signal jamming” the prey is attempting to ascertain consumer
response to a new product or to its entry into a new geographic market.  The predator
frustrates the prey’s market probe by either offering secret discounts and thus inducing the
entrant to believe that demand for its product is low, or openly cutting price in the test market
to keep the prey ignorant about normal market conditions. In cost signaling a predator
drastically reduces price to induce the prey to believe that the predator has lower costs, when
in fact the predator has no cost advantage.  
To summarize, the present judicial skepticism of predatory pricing assumes that
predation is extremely rare, but soundly-based empirical and experimental studies and modern
economic theory do not justify this assumption.  The judicial skepticism, influenced by
economic assumptions based on a world of perfect information, has failed to make use of
sophisticated modern theories, founded on a more realistic assumption of imperfect and
asymmetric information, where much is not known and where one party may have more
knowledge than the other.  In addition, the present legal rule does not contain a fully specified
efficiencies defense that reaches dynamically efficient pricing strategies, so that predatory
pricing enforcement may lead to both under- and over deterrence.  
While critics of strategic analysis have suggested a variety of counterstrategies that
might foil predation, the counter strategies are not considered in an exhaustive (or equilibrium)
analysis that works out all possible moves and countermoves of the parties.  Moreover, the
counter strategies implicitly assume that market participants have full or symmetric
information.  As we develop in Part VII, the counterstrategies rarely go through in a world of
imperfect information.  In another  recent critique (which does not rest on an assumption of
          See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., supra note ____ , Ch 2.39
12
perfect information) John Lott argues that managers lack incentive to engage in predatory
pricing because their compensation depends on short run profits, which can only be reduced
by predatory pricing.   However, this is an incorrect view of current managerial compensation39
policies and Lott's statistical study provides no basis for a different conclusion, as we also
discuss in Part VII.
We propose to remedy these deficiencies by taking an approach explicitly based on
modern strategic theory.  Modern theory is critically needed because proof of predatory
pricing under recent Supreme Court decisions requires a showing that the alleged predation is
economically rational, and that is precisely what modern economic theory demonstrates. Thus,
our proposal would augment existing approaches by allowing predation to be shown by proof
that a predatory strategy exists and that the predator has acted pursuant to that strategy.  This
would involve identification of a predatory strategy recognized  in the economic literature
(e.g. financial predation) or in some instances even a new coherent strategy not covered by
current economic writing if sufficiently persuasive and factually supported.  We emphasize that
our proposal is not intended  to burden plaintiffs with new requirements of proof, but to
augment and enlarge enforcement options to reflect the teachings of modern economics. 
Plaintiffs would remain free to maintain a predatory pricing case without reliance on modern
theory.  
Consistent with existing law, our proposed rule would require that price be below
some measure of cost, which we think is best viewed in terms of incremental cost.  We would
also allow an efficiencies defense, but would expand the defense to include dynamic and
output-enhancing gains that outweigh competitive losses.  We believe that our proposed
          Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the40
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
          15 U.S.C.A. §13(a).41
          See generally Koller II, supra note _ .42
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approach is basically consistent with the legal doctrine of Brooke, and would enrich and
inform its application by a better understanding of both predatory strategies and efficiencies
justifications.  In briefest compass, one might describe our approach as a structured rule of
reason informed by modern economic theory.   Before presenting our proposal in more detail,
we first describe current legal policy, its evolution and the present diminished level of
enforcement.
II. CURRENT LEGAL POLICY 
U.S. antitrust law entered a new era in 1993, when the Supreme Court decided the
Brooke case, the Court’s most important predatory pricing decision in modern times.  As
interpreted by the lower courts, the decision had an effect on enforcement comparable only to
the impact of the Areeda-Turner article in 1975, which launched the cost-based approach to
predatory pricing.   Indeed, in the five years following Brooke, plaintiffs have not prevailed to40
final judgment in a single reported case.  To appreciate the significance of Brooke we must
know something of its historical background, its proper interpretation and subsequent lower
court applications..
A. Before Brooke: The Areeda-Turner Rule
Predatory pricing enforcement extends over almost the full history of the Sherman Act. 
Cases were infrequent until after passage of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,  and the41
inauguration of a strong enforcement effort by the FTC beginning  in the 1940's.   In the early42
years of the Robinson-Patman Act, enforcement essentially protected small local firms from
          See CARLA ANDERSON HILLS, supra note _ , at 312-13.  See generally, CYRUS AUSTIN, PRICE43
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, 46-47 (1959).  Predatory
intent was easily established.  See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 697 (1967).
          See Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. at 706 (Stewart, J., Dissenting).  44
          See Koller II, supra note _ , at 105.  Out of a total of 123 federal cases from 1890 to 1971 the prey was45
legally adjudged to have suffered predatory injury in 95 cases, or 77 percent of the cases brought.
          See generally, Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories46
and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981) (describing and evaluating Areeda-
Turner and alternative rules).
          See James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends,47
35 VAND. L. REV. 63,140,145(1982) (success rate fell to eight percent).
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price cutting by large sellers.  Discriminatory price cutting by a large interstate seller which
injured a local rival, accompanied by predatory intent was virtually per se unlawful.   Largely43
missing was any consideration of the consumer interest in lower prices and vigorous
competition.    Plaintiffs won most litigated cases, including cases they probably should have44
lost.    It seems no exaggeration to call this the populist era of predatory pricing enforcement.45
Areeda-Turner Rule. The enforcement climate changed radically in 1975 with
publication of the Areeda-Turner article.   The article proposed a single per se standard based46
on average variable cost—the average unit costs of producing the product excluding fixed
costs — which replaced the vague conjunction of factors previously used.  The Areeda-Turner
rule made an immediate impact on the courts, indeed so much so that plaintiffs’ success rate
fell drastically in the years immediately following publication of the article.   47
Economic Critique.   However, a sharp economic critique quickly challenged the
Areeda-Turner rule, asserting in general terms the need for a strategic approach, although
economists had not yet rigorously proved that predatory pricing could be profitable.  The
critics charged that the short run AVC rule missed the essential nature of predation—strategic
behavior over time.  Price cuts by dominant firms must be viewed as strategic communication
involving threats and sanctions.  Effective policy, therefore, required a predatory pricing rule
          Actually, Areeda and Turner did not disagree in principle, but emphasized that their rule was48
pragmatic, and they had simply chosen the best rule, given the constraints of the legal process and the
“extremely rare” occurrence of predatory pricing (citing the Koller case study of predatory pricing during the
populist era).  Areeda & Turner, supra note   , at 699, 718 & note 7.
          See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 38449
(1977).
          See Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions:  A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,50
89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).  Baumol has recently written a second article on predatory pricing, which is essentially
an updating of the Areeda-Turner rule, but which replaces the AVC standard with average avoidable cost.
William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J. L. & ECON. 49, 58
(1996) [hereinafter Baumol II].
          Thus, some judges gave evidentiary weight to the reversal of a price cut after the prey has left the51
market, as suggested by Baumol and Joskow-Klevorick.  Most recently the Department of Transportation
issued proposed guidelines that used an output-based rule to identify airline predation, as suggested by
Williamson.
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which considered strategic factors and long run welfare effects.   Moreover, the critics did not48
simply fault the Areeda-Turner Rule. They offered a series of alternative rules, which sought
to capture the strategic and intertemporal essence of predatory pricing.  The proposals were of
two types.  The first sought to mirror the seeming simplicity of the Areeda-Turner rule by
focusing on a single non-cost parameter that would identify predation.  The second attempted
to assess strategic conduct directly, relying on multiple criteria, including but not limited to
cost.
Falling within the first category were the Williamson output increase rule  and  the49
Baumol price reversal rule.    Williamson would find  pricing conduct by a dominant firm50
predatory when the predator significantly increased output within 12 to 18 months following
new entry into the market.  The Baumol price reversal rule (Baumol I) would deem a price
predatory if it forced a rival to leave the market and the predator thereafter reversed the price
cut within the next several years.  Neither of these rules attempted to identify the firm’s
predatory strategy, but relied essentially on the designated objective indicator.  While the two
tests can be helpful in identifying predation,  neither is sufficient by itself.  Predation is too51
multifaceted a phenomenon to be identified by any single factor, and the attempt to do so may
          See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 8952
YALE L.J. 213 (1979). 
          Posner would combine an average total cost test and a high market concentration requirement with53
proof of an intent to exclude rivals.  See POSNER, supra note _ , at 188-91.  Scherer would require a full rule of
reason inquiry into all relevant economic factors, but with particular focus on intent and market structure. 
F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act:  A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-875 (1976). 
Baumol II in an updating of the Areeda-Turner rule, essentially embraces the rule as a per se test, although he
introduces refinements. Baumol II, supra note _ .   Finally, Ordover-Willig, reaching for a unifying principle,
would define a price reduction as predatory if the gain to the predator depends on  the added market power the
predator receives from the prey’s forced exit.  Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition
of Predation:  Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981).
          Foreshadowing our approach, Richard Schmalensee suggested that a strategic approach to predatory54
pricing required that analysis be focused on the particular model that fits the factual circumstances of the case. 
See Richard Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust Cases: the Realemon Case, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 994 (1979).
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lead both to errors of over—and under—inclusion.
The second category of post Areeda-Turner proposals attempted to assess strategic
conduct directly, combining one or more economic indicators, usually including cost and
market structure, often combined  with an appraisal of corporate purpose or intent.  For
example, in the most comprehensive of the proposals, Joskow-Klevorick would identify
suspect pricing through evidence of monopolistic market structure, below cost pricing,
reversal of the price cut, and documented corporate purpose to increase prices after
competition is eliminated.   Other leading  proposals were offered by Posner, Joskow-52
Klevorick, Scherer, Baumol (Baumol II), and Ordover-Willig.   These rules are closer in spirit53
to our approach, but none of them adequately confronts the fact that predation is not a unitary
phenomenon, but involves a variety of predatory strategies that require distinct legal
approaches.  Thus, the critics did not attempt to describe and classify the various predatory
strategies and to craft an approach keyed to an identified predatory strategy, as we propose in
this article.  54
Augmented Areeda-Turner Rule.  Following the 1975 Areeda-Turner article, the lower
courts at first embraced the average variable cost pricing rule in its per se form, but soon
          See International Air Ind., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F2d 714, 723 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting55
the Areeda-Turner pricing rule);  William Inglis, Etc. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F2d 1014, 1032
(9th Cir. 1981) (declining to adopt the Areeda-Turner test without qualifications).  See generally, Brodley &
Hay, supra note __ ; James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation:  The Emerging
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63, 97-98 (1982) (collecting cases).
          See Williamson, supra note _ , at 66-67.56
          See A.B.A., PREDATORY PRICING LAW:  A CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT SURVEY (Barbara O. Bruckman, ed.57
1995) [hereinafter CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT].
          Following  Supreme Court dictum (Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119, n.1558
(1986)), the lower courts increasingly recognized high concentration and entry barriers as necessary conditions
for predation since otherwise the predator would be unable to recoup its predatory investment.  See e.g., A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d at 1401 (citing Joskow-Klevorick).  Finally, some
courts gave particular weight to evidence that the price cut had been reversed following exit of the prey.   See
e.g., U.S. Phillips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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retreated after confronting criticism and litigation problems.   To begin with, the AVC rule55
proved difficult to litigate.  Cost determination—however cost is defined—is inevitably
complicated and uncertain in a courtroom, particularly when made by juries.  Second, all of
the economic critics rejected a per se short term cost test.  Finally, it appeared to many that a
per se rule based on average variable costs strongly favored defendants.  Indeed, in the five
years immediately following the Areeda-Turner article, no predatory pricing plaintiff prevailed,
and the rule was aptly called “a defendant's paradise.”56
In the face of these difficulties most courts declined to adopt a per se rule, and instead
augmented the Areeda-Turner formulation with other factors, which included cost-based
presumptions, intent and market structure.  While there were variations between judicial
circuits, most commonly courts held that a price below average variable cost was
presumptively unlawful, while a price above average total cost was conclusively lawful.  A
price falling between these two cost benchmarks was presumptively lawful, but the
presumption could be rebutted by evidence of intent and market structure.   In the absence of57
a controlling Supreme Court precedent, the lower courts weighed the non-cost factors
differently, but courts in most circuits relied on evidence of intent and increasingly market
structure.  Some courts followed a "sliding scale" approach, requiring more or less proof of58
          CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note   , at 66-67.59
          See e.g., William Inglis & Sons v. Continental Baking, 942 F2d at 1337 (rejecting offered evidence of60
intent as more consistent with competition than predation).
          See e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1  Cir. 1983).61 st
          The cost issue was expensive to litigate, and subject to unavoidable dispute in resolving whether costs62
were fixed or variable, and in allocating joint and common costs.  Compounding the problem, cost
determination was usually a jury question. CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note ____, at 29.  By 1995, Professor
Areeda, having minimized the cost determination twenty years earlier, now conceded that “the difficulties of
measuring cost are notorious.”  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note ____ at 508 (Supp.1995).
          A study of reported predatory pricing decisions from 1975, the year of the Areeda-Turner article, until63
1982 found that out of 48 decided cases, the plaintiffs prevailed in only four cases or eight percent of the total. 
Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note __, at 140,145.  See also Stephen S. Salop & Lawrence J. White, An
Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING 42
(Lawrence J. White, ed. 1988) (over roughly comparable period plaintiffs obtained favorable judgments in
seven percent of cases filed with predatory pricing claim, as compared with success rate of 11 percent for all
antitrust claims).
          Westlaw search, July, 1996. 64
          From 1983-1993 plaintiff won only four cases.  But in nine additional cases the court denied65
defendant's motion for summary judgment.  None of these cases was subsequently reported, and one may
surmise that favorable settlements may have been obtained in some.  Defendants would have good reason to
settle strong cases, given the expense of trial and the propensity of juries to give large awards.   Assuming that
half of the cases led to favorable results for plaintiff, the plaintiff's success rate would rise to 37 percent.
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predatory intent (and other non-price factors) depending on how far price fell below average
total cost.   In examining intent, courts began to distinguish between a mere intent to defeat a59
rival in competition, however vividly expressed, and a plan to eliminate rivals and then raise
prices.   On the other hand, a few courts found intent unhelpful, and simply inferred the60
specific intent required by the statute from the relation of price to cost.   In all circuits cost61
determination remained a source of continuing difficulty, however.62
Litigation Outcomes.  The decisive impact of the Areeda-Turner rule was reflected in
litigation outcomes.  In the seven years immediately following the article’s publication
plaintiffs’ success rate measured by favorable judgments fell to only eight percent of cases
reported (as compared with 77 percent in the populist era).   However, in the succeeding 1063
years up until the Brooke decision, which roughly coincided with the augmented AVC rule, 
plaintiffs’ success rate rose to 17 percent.   Moreover, there is reason to think that if64
settlements are taken into account plaintiffs’ success rate may have been considerably higher.  65
          Thus, the number of decided cases fell from 48 cases in the earlier period from 1945 to 1952 to 2366
cases in the later period under the augmented AVC rule.
          It is of course possible that the deterrent effect was excessive, inhibiting competitive pricing.  But we67
know of no evidence supporting such a conclusion, and it appears unlikely in view of the odds favoring
defendants in litigated cases, the absence of government enforcement and the small number of reported
predatory pricing cases.
          See Matsushita, supra note _ at 592 n. 16 (recoupment concept); Cargill, supra note _ at 119 n.68
15(market structure condition).  See also Rose Acre, supra note _ at 1401, discussing these concepts.
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Interestingly, the number of reported cases declined in the latter period, perhaps indicating
greater selectivity by counsel in cases tried.   66
Indeed, it is possible to believe that predatory pricing enforcement had achieved a
more or less satisfactory equilibrium in the years immediately preceding Brooke.  While a
predatory pricing case remained difficult for a plaintiff to win, flagrant predation based on
prices below either average variable or even average total cost remained actionable in most
jurisdictions.  Juries were something of a wild card, occasionally handing down enormous and
perhaps excessive verdicts, but courts moderated these tendencies by granting summary
judgement or judgement NOV, following jury verdict.  Nevertheless, the continued filing of
predatory pricing cases, accompanied by large jury awards when plaintiffs did succeed,
probably worked to maintain a steady deterrent on real predation.   This gradually evolved67
equilibrium is now threatened—not by the Brooke decision as we read it—but by its
application in the lower courts.
B. The Brooke Decision
The Brooke decision established a new framework for predatory pricing analysis. 
While elements of the new analysis were anticipated in two earlier Supreme Court decisions,68
Brooke melded them into a more fully articulated judicial policy.  First, predatory pricing
required proof of below cost pricing, but the Court did not embrace a particular cost test, such
as AVC.  Clearly, however, a price could not be predatory unless it was below some measure
          Brooke, 509 U.S. at 223.69
          A predatory pricing case may be brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C § 2) or the70
Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C §13).  While the essence of the predatory pricing claim is the same under
either statute, the standard of proof differs.  Brooke was brought under the more expansive Robinson-Patman
Act because the Sherman Act requires proof of a “dangerous probability” of monopolization, while the
Robinson-Patman Act requires only a “reasonable possibility” of substantial injury to competition.  The
Sherman Act prohibits predation that creates or maintains single firm monopoly power, while the Robinson-
Patman Act also reaches predation that creates or maintains oligopoly conditions enabling tacit collusion.  See
Brooke, supra note ___, at 222.  The jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act are somewhat
more limiting than the Sherman Act in that the predatory sales must involve price discrimination between
different buyers or between buyers in different geographical regions, and either the lower or higher cost sale
must be in interstate commerce, as distinct from merely affecting such commerce.
          See e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 (1992); Aspen71
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985).
          See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note _ , ¶726a.72
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of cost or even “some measure of incremental cost.”.    Second, and most strikingly,69
predatory pricing required proof of recoupment—a dangerous probability, or under the
Robinson-Patman Act a reasonable prospect, that the predator can later raise price sufficient
to recoup its investment in below cost pricing.      70
Recoupment is the new factor in Brooke and the elaboration of its requirements
provides the added element of proof that Brooke mandates.  Proof of recoupment requires not
only that the below-cost price exclude or discipline the predatory victim, which was required
under previous law, but also proof that the predator will be able to raise price above the
competitive level (recoupment capability) sufficient to compensate the predator for its
predatory investment (recoupment sufficiency).  The recoupment requirement sharply
differentiates predatory pricing from other predatory or exclusionary conduct, where the
inference of injury to competition is drawn from the exclusionary conduct and market
structure.   Recoupment requires the added showing that the predatory conduct will be71
profitable.   More specifically, the plaintiff must demonstrate either (1) actual recoupment of72
its predatory investment through supracompetitive pricing, or (2) that increased pricing power
or other economic conditions make recoupment likely.  As a necessary precondition, the Court
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 243.73
          Id. at 226.74
          See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note   ,  ¶726d.4.75
          See generally,  3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note   , ¶726d.4 (similar reading).76
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emphasized that the recoupment requirement could be satisfied only if the market structure
facilitated predation, which would require proof of market concentration, entry barriers and
capacity to absorb the prey’s market share.  When these threshold conditions are lacking,
summary disposition is appropriate.
In Brooke the Supreme Court upheld lower court dismissal because plaintiff had failed
to show that price could be raised above the competitive level.  Thus, the Court never reached
the issue of recoupment sufficiency.    Nevertheless, the language of Brooke directs plaintiff 73
to demonstrate that the likely predatory price increase would be “sufficient to compensate for
the amounts expended on the predation, including the time value of the money invested in
it.”   Overly literal interpretation of this language could vastly complicate predatory pricing74
cases.   However, in examining the facts, the Court makes clear that the recoupment element75
can be satisfied by showing either that the predatory scheme in fact produced sustained 
supracompetitive prices, or that it was likely to have caused that result, even if it did not
actually do so.  Thus, evidence of increased prices likely to persist (partial recoupment) or
simply an intensified anticompetitive market structure or other market conditions (recoupment
capability) would suffice.   The subsequent lower court decisions appear consistent with this76
interpretation.
Clearly, however, the Court applied an exacting standard of proof to the specific
evidence offered in the case.  The facts in Brooke were unusual in that the alleged predator
was not a single dominant firm, but a relatively small cigarette manufacturer holding only 12
percent of the total market, although the market itself was highly concentrated.  Predation
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 228.77
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 249 (dissenting opinion).78
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could occur only through the joint action of the leading firms engaged in oligopolistic price
coordination.  As no explicit agreement was alleged, the joint action necessarily rested on tacit
coordination—a predatory theory the Court thought highly problematic, especially in the
factual context of the case.77
The alleged predation occurred in response to the plaintiff’s introduction of non
branded, low cost cigarettes, which were known as “blacks and whites,” to reflect their stark
packaging on which was printed only simple black letters describing the cigarette content.  In
response to this bold initiative, which proved popular with consumers, the defendant Brown &
Williamson put out its own similar non branded black and white cigarette.  In a series of ever
steeper price cuts the defendant undersold its rival, reducing its price below average variable
costs.  For 18 months Brown & Williamson held prices below AVC, sustaining losses of
millions of dollars.  At the end of the 18 month period the plaintiff, one of the smallest
cigarette manufacturers, capitulated and raised price.  The defendant and the other cigarette
companies generally followed.  The list price of non branded black and whites rose by 71
percent, while the price of branded cigarettes increased by 39 percent.78
On these facts the Supreme Court held that no reasonable jury could find that
oligopolistic price coordination had produced supracompetitive pricing or that there was even
a likelihood that this would occur.  The Court noted that supracompetitive pricing through
tacit coordination is both improbable in general and particularly unlikely under the facts of the
case due to pricing uncertainty caused by multiple product varieties and the practice of giving 
rebates on list prices, demand uncertainty created by the introduction of unbranded cigarettes,
divergent incentives among competing manufacturers, the absence of evidence showing that
          See id., 509 U.S. at 237.79
          Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (1992).80
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 228; Matsushita, 475 U.S  at 590.81
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pricing signals between manufacturers were understood, and the not surprising denial by the
plaintiff’s officers that they had tacitly colluded with their competitors, either voluntarily or by
compulsion.79
The Court’s exacting requirements of proof appear to be driven partly by the
assumption that predatory pricing rarely occurs and partly by its skepticism toward predation
by tacit coordination among rival firms.  As discussed earlier, the view that predation is rare
and implausible conduct is based on outdated economic theory, but in fairness  the old theory
was the only economic view presented to the Court.   Beyond that, and more immediate to the
case, the Court’s view of the predatory pricing claim was colored by its doubts that predation
by tacit coordination could realistically occur.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals held plaintiff’s
predatory theory to be so weak that it dismissed the case as economically senseless.   While80
not willing to go that far, the Supreme Court itself expressed grave misgivings,  emphasizing
the difficult coordination problem of maintaining predation by tacit coordination without
explicit communication, particularly in view of the defendant’s small market share.   In cases81
resting on other, generally accepted predatory theories both the Supreme Court and the lower
courts are free to take a less skeptical view of predatory strategies.  Thus, Brooke does not
foreclose reliance on the soundly based predatory theories discussed in this paper.
A strategic view of recoupment would close the gap in predatory pricing enforcement
caused by the neglect of modern analysis.  In Brooke the Court omitted from its analysis any
consideration of strategic factors such as possible gains from deterring aggressive pricing in
future time periods or in other cigarette markets, for example, branded cigarettes.  Nor did the
           Westlaw search, July, 1999; telephone conferences with attorneys verifying settlement on August82
7,15,21, 1998.  While it is difficult to judge the merits of the universe of legal claims based on success rates at
trial, a  sharp change in trial outcomes may be more informative, following a Supreme Court decision and
absence of apparent change in other factors affecting litigation outcomes.  (See George L Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Donald Wittman, Is the Selection
of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985).)
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Court consider the counterfactual event of what might have happened in the absence of the
price war—the diminished profits the predator would have earned had it not forced the prey to
stop cutting prices.  By contrast under a strategic approach counsel might have attempted to
show that a reputation effect or other predatory theory, such as financial market predation,
enabled probable recoupment. Whatever might have been the ultimate outcome, that is the
issue that should have been submitted to the courts.
C. Post-Brooke Decisions  
As interpreted by the lower courts, the Brooke decision had a powerful effect on case
outcomes.  In the six years following Brooke plaintiffs have not prevailed in a single case.  Of
37 reported decisions, defendants have won 34 cases, and the remaining three cases were
settled after plaintiffs survived motions for summary judgment or dismissal.  Strikingly of the
34 cases won by defendants all but one were decided by summary judgment, judgment
N.O.V., or dismissed on the pleadings.82
Plaintiffs’ dismal success rate since Brooke (after eliminating clearly misconceived
cases) appears to be caused at least in part by (1) exacting proof and pleading requirements,
spurred by the Supreme Court’s open invitation to dismiss predatory pricing cases by
summary means,  (2) skepticism that predation can ever be a plausible business strategy, also
influenced by the Supreme Court’s opinion, and perhaps not unrelated (3) judicial neglect of
modern strategic theories of predatory pricing.
Review of the post-Brooke decisions shows that the lower courts clearly took full
          Brooke held that summary disposition is appropriate where the market structure is unconcentrated,83
entry barriers are low or the defendant lacks excess capacity.  See 509 U.S. at 209.  To this list some lower
courts have added a requirement that rivals should not be able to expand output. See Rebel Oil Co., Inc., v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 987 (1995) (existing rivals
lack capacity to increase output in short run).  But, as we shall see, strategic factors may prevent smaller rivals
from increasing output even when they have excess capacity.  See infra text accompanying notes ____.
          See Zeller Corp. v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶71, 805 (N.D. Ohio July 25,84
1996)(dismissing complaint that  alleged only that defendant could recoup predatory losses rather than recoup
"more than" its losses);  see also C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998)
(affirming summary judgment for failure to produce evidence of below-cost pricing despite plaintiff's argument
that district judge ruled on the motion without permitting discovery).
          See Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶70, 821 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1994)85
(summary judgment for failure to specify which variable costs uniquely incurred in producing predatory
output). 
          Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Prof’l Publ’g, 63 F.3d 154086
(10  Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.702 (1996); Adventura Cable Corp. v. Rifkin/Narragansett S.Flath
CATV Ltd. Partnership, 941 F. Supp. 1189 (D.D. Fla. 1996); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Medical Sys.,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
          Certainly, this is how the practicing bar appears to be reading the results.  See Penelope A. Preovolos,87
Predatory Pricing and Unfair Trade Practices, 37  Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar (Jan-March 1998)th
(Brooke’s statement that bases for recovery not easy to establish is “masterpiece of understatement”)
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advantage of the Supreme Court’s invitation to dispose of non-meritorious cases by summary
means.  Indeed, there have been only four reported trials since Brooke and in the two cases
where plaintiffs initially prevailed, the district courts reversed the jury verdicts by judgment
N.O.V.  To be sure, many of these cases appear to have been appropriate for summary
disposition;  for example,  in 12 cases the defendant’s market share was below 40 percent or
other structural factors showed that post-predation market power was lacking.   But it is also83
true that the courts dismissed seven cases on the pleadings, sometimes neglecting the need in
antitrust cases to conduct discovery to develop necessary evidence;   and in other cases84
imposed severe requirements of proof at the summary judgment level.   Despite the fact that85
plaintiffs defeated motions for summary disposition in three cases (all of which were then
settled) ,  the prospects of a predatory pricing claim in the lower courts remain far from86
encouraging87
However, there appears to be a brightening prospect that the courts will begin to
analyze predatory pricing in the light of modern economics.  In Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia
          Advo, Inc., v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 1995).88
          Id. at 1196 n.14 (the defendant competed in only a single market, and no proof was offered that the89
defendant’s parent company—a newspaper chain—was pursuing such a strategy).   See also Jonathan Baker,
Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994) (cited by
court).
          See Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v. Winston, 1995 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,044 (E.D. La. May 24, 1995).90
          See complaint in United States v. AMR Corp., Civil Action No. 99-1180-JTM (D. Kan. Filed May 13,91
1999).
          See DOT Proposal - Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in Airline Transportation Industry Policy, 7 Trade92
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 49,227, 49,228-229.  The Department of Justice has also come to view predatory pricing in
airline markets in strategic terms.  See Roger W. Fones, Predation in the Airline Industry, Speech Before the
ABA Forum on Air and Space Law (June 12, 1997).
          Statement of Nancy E. McFadden, General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Transportation before Subcommittee93
on Aviation, U.S. Senate, April 23, 1998.
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Newspapers, Inc.   the Third Circuit accepted reputation effect as a possible theory of88
predatory pricing.  The court indicated that price cutting by a chain store in selected local
markets could be predatory when the price cutter’s demonstrated predatory conduct inhibits
competition in other markets as well as the predatory market, causing prices to rise.  Finding
that a reputation effect theory “makes economic sense,” the court rejected its specific
application in the case as factually unsupported.    Similarly, in Traffic Scan Network, Inc. v.89
Winston,  the district court rejected a reputation effect argument not because it was90
implausible, but because market conditions would have prevented such an effect.  In addition,
the Department of Justice has recently filed a civil complaint against American Airlines, based
in part on anticompetitive reputation effects from alleged predatory pricing.91
Proposed  DOT Guidelines.  Perhaps the most striking development since the Brooke
case has been the recently proposed Department of Transportation (DOT) Guidelines, which
explicitly recognize predatory pricing as a strategic problem and would allow proof of
recoupment based on reputation effects.   The Guidelines focus on the ability of a major air92
carrier dominating a city hub, such as Chicago or Atlanta, to exclude competition and
potential competition between the hub and directly connecting non-hub cities.    The observed93
strategic mechanism is a drastic expansion of capacity and lowering of fares by a locally
          See DOT Proposal, supra note _ at ¶ 49, 228-29; Roger W. Fones, supra note _ .94
          The Guidelines indicate that a reasonable alternative response to new entry would be to match the95
entrant’s low fares without significantly increasing capacity.  Alternatively, the hub-dominant airline might
price its flights in the contested market in a manner consistent with its pricing in other markets where it
competes on a sustained basis with new entrants.
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dominant airline in response to new entry of an independent airline.  Using the economic
definition of predatory pricing, the Guidelines would identify as predatory any response to new
entry by a hub-dominant major airline that makes economic sense only because the major
airline can  exclude the entrant from the market and thereafter charge high fares.
From a strategic viewpoint the most notable thing about the new Guidelines is their
reliance on reputation effects to prove recoupment—the expected gains to the predator from
deterring future entry by other airlines.   Thus, if the predator suffers sustained losses in a94
contested local market such that recoupment in the local market appears doubtful, evidence
that the predation deterred future entry into either the local market or the predator’s other
monopoly markets could presumably establish recoupment. 
In contrast to Brooke the Guidelines do not require proof of below-cost sales.  Instead,
the Guidelines  rely on a gross revenue measure to identify predation.  Thus, a predatory
response to new entry is a capacity increase in a local hub market that causes the hub-
dominant airline to forgo more revenue than all of the new entrant’s capacity could otherwise
have diverted from it (or simply yields lower revenue than would a “reasonable alternative
strategy” for competing with the entrant).   The substitution of a gross revenue or output95
measure for the traditional cost test may be justified because the special characteristics of
airline markets makes output expansion a particularly effective predatory strategy.  Airlines are
able to discriminate between customers with great precision and can respond swiftly to
competitor moves, based on “real time” information about rivals.  Mobility of assets, including
          For these reasons the use of an output test in local airline markets rests on a firmer basis than earlier96
proposals for identifying predatory pricing based on substantial output expansion in anticipation of entry.  See
Oliver Williamson, supra note _____. In a typical industrial setting, substantial output expansion requires
constructing a fixed-site plant that serves a national, regional, or other broad industrial market.  Under these
conditions a strategy of output expansion would be costly since it would require large investment in advance of
entry, involving high opportunity costs. Mobility of airline plant reduces these costs significantly.
          Of course dramatic output increases, such as increasing local output ten-fold, offer no planning97
difficulty.
          Robert M. Rowen, The Dilemma Of Predatory Pricing In The Airline Industry, 13 WTR AIR & SPACE98
LAW 1, 13 (1999).
          However, assured predictability is perhaps less vital under the cease and desist enforcement available99
to the DOT, which includes no punitive remedies.  On the other hand, under the Sherman Act the risk of
criminal and civil penalties and treble damage suits cause greater need for planning certainty, particularly safe
harbors.  In any event the Justice Department in announcing its similar output-based enforcement policy under
the Sherman Act for airline predation, includes a cost standard.
28
the ability to lease aircraft, permits rapid expansion of capacity in contested local markets.96
The main objection to the use of a non-cost standard to measure predatory pricing is
loss of certainty in business planning.  Since future demand, particularly in airline markets, may
be difficult to predict, under an output rule a major airline may face difficulty in determining
whether it can lawfully expand its capacity to serve a local market following new entry.  .  On97
the other hand cost determination in airline markets also presents difficulties due to secondary
effects in other markets caused by flights on a specific city pair route.    Despite the98
difficulties it poses in airline markets,  a cost standard may provide a more secure basis for
business planning.99
The DOT Guidelines conceive the problem of airline predation in strategic terms. 
They do not attempt to define predatory pricing under a single legal formulation, but rather
identify the particular predatory strategy involved in local airline markets.  This approach is
consistent with modern economics,  and it is the viewpoint taken in this paper.  While we
would generally adhere to a cost-based approach, relevant costs would include long run
incremental costs, as well as short run costs.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
          See supra text accompanying notes ____.100
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A strategic approach to predatory pricing would augment existing practice in two
critical respects.  First, it would explicitly permit proof of predation based on modern
economics. Second, it would expand the standard efficiencies and business justification
defenses to encompass procompetitive dynamic gains.  In addition, we suggest use of short
and long run incremental cost rather than average cost in proving below cost pricing, and,
further, suggest use of a discriminating burden-of-proof for the different legal elements within
our framework.  Neither of these latter suggestions is essential to our proposed strategic
approach, however.
While the use of modern economics in proving predatory pricing is novel compared to
recent practice in most of the lower courts, such an advance is implicit in the recoupment
standard adopted by the Supreme Court.  The recoupment requirement was designed to screen
out cases where predation appeared unprofitable and hence irrational.  The Court’s skepticism
about the rationality of predatory pricing was justified by the now dated economic authorities
on which the Court relied.    However, modern economics has developed new, more100
sophisticated theories of how recoupment may be achieved consistent with rational behavior,
and thus identifies economic conditions under which a predatory pricing strategy is plausible.
Accordingly, our approach would permit the plaintiff  to amplify its proof of predation
by showing that under the specific facts of the case, one or more strategic theories are
economically plausible and that surrounding economic conditions make recoupment likely in
the light of such theory.  We emphasize that we are not adding a new element of proof.  Proof
of predatory pricing under modern theory would augment and complement existing
approaches.  Plaintiff could still bring a case without advancing modern strategic theory. 
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226; see also Multistate Legal Studies Inc., 63 F.3d at 1554-56; Rebel Oil101
Co. Inc., 51 F.3d at 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
30
However, under our proposal a plaintiff could also base proof on well-founded strategic
analysis whenever the facts warrant. 
Our proposed approach is consistent with Brooke.  That decision permits proof of
predatory pricing and  recoupment based on a scheme of predation that excludes rivals and
enables the predator to recoup predatory losses.  Proof of recoupment may be based on an
actual price increase in the predatory market, increased concentration and entry barriers in the
post-predation market, or on other relevant market conditions, including market structure and
conduct, that make recoupment likely in the future.   Thus, proof that market conditions101
make recoupment probable under an identified and recognized strategic theory should satisfy
this test.  Perhaps because modern strategic theory was not presented to the Supreme Court in
Brooke, a gap exists in predatory pricing coverage.  Interpretation of the recoupment
requirement to encompass modern analysis would close that gap.
A strategic analysis also has implications for the efficiencies justification, which would
assume a larger role.  The justification would encompass not only defensive responses to price
cutting by rivals (e.g. meeting competition) or temporary market conditions (e.g. excess
inventory), but also market expanding dynamic efficiencies, such as learning-by-doing and
network economies.  Strikingly, these efficiencies, particularly dynamic efficiencies,  also
involve recoupment, but in this case the post-predation gain is procompetitive because
recoupment comes not from output contracting monopoly pricing, but from output expanding
efficiencies.
A. Legal Elements—Prima Facie Case
          In Brooke the Court included scheme of predation, exclusionary capability  and recoupment within the102
single element, recoupment.  509 U.S. at 225.  We have separated them into two elements for analytic clarity.
          See generally, Joskow & Klevorick, supra note ____, at 274-79; Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.103
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:  Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 10-13 (1981).
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Consistent with existing law, the proposed rule would require proof of the following
elements: (1) a facilitating market structure, (2) a scheme of predation and supporting
evidence, 
(3) probable recoupment, (4) price below cost, and (5) absence of an efficiencies or business
justification  defense.   We discuss the four elements necessary to make out a prima facie102
case of predatory pricing in this section, and the efficiencies defense in a separate section.  The
plaintiff would generally have the burden of proof on the first four elements, while the
defendant would have the burden on the last element.
1. Facilitating Market Structure
The market structure must make predation a feasible strategy.  This requires what
Joskow and Klevorick call “short run pricing power”—the ability to raise prices (or otherwise
exploit consumers) over some significant but not necessarily unlimited period of time.  A
predatory market structure exists when a dominant firm or small group of jointly acting firms
has high market share, and when there are both entry and reentry barriers.   When these103
conditions exist, predation may injure competition.  When they do not, the court should be
able to dismiss the case if the structural facts are sufficiently clear.  Thus, predatory market
structure would operate as a threshold screen, as the Supreme Court held in the Brooke case.
Entry barriers exist when a new market entrant faces costs that the incumbent predator
need not bear, or no longer faces.  The most frequent example is sunk costs—fixed cost
investment that cannot be withdrawn from the market except at large sacrifice, such as the
          See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 119-121 (1986).  104
          See infra, text accompanying notes _ ; See also LOUIS PHLIPS, COMPETITION POLICY: A GAME -105
THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 220-21 (discussing Mogul case, supra note _ , and accompanying text).
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trackage of a railroad.  While the predator has borne these costs in the past, they are now
irretrievable.  Thus, if challenged by new entry, the incumbent will rationally disregard such
costs in its pricing decisions rather than lose the business.  The entrant on the other hand must
now incur such costs, and hence faces risk of underpricing by an incumbent with sunk costs. 
Thus, sunk costs may act as an entry barrier, giving the incumbent power to raise price above
the competitive level.  
Reentry barriers exist when a firm that has left a market bears significant costs in
seeking to reopen its business.  As an example, a small airline forced to cease operations in a
local market just as it is beginning to establish its brand name, may have damaged its
reputation as a reliable alternative to the established carrier.  To reenter it will have to slowly
rebuild its reputation, and this is costly.  Reentry barriers combined with entry barriers give a
successful predator the power to raise prices.  The Supreme Court has emphasized that proof
of predatory pricing requires proof that entry and reentry barriers continue to exist during the
recoupment period.   104
However, the courts have failed to see that successful past predation can itself operate
as an entry and reentry barrier particularly where reputation effects are present.  In such cases
the would-be entrant anticipates that any attempt to enter the market will evoke a predatory
response from the incumbent.  Anticipating that consequence, the firm declines to enter.  That
is to say, the incumbent’s past reputation as a predator deters future entry or reentry.    The105
problem of proving entry barriers, particularly those based on reputation effect, can be eased
by presuming their existence if the incumbent significantly raises price after the prey’s exit
          See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents of106
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109, 120 (1984).
          See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (more persuasive evidence needed when predatory claim107
implausible); Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226, 228 (exacting scrutiny of recoupment evidence where predatory scheme
was  “ least likely means of recouping predatory losses”).  Cf. First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 277-280 (1968). 
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without inducing new entry or reentry. Such a presumption is similar to the inference made
under the rule of reason that proof of anticompetitive effects may serve as proof of market
power.   The presumption is of course rebuttable since other economic factors, such as106
excess capacity may explain the absence of entry.
2. Scheme of Predation and Supporting Evidence
Proof of predatory pricing and recoupment require a showing that predation is
plausible ex ante and probable ex post.  Ex ante plausibility is shown by proof of a predatory
scheme and supporting evidence.  Ex post probability is shown by proof of subsequent
exclusion of rivals and post-predation market conditions that make future recoupment likely.
We discuss the ex ante condition—proof of a predatory scheme and supporting evidence—in
this section and the ex post conditions in the following section. 
Under Brooke and Matsushita proof of a predatory scheme, under which the predator
can expect to recoup its predatory losses, is an essential element in a predatory pricing case. 
Moreover, the degree of plausibility of the predatory scheme vitally affects the standard of
evidentiary proof for recoupment.  If the alleged predatory scheme is only weakly plausible, as
the Court found to be the case in Brooke and Matsushita, more persuasive evidence of
recoupment is required.   Illuminating the stringency of this requirement, the Court in Brooke107
subjected the evidence to a demanding analysis such as to make it doubtful that any claim of
multi-firm predation could have survived the Court’s scrutiny. However, where the predatory
theory is less problematic, proof of market conditions enabling probable recoupment, while
          See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590-595.108
          See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 451, cited with approval in Brooke, 509 U.S. at 229.109
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still required, more readily leads to the conclusion of probable recoupment.  In any event,
taken together the alleged scheme of predation and post-predation market conditions  must
add up to a compelling theory of predation.
The Court found the alleged predatory scheme in Brooke implausible because the
scheme appeared to require sustained tacit coordination between multiple firms without
explicit communication or agreement on a predatory strategy and a mechanism for
recoupment.  In the absence of a focal point for coordinated action, it was unclear how the
alleged predators could overcome cheating and free-riding problems in executing a predation
and recoupment strategy.  The Court also thought the predatory scheme to be implausible in
Matsushita, even though it involved alleged agreement between the alleged predators, because
of the inherent difficulties of orchestrating a coordinated predatory pricing and recoupment
strategy among competing firms.108
The predation theories we discuss stand on a stronger foundation of economic theory. 
Rigorous economic analysis, developed over the last 30 years and using the tools of applied
game theory, identify the economic conditions under which predatory pricing is rational,
profit-seeking conduct by a dominant firm.  Expected or anticipated recoupment is intrinsic to
these theories, because without such an expectation predatory pricing is not sensible economic
behavior.  Thus, modern theories when factually supported may sustain the plausibility of a
predatory scheme.  Finally, when modern theory has been properly briefed to the Supreme
Court in other types of antitrust cases and when the predatory or exclusionary theory is
supported by convincing factual evidence, the Court has been willing to follow modern
theory.109
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 225.110
          2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 363a (Rev. Ed. 1995).  Some111
courts have required a showing that the antitrust violation be the “predominant cause,” but this view appears
excessive and has been criticized.  Id.
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3. Probable Recoupment
 Under Brooke and Matsushita a predatory scheme, however plausible and well
supported by ex ante evidence,  violates the antitrust laws only if the ex post evidence shows
that the alleged predatory pricing (1) excludes or disciplines rivals or potential rivals, and (2)
thereby injures competition and consumers by enabling the predator to raise prices or lower
quality, or dangerously threatens to do so.  The exclusion or disciplining of rivals is the
intended instrument of the predatory scheme and the future raising of prices is its anticipated
effect.  Together they establish that the predatory scheme is not only plausible in itself, but had
its planned effect on rivals and injures consumers either now or in the foreseeable future.  We
discuss the two effects separately for clarity of analysis.
Exclusionary Effect on Rivals.  The means by which  predatory pricing works its
ultimate injury to consumers is through its exclusionary effect on rivals or potential rivals. 
Exclusionary effects involve either the exclusion of a rival or potential rival from the market,
or the disciplining of the rival's competitive conduct.  At a minimum this requires proof that
the below-cost pricing was capable of achieving its intended exclusionary effect on rivals, as
the Supreme Court noted in Brooke.    While such pricing must have been a substantial110
factor in producing this result, the defendant’s low prices need not have been the exclusive
cause of the victim’s market exclusion or threatened exclusion; and indeed other factors may
have contributed, such as increased raw material costs or reduced demand.  It suffices to show
that the alleged unlawful conduct was a “material cause,” “a substantially contributing factor,”
or “among the more important causes.”    On the other hand, predation that was only “a111
          Proof that the predatory price was a substantial factor in causing the victim’s injury is the normal112
requirement in antitrust cases because proof that an act is the sole or predominant cause of the injury might
preclude effective enforcement.  See Zenith Radio v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Irvin
Industries, Inc. v. Aerospace Corp., 974 F.2d 241,245 (2nd Cir. 1992); see generally 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note _ , ¶657.
          See Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal113
Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738, 741(describing “classical view”); Ordover & Willig, supra note _ , at 9;
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 373 (1988).
          See Brooke, 509 U.S. at 223-225, 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 723a; BORK, THE114
ANTITRUST PARADOX 144, Milgrom & Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS supra note    at 112.
      While Brooke held that disciplining predation can clearly violate the Robinson-Patman Act, some115
might question whether it also violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act because predation that does not exclude
rivals will not increase market concentration.  Cf.  Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. SuperValu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d
1409, 1416 (7  Cir. 1989) (price disciplining by firm without individual monopoly power that reducesth
competition through joint action in oligopolistic market not within Sherman Act).  However, when a single
firm (or group of firms acting pursuant to agreement) have monopoly power or the dangerous probability of
getting it, disciplining predation which inhibits competitive pricing by rivals may intensify or maintain such
power,  and hence violate the Sherman Act.  See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 391 (1956) (monopoly power as power to control price);  Indiana Grocery, supra note    , at 1414 
(monopoly power as “ability to cut back the market’s total output and so raise price.”)   By contrast in Brooke
the predatory pricing claim necessarily rested on the Robinson-Patman Act because single firm dominance was
lacking and the power to raise prices required the cooperative action of several firms without agreement.
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minor contributing factor” to the victim’s forced exclusion or threatened exclusion would be
insufficient to establish an exclusionary effect.112
A second type of exclusionary effect is the disciplining of rivals.  In this case the rivals
are not excluded from the market, but their competitive conduct is inhibited.  While some
writers define predatory pricing solely in terms of rival exclusion,  disciplining of rivals is a113
well accepted anticompetitive effect, particularly by legal authorities.   In fact, the114
disciplining of rivals is itself exclusionary since its object is to exclude the growth and
expansion of the prey or the prey’s entry into new markets.  Proof of a disciplining effect
requires the plaintiff to show (1) the victim is a rival firm whose competition threatens or
potentially threatens the profits of the predator, (2) following the period of below cost pricing
the victim raised its prices, became less aggressive or otherwise restrained its competitive
conduct, or that the below-cost pricing was capable of producing this result,  and (3) the
below-cost pricing was a substantial factor in causing these exclusionary effects.115
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The Brooke case provides an illustration of price disciplining (although the plaintiff’s
case ultimately failed on the issue of recoupment).  The victim Liggett had introduced low
cost, unbranded cigarettes which threatened the profits of the larger manufacturers including
the defendant Brown and Williamson.  After 18 months of sustained below cost pricing by
defendant, Liggett raised its prices and essentially became a price follower.  Below cost
pricing clearly appeared to have been a substantial factor in causing Liggett to raise its prices
and to become less aggressive since it was only after five successive price cuts by defendant
that Liggett ultimately succumbed.
Injury to Competition and Consumers.  Under Brooke and Matsushita proof of an
injury to competition, actual or probable, is an essential element of a predatory pricing case. 
This requires evidence either that (1) the alleged predatory scheme caused prices to rise above
the competitive level in the predatory market or in another strategically-linked market in which
the predator has market power, or (2) market conditions and the predator's conduct makes
future recoupment likely under the alleged scheme.  Proof of actual recoupment is not a
necessary ingredient of predation since Brooke requires only a showing of probable
recoupment.  Indeed, if actual recoupment were required, a predator might be able to avoid
liability by delaying recoupment until risk of suit has passed, perhaps because the passage of
time has made it difficult to rebut the claim that other economic conditions caused the price
increase.
Consistent with Brooke, a sufficiently strong showing of an increased ability to raise
and maintain high prices as a result of successful predation could meet the  recoupment
requirement even in absence of a well-articulated strategic theory.  In such a case the evidence
will have shown that the alleged predator has excluded a rival from a market with a below cost
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price, has at least partly recouped its predatory losses subsequently by raising price, and likely
will be able to maintain above-cost prices sufficiently long to fully recoup its predatory losses. 
With such evidence of actual recoupment already in progress, it seems reasonable to infer a
coherent predatory strategy without requiring the plaintiff  to completely spell out and prove
the logic of the strategy.  The risks of over deterrence in such a case seem minimal since the
Supreme Court has made clear that the standard of proof in predatory pricing cases is
exacting, and the post-Brooke cases show that it is exceedingly difficult to satisfy that
standard, absent a persuasive theory of predation.
In contrast, we propose that the evidentiary standard for probable recoupment should
be less demanding when proof of the predatory scheme rests on a coherent strategic theory
supported by evidence of market structure and conduct.  As suggested above, Brooke permits
such an interpretation because the conclusion of probable recoupment is drawn jointly from
the plausibility of the predatory theory and the post-predation market conditions.  When, as in
Brooke, the theory is weak, the post-predation evidence must be stronger.  
Where, however, the predatory theory is robust, the post-predation evidence standard
should be less exacting, though of course still required.  Suppose, for example,  that the
plaintiff articulates a coherent theory of strategic predatory pricing based on modern economic
analysis, that the evidence shows that post-predation market structure and conditions are
consistent with the required assumptions of the theory, that the actions of the defendant and
other market participants have also been congruent with the theory, and that the plaintiff has
been excluded from one or more markets as result of below-cost pricing.  With this evidence
of post-predation market structure and conduct in hand, it seems reasonable to infer probable
recoupment.  In this way our proposal extends the existing interpretations of Brooke to enable
          See Richard Schmalensee, supra note ___, at 1021 (above cost pricing based on present costs may116
exclude dynamically more efficient rival whose costs would fall over time).
          See CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note     at ch. III; Brooke, 509 U.S. at 222-23 (price above ATC is117
conclusively lawful).
          See CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note _ at ch. III.118
          See id.119
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a plaintiff to prove recoupment based on modern strategic theory without having to show
actual recoupment.
4. Price Below Cost
The final element in establishing a prima facie case of predatory pricing is proof of
sales below cost.  A cost standard can be faulted as difficult and expensive to prove,  and also 
under-inclusive because prices above cost can be both predatory and injurious to
competition.   Despite these problems, a cost benchmark is generally necessary for effective116
business planning for an activity as ubiquitous as pricing.  Moreover, since at least 1975, U.S.
courts have uniformly followed a cost standard in evaluating predatory pricing.
The cost standards that the courts have most often used are average total cost (ATC)
and average variable cost (AVC).  Under current U.S. law, a price above ATC is conclusively
lawful, while at the other extreme, in most jurisdictions a price below AVC is presumptively
unlawful  (assuming the other preconditions of Brooke are satisfied).   A price between AVC117
and ATC is either presumptively or conclusively  lawful, depending on the Circuit.   In118
Circuits where the price is presumptively lawful, the presumption can be rebutted by other
evidence of predation,  particularly intent and market structure.   However, we shall urge119
that an incremental cost standard provides a superior measure for assessing predation.  Thus,
we would substitute average avoidable cost for AVC, and long run average incremental cost
for ATC.
This proposal follows in substantial part the recent proposal of William Baumol, who
          See Baumol II, supra note ______, at 58-59.120
          Joskow & Klevorick, supra note_____, at 252 n. 79 and accompanying text.121
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similarly urges substitution of average avoidable cost for AVC.    We agree that this should120
be the lower bound cost test.  However, we would add an upper bound cost measure of long
run average incremental cost as a substitute for ATC, a proposal originally made by Joskow
and Klevorick. .  Thus, we adhere to the dual cost approach that many courts presently121
follow, but we  reformulate the cost test to more closely approximate the theoretically correct
marginal cost standard.
Average avoidable cost (AAC) is the average per unit cost that predator would have
avoided during the period of below cost pricing had it not produced the predatory increment
of sales.  Thus, if the period of alleged predation is 10 months, AAC is the sum of the costs
incurred in producing the predatory increment over the 10 month period divided by the
quantity produced.  It is immediately apparent that AAC is a short run measure because, like
AVC, it does not include any sunk costs incurred before the period of predation (since these
are not escapable).  However, unlike AVC, AAC does not require an often controversial
allocation between fixed and variable costs, and also more closely approximates marginal cost
since AAC includes all costs that could have been avoided had the defendant not made the
predatory sales, whether fixed or variable.  Thus, AAC is both easier to calculate and more
theoretically correct than AVC.
Long run average incremental cost (LAIC) is the per unit cost of producing the
predatory increment of output whenever such costs were incurred.  More precisely, the LAIC
of a new product is the firm’s total production cost (including the new product) less what the
firm’s total cost would have been had it not produced the new product, divided by the quantity
          See Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,122
89 YALE L.J.1, at 9, n.26 (1979), quoted by Joskow & Klevorick, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 252 n.79.  Baumol used
the term average incremental cost to delineate long run average incremental cost.  We prefer LAIC because it
specifically identifies the long run factor.
          LAIC is in essence a concept of long run avoidable cost since it encompasses any costs that would not123
have been incurred had the product not been produced.
          See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note at 252 n. 79.124
          1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 77-83 (1970).125
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of the product produced.   LAIC thus includes all product-specific costs incurred in the122
research, development and marketing of the predatory product or increment of sales even if
those costs were sunk before the period of predatory pricing.    In addition, LAIC logically123
includes any costs incurred to effectuate the predatory scheme, following formation of the
predatory strategy.  LAIC is a superior cost  measure over ATC for a multi-product firm
because it does not require courts to allocate joint and common costs, an undertaking which
lacks a precise methodology and is particularly unsuited for jury resolution.   Moreover,124
LAIC measures the present worth of the productive assets by replacement cost, and not by
historic costs which may give little indication of their current value.125
Long run average incremental cost is a necessary benchmark in addition to short run
cost because sales below LAIC may reflect a strategy of sacrificing current profit in order to
exclude or discipline a rival and thereafter hold price at the monopoly level.  Such conduct, if
not otherwise explainable, is predatory and a predatory pricing rule that excluded it would be
seriously under inclusive.   
The risk of under inclusion is particularly acute for intellectual property.  A short run
cost test provides little protection against predatory pricing involving intellectual property
since after the product is developed and launched, AAC or AVC may approach or equal zero. 
In computer software, for example, the short run incremental cost of a program downloaded
from the Internet, is nil.  As a result there can be no sale below AAC.  An AVC standard does
          An equally important issue in intellectual property, and generally in multi-product firms, is the126
calculation of price.  Does the price include the value of indirect benefits received at a later time?  In predation
by a single firm the fact that the predator makes increased sales  as a result of the current predatory sales would
not prevent a finding of predatory pricing if the current sales price is below cost.  The same conclusion should
follow if predation enables increased future sales in another market.  Judged in terms of efficiency within the
market, such conduct could defeat a more efficient firm.  Thus, if a producer of software sells its product below
AAC or LAIC, and thereby increases its future sales of a complementary product, the revenues from such
enhanced future sales should not be added to the price in determining whether the price is below cost.
          See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note___ ¶ 740 (reasonable anticipated costs as test for below-127
cost sales).
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little better since the average variable costs of computer software continuously decline and
may approach insignificance as sales volume becomes sufficiently high.  Thus, the only tenable
cost standard for intellectual property must be a long run cost measure.  LAIC is superior to
ATC as a measure for intellectual property because LAIC emphasizes that the relevant costs
relate to research, development, marketing and production of the predatory product or
service, rather than to some larger category of sales.126
Cost Presumptions and Burdens of Proof.  Applying these cost concepts, we would
treat a price above ATC as conclusively lawful (following Supreme Court precedent), but
otherwise we would substitute for ATC, the similar but economically more accurate measure
of LAIC.  A price below AAC would be presumptively unlawful (assuming the other elements
of proof of liability are satisfied).  When price is below this level, the defendant would then
have the full burden of persuasion to show that the low price was necessary to achieve
competition-enhancing efficiencies.  Consistent with the standard for proof of liability,  the127
efficiencies defense would be applied from an ex ante perspective:  Would a representative
firm in the industry have anticipated the conduct to be profit maximizing in the absence of
exclusionary effects?
If the predator has priced below LAIC (but  above AAC), the burden of proof would
be divided between plaintiff and defendants.  First, the defendant would have an initial burden
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of production—of coming forward with some tangible evidence of efficiency or legitimate
business purpose.   Second, once defendant has offered such an explanation, the burden of
persuasion would then shift to the plaintiff to persuade the court that the pricing conduct was
predatory.  
Placing an initial burden of production on the defendant when price is below LAIC is
justified because the first four elements will have established not only that price is below some
measure of cost, but also that industry structure makes predatory pricing feasible, specific
market conditions facilitate and enable the alleged predatory strategy, the prey has been
excluded or disciplined, and as a result the price has increased or is likely to increase.  Such a
record properly puts some burden of explanation on the defendant.   At the same time the
presence of the specified preconditions mandated by Brooke assures that defendants will not
be required to justify all challenged price cutting since the preconditions confine possibly
suspect price cutting to a narrow range of cases.  Moreover, the defendant is well placed to
provide such an explanation since it surely has the best knowledge of the efficiencies and
business reasons for its actions.
B. Legal Elements—Efficiencies Justification
The efficiencies or business justification defense serves as a means of eliminating cases
where below cost pricing by a firm with market power is efficiency-enhancing, rather than
predatory.  In these cases the sacrifice of present profits through low pricing is justified for
reasons other than exclusion or disciplining of rivals.  The defense thus serves as a necessary
shield against an overly inclusive legal rule.  The predatory pricing cases have recognized a
business justification defense in a variety of factual settings, but have created no clear
          See CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note     at 71-76.128
          See 4A AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶976d (Rev. Ed. 1998).129
          See supra text accompanying notes ___.130
          See generally, Edward H. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to131
the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375, 437-438 (1974); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶¶
746,748 (Rev. Ed. 1996); CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note at 71-76. 
44
standards to guide application of the defense.   128
The burden of proving an efficiencies defense is generally placed on defendants in
antitrust cases on the theory that they have superior access to the information, which is under
their control.    As noted above,  in applying our approach, we would place the full burden129 130
of proof on the defendant when price is below short run cost.  When the price is above short
run cost (but below long run incremental cost), defendant would have an initial burden of
producing evidence of efficiencies, after which the burden of persuasion would shift to the
plaintiff.  Business justifications for below cost pricing may be either defensive and
competition-compelled or market expanding.
1. Defensive Business Justifications
In defensive price cutting a firm prices below its cost in response to price reductions by
its rivals or to market events outside the firm’s control, seeking to maintain its competitive
position in the market.  Examples of defensive price cutting include price reductions that (1)
meet the lower price of a rival who initiated the price cutting, (2) minimize losses stemming
from unexpected market developments, such as excess capacity, product obsolescence, or
shrinking demand, or (3) serve to maintain marketing channels or an ongoing organization, so
as to preserve existing options for resumption or expansion of production when market
conditions improve.131
Unilateral best response.  In addition, we would recognize as an additional
justification for defensive price cutting a price reduction below LAIC (but not below short run
          We are indebted to Barry Nalebuff for pointing this out.132
          If the price cut goes below short run cost, it is not likely to be profit maximizing unless it falls within133
one of the other explicit defenses, e.g. attempt to regain lost customers.
          See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note      at 253.  But such defense would not apply if the incumbent134
had pursued a deliberate strategy of investing ahead of demand to deter entry.  Id. at 254.  While in a technical
sense the price might be above short run costs, that result occurs only as an inherent part of a larger predatory
investment strategy, which would not be profit maximizing except on the prospect of eliminating competition. 
Cf. James E. Meeks, Predatory Behavior as an Exclusionary Device in Emerging Telecommunications
Industry, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 125, 129 (1998) (viewing predatory pricing in strategic terms, dominant
firm price cutting that raises entry barriers and harms potential competition is anticompetitive when it appears
probable that the low pricing will not be maintained if entry is deterred).
          The courts appear divided, however, on whether pricing below short run costs is justified in order to135
meet the lower price of a competitor.  See generally, CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT, supra note    at 74-76.  Cf. ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. V. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d sub nom; Memorex v. IBM
Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9  Cir. 1980 (per curiam), cert. denied 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Richter Concrete Corp. v.th
Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F.Supp. 893, aff’d 691 F.2d 818 (6  Cir. 1982) (below-cost price notth
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cost) that is a unilateral best response to a competitive price offered by a rival.  By a unilateral
best response we mean a price that maximizes the incumbent’s immediate or short run profit
even though its rival remains in the market.  Such a price will thus always be above
incumbent’s short run cost but may well fall below LAIC.  Under these conditions the reduced
price is simply an independently justified, profit maximizing response to the prevailing market
price.   Note that the incumbent’s price may be profit maximizing even if it undercuts the132
rival’s price so long as it remains above incumbent’s short run costs.    Typically, this is likely133
to occur when the incumbent has high sunk costs and excess capacity such that its short run
costs are  very low.134
The courts have generally upheld most types of defensive below cost pricing, as
compelled by competition.  Such pricing benefits consumers in the short run through lower
pricing and may promote long run consumer and social welfare in cases where it preserves the
price cutter as a competitor or potential competitor in the challenged market.  Indeed, the
freedom to respond to aggressive price cuts by rivals or to sudden changes in economic
conditions may be necessary to give firms the incentive to create and develop markets in the
first place.135
predatory so long as it does not undercut rival’s price) with California Computer Products v. IBM, 613 F.2d
727, 741-42 (9  Cir. 1979); Superturf v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1281 (8  Cir. 1981) (price aboveth th
marginal cost justified to meet competitive price).
In our view, the latter position is correct.  A monopoly or dominant firm should not be permitted to
sell below its short run costs (which we would measure by AAC) to meet the price of a new entrant or smaller
rival.  If the rival’s price is sustainable, it will almost surely be above short run cost.  To allow a predator to
price below its short run cost frustrates a market test based on the relative efficiency of the two firms.
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2. Market Expanding Efficiencies Defenses
In market expanding price cutting the firm prices below its cost to promote a new
product or enter a new market, entice consumers to shop at an existing outlet, reduce costs
through learning-by-doing, or increase the value of its product through network externalities. 
Such pricing is essentially dynamic in that the price cutter anticipates that lower costs or
increased marketing efficiency in the future will compensate for present losses.
Market expanding price cutting raises more difficult issues than defensive price cutting
because it involves an aggressive move that may either be procompetitive and output
expanding, or injurious to competition, excluding or disciplining rivals.  To sort out these
differing effects we suggest that a market expanding business justification defense should have
three elements:
(1) Plausible efficiencies gain.  The increased sales resulting from the below cost
pricing plausibly increases efficiencies, e.g. reduces cost through learning by doing or other
increasing returns to scale effects.
(2) No less restrictive alternative.  The efficiencies gained cannot reasonably be
achieved by a means substantially less restrictive of competition.
(3) Efficiency-enhancing recoupment.  Recoupment of the investment in below cost
sales stems from efficiency-enhancing factors, e.g. higher product quality or lowered cost,
rather than from increased profits through eliminating or disciplining a rival.
          This is consistent with existing requirements for proof of less restrictive alternatives.  See 7 AREEDA,136
ANTITRUST LAW ¶1507b.
           Promotional economies as an efficiencies defense has been criticized because a dominant firm137
typically has little need to promote its product by pricing below cost.  See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶746
(Rev. Ed. 1996).  However, we see no reason not to recognize the defense where it is justified and no less
restrictive alternative exists, even if such cases are rare.
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The defendant would have the burden of proving the first and third elements—
efficiencies gain and efficiency-enhancing recoupment.  However, the burden to establish the
second element—no less restrictive alternative—should be allocated between the parties.  In
proving the second element the plaintiff would have the burden of identifying one or more
plausible less restrictive alternatives, after which the burden would shift to the defendant to
show that such alternatives are either not feasible or not less restrictive.136
We sketch three types of market expanding efficiency defenses: promotional pricing,
learning-by-doing, and network externalities.  These are all dynamic efficiencies that explain
how the higher sales resulting from lower prices  might increase future profits even with no
exclusionary or disciplining effect.  Typically they involve new products or new markets. 
Evaluation of market expanding efficiencies may raise difficult issues of characterization.  On
the one hand, market expansion provides procompetitive explanations for recoupment of
losses from below cost sales.  On the other side, the mere presence of these efficiencies does
not preclude a coexisting predatory strategy to exclude or discipline rivals.  Thus, it is
important to show whether dynamic efficiencies alone make recoupment sufficiently probable
to justify the losses from below cost prices.   Only when this condition holds should we accept
an efficiencies defense involving dynamic economies.
a.  Promotional pricing  
A profit-maximizing firm with no exclusionary purpose might temporarily price below
its cost in order to induce consumers to try a new product.   The firm’s expectation is that a137
          Obviously, the firm must have reason to believe that the product would achieve sufficient consumer138
acceptance to enable it to recoup its losses either by raising price or through scale economies.  A necessary
condition for this to occur is that consumers would reasonably expect that current product quality indicates
continued high quality in the future.
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favorable consumption experience induced by prices below cost will increase future consumer
demand at prices above cost.  This might be the case if consumers make frequent repeat
purchases or communicate their views of product quality to other consumers by word-of-
mouth.   The promotional pricing defense is best understood through a hypothetical case.138
Illustrative Example: Tasty-Frozen Pizzas.  Tasty-Frozen, a leading manufacturer of
frozen pizzas, develops a new kind of cheese that retains its flavor and texture much better
than other frozen pizzas.  The new ingredient is much more expensive than existing cheeses,
but test market research shows that consumers prefer the enhanced pizza and would be willing
to pay for it.  However, test market research also indicates that consumers, distrustful of “new
and improved” product claims, are unwilling to try the new pizza if they must pay a higher
price.  To convince consumers that the new pizza tastes better, Tasty-Frozen considers in-
store sampling  but this is a costly and likely ineffective marketing device since in-store
congestion limits ability to reach consumers.  Instead, Tasty-Frozen introduces its new
product at the price charged for other frozen pizzas, supported by an intensive three-month
advertising campaign.  As a result, the price of the new pizza falls below Tasty-Frozen’s short
run costs (e.g. AIC or AVC).
At the end of the three months promotion, Tasty Frozen raises its price.  Consumers
remain loyal, having come to appreciate the new pizza’s improved taste.  While the
manufacturer sustains large losses during the three months promotional period, from that time
on the firm earns substantial profits from its higher prices and scale economies.  Projected
sales indicate that Tasty-Frozen will become profitable within a year.  Moreover, the company
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has no incentive to later degrade the quality of its product, e.g. by mixing the new cheese with
less expensive standard cheese, because consumers would note the change and no longer be
willing to pay a premium.   The higher quality of the new pizza has caused many customers to
switch from the lower priced brands, and the switch persists even after Tasty-Frozen had
raised prices.  Indeed, so successful is the new pizza that several of Tasty-Frozen’s low price
rivals suffer losses and leave the market.
Assume that Tasty-Frozen dominates the frozen pizza market, that brand recognition
creates entry and reentry barriers, pricing is below cost, a predatory strategy is plausible (e.g.
financial market predation), rivals are excluded, and following the price cutting, Tasty-Frozen
raises price, enabling recoupment of its investment in below cost sales.  In the absence of an
efficiencies defense Tasty-Frozen’s pricing conduct appears to raise antitrust problems.  
Proof of Efficiencies Defense.  The above facts would satisfy each of the elements
necessary to sustain an efficiencies defense.
(i) Plausible Efficiencies Gain.  The below cost pricing has caused consumers to
try the new product (and could reasonably have been expected to have this effect). 
Introduction of the new pizza has improved both product quality and variety, as shown by
consumer willingness to pay higher prices after the promotion period; and the fact that cheaper
brands of pizza continue to be offered.  Thus, successful launching of the new pizza plausibly
increases efficiency.
(ii) No Less Restrictive Alternative.  Success of the new pizza depends on
informing consumers of its superior qualities.  Sales below cost have induced consumers to try
the new product and persuaded them that its improved taste justifies a higher price.  Other
means to induce consumers to experience the product, such as in-store sampling, are costly
          Even if eventually consumers switch to the new product in such numbers as to exclude lower cost139
brands, such an informed choice by consumers would be welfare improving.
          Learning curve efficiencies could be considered within the cost element of the liability case as a future140
benefit that augments an otherwise below-cost price.  We include it as an efficiencies defense because the
complexity of its determination prevents it from being a feasible screen for prima facie liability and because the
burden of proof should be on the defendant, who controls the evidence necessary for successful proof.
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and ineffective.  The planned three month period of below cost promotional pricing is no
longer than appears reasonably necessary to inform consumers about product attributes. 
Thus, no less restrictive alternative appears reasonably available to successfully launch the new
product.
(iii) Efficiency-enhancing Recoupment.  Tasty-Frozen raised its price after three
 months and became profitable after only a year, thereby recouping, at least in part, its
investment in below cost pricing.  Tasty-Frozen’s profit stems from the improved quality of its
pizza and not elimination or disciplining of rivals, since competition from existing, lower cost
frozen pizzas remains vigorous.   Moreover, the manufacturer has a continuing incentive to139
maintain product quality since quality alone enables it to charge a premium price in the face of
continuing competition from lower priced frozen pizzas.  Thus, recoupment stems from the
efficiency-enhancing improvement in the quality of Tasty- Frozen’s pizza.
b. Learning-by-doing  
The learning curve is an empirical relation showing that unit costs decline with
cumulative production experience.  The learning curve reflects the idea that learning-by-doing
can be an important source of process innovation.  In the presence of a learning curve, a
profit-maximizing firm might reduce its price below its current cost to increase its production
volume without having any predatory purpose.  By this means the firm may accelerate its
discovery of cost-reducing production methods, recouping its investment in below cost pricing
from increased profit available at a later time.  140
          Ideally, to determine whether the price cutting enhanced efficiency, we would  ask whether the pricing141
would have been profitable in the absence of rival exclusion, but there appears no feasible means for courts to
make that determination in a learning curve context.  See generally, Cabral & Riordan, The Learning Curve,
Market Dominance, and Predatory Pricing, supra note ______.
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Proof of Efficiencies Defense.  Learning-by-doing induced by below-cost sales may
achieve efficiencies gains through earlier discovery of cost-reducing production methods, but
it may also have exclusionary effects, which at the limit may create a dominant or monopoly
firm.  Thus, absence of a less restrictive alternative becomes a key factor in assessing
availability of an efficiencies defense.  This requires proof that other means of achieving
learning curve economies are more costly, for example mentoring by other workers, class
room training, process R&D, or producing to inventory.  In addition, the period of below-cost
pricing must be no longer than reasonably necessary to achieve the learning economies.
Finally, to prove efficiency-enhancing recoupment the firm must show that accelerated
production enabled it to achieve important cost savings, and that its rivals, producing at lower
volume did not achieve similar cost savings during the same time period.  Proof of such facts
would tend to establish that below-cost pricing was necessary to induce the savings in
production cost.141
c. Network Externalities.  
A network externality occurs when a consumer’s valuation of a product increases with
the number of other consumers using the product.  An example is a telephone network, where
the value of the network to a user increases with the number of connected telephone users. 
The procompetitive rationale for below-cost pricing in cases involving network externalities
bears similarities to both promotional pricing and learning-by-doing.  The rationale is similar to
that for promotional pricing because future demand increases with added current sales.  The
rationale is similar to learning-by-doing because demand depends on cumulative sales.
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When network externalities are present a profit maximizing firm might initially price a
product below cost in order to establish a large installed base of users, and thereby increase
demand for its product.  Moreover, the firm might do this for procompetitive reasons and
without any exclusionary purpose.  Such a procompetitive effect might occur, for example, if
(1) the firm had reason to expect that an installed base would  significantly increase the
demand for its product, (2) a large installed base would increase availability of complementary
products and services, augmenting the value of the basic product, (3) as a result, consumers
would value the product more highly, enabling the firm to recoup its investment in below cost
pricing, and (4) the period of below-cost pricing extends no longer than reasonably necessary
to achieve the installed-base network economies.  As in the case of learning curve economies,
the presence of a less restrictive alternative is likely to be a key issue.
An example of network externalities would be a new battery for electric cars that
requires a network of service stations with specialized equipment and service personnel. 
Assume a new technology is developed by two firms such that each requires its own specially
equipped servicing network, as well as specially designed auto engines.  Firm A develops its
battery a few months earlier than Firm B and obtains initial contracts with auto manufacturers
developing a pioneer electric car to test market in a few cities.  Firm A also induces a small
number of service stations to buy the necessary equipment and train personnel.  When Firm B
enters the market, Firm A bids aggressively in each competitive encounter, often bidding
below cost.  As a result Firm A obtains most of the initial contracts.  Since far more cars now
have A-type batteries, few service stations are willing to invest in the specialized equipment
and training costs for Firm B’s batteries.  As a result, the market for Firm B’s batteries dries
up and Firm B leaves the market.  Thereafter, Firm A raises prices steeply
          See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, supra note __, at 112, 119142
(predation based on having larger war chest). 
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This example clearly involves a network efficiency since a large installed base for a
particular battery makes servicing available and convenient for consumers.  A less restrictive
alternative would, of course, have been for Firm A to price above cost.  In that event
consumers would have had a choice between two battery types and probably lower prices.  In
retrospect that alternative appears clearly viable in view of the rapid growth of the electric car
market.  On the other hand at the time of the below cost pricing the potential size of the
market was unknown, and Firm A might reasonably have anticipated that the market would
support only one type of battery.  In that event below cost pricing might have been justified as
the quickest path to a viable battery network.
Firm A clearly recouped its investment in below cost pricing, but the recoupment may
or may not have been efficiency enhancing.  If a single, quickly developed battery network was
essential to the success of the electric car, recoupment was efficiency-enhancing.  However, if
above cost pricing would have led to marketing success for two batteries, the huge
recoupment Firm A obtained would be predatory, not efficiency-enhancing.  Since counter-
factual determinations are always difficult, convincing proof should be required to sustain the
predatory finding where, as here, market expanding efficiencies are plausibly achieved.
IV. FINANCIAL MARKET PREDATION
A. Economic Theory
Financial market predation is not to be confused with traditional deep pocket
predation.  The deep pocket theory in its original form held that a richly endowed predator
would charge low prices to drive out a poorly endowed rival.   This simple form of the142
          See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 532-33143
(2d ed. 1995), (cross-subsidization of below cost pricing in one market  by setting  regulated price in second
market above socially efficient level).
          Patrick Bolton & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Predation  Based on Agency Problems in Financial144
Contracting, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 93 (1990) [hereafter Bolton & Scharfstein (1990)]; Drew Fudenberg & Jean
Tirole, A Signal Jamming Theory of Predation, 17 RAND J. ECON. 366 (1986).
          Agency problems limit the ability of outside investors to appropriate the returns from a project and145
thus may prevent the financing of otherwise efficient firms.  Implicit or explicit termination threats mitigate
agency problems by making continued financing dependent on repayment obligations or collateral.  If the firm
fails to meet repayment obligations, then creditors have the right to liquidate the firm.  Such liquidation
potentially destroys a profit stream to which the firm would otherwise lay claim.  Less drastically, the
liquidation threat may enable the lender to claim a greater share of these continuing profits through
renegotiation of the terms of the loan.  In either case, the firm’s incentive to retain a claim on a continuing
stream of profits provides an incentive to the manager to make efficient decisions and meet repayment
obligations.   See Bolton & Scharfstein (1990), supra note    at 99-100.
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theory is no longer accepted except in certain regulatory applications   because it ignores the143
possibility that profit-seeking investors would finance the prey.   Thus,  in the general case, we
must assume that capital markets are open to a profitable prey, and allow that external
financing could foil predation. 
Accordingly, modern strategic theory focuses on the relation between the prey and its
investors.   The predator seeks to manipulate that relationship and thereby drive the prey out144
of the market or deter its expansion into new markets.  A predatory strategy becomes viable
because of capital market imperfections.  In supplying capital, investors  face agency or moral
hazard problems arising because the managers of the firm  may take excessive risks, shield
assets from creditors, dilute outside equity, fail to exert sufficient effort, or otherwise fail to
protect investors’  interests. 
Suppliers of capital can mitigate these agency problems by extending financing in
staged commitments, thereby imposing an explicit or implicit threat of termination in case of
poor performance.   If the investors  are debt-holders, they threaten to liquidate the firm or145
deny new credit  in the event of default. If they are venture capitalists they refuse to extend
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additional financing when early performance is poor. And if they are shareholders, they decline
to purchase additional equity if expected returns are low due to disappointing initial
performance. Predatory pricing in product markets thus becomes possible when a predator
exploits  these termination threats to dry up the financing of a rival firm.  
Admittedly,  termination threats are blunt instruments and investors in principle could
shield themselves more effectively by making the financing contract dependent on the firm’s
realized profits in a more discerning way.  But generally, more sophisticated contractual
agreements which attempt to discriminate between different causes of poor financial
performance fail because the firm’s accounting profit is manipulable and therefore not reliable. 
The true economic profit of the firm is not perfectly observable by an outsider, and even if it
were, it could not be verified by a court sufficient for use as a condition in a financing
contract. 
Agency problems are  particularly acute in the financing of new enterprises.  Typically,
there is great uncertainty about cash flow in the beginning stages of a new enterprise. 
Investment in a new or expanding firm may encounter initial losses or lower than expected
profit.  These losses may be unavoidable start-up costs, never fully foreseeable, or may be due
to agency abuse.  Lenders can mitigate moral hazard problems by requiring collateral and by
agreeing to extend financing (in staged commitments) only when the firms’ initial performance
is adequate.  In many instances lenders commit explicitly to further financing, contingent on
verifiable performance (as in venture capital contracts), but more commonly the agreement to 
          See  Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 92 J.146
POL. ECON. 155-78 (1989);  Douglas Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON.
829-862 (1989);  Oliver Hart and John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human
Capital, 109 QUART. J. ECON. 841-79 (1994);  Jonathan Thomas and Tim Worrall, Foreign Direct Investment
and the Risk of Expropriation, 61 REV. ECON. STUD. 81-108 (1994).
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extend additional financing is implicit .  When the promise of new financing is implicit, firms146
can only obtain new funding if the new investment is perceived to be sufficiently profitable by
the lender and if the lender has adequate protection against agency abuse. Thus, to obtain
additional financing in a later period, the borrower must be able to put up a significant fraction
of its own capital as collateral, as well as meet its existing financial obligations. 
Financial contracts that guard against agency abuse may invite predation. A predator
may slash price to drain the prey of sufficient funds to meet its loan commitments, thereby
forcing default. Less drastically, the predator may be able to lower the prey’s earnings and
thus to impair the prey’s debt capacity by limiting the amount of collateral it can put up.  In
addition, reduced earnings exacerbate future agency problems by forcing the prey to pledge a
bigger share of future  profits to its’ outside investors and creditors. As a result the firm’s
manager would have less incentive to maximize profits. Finally, lower earnings may cause the
lenders to wrongly believe that the firms’ profits are likely to be lower or riskier in the future
and therefore to stiffen their lending terms.
   It might at first appear that a lender could easily counter predation by agreeing to
finance the prey irrespective of its ability to meet scheduled loan repayments; and that the
predator, anticipating the lender’s counter strategy, would realize that financial predation
cannot succeed.  However, a lender will not ordinarily make such a commitment because to
          In an attempt to forestall predation, lenders may write financial contracts that are less sensitive to147
performance, as is shown in Bolton & Scharfstein (1990), supra note     at 102, but they will not choose to
make the contract independent of performance even if renegotiation of the loan contract is permitted.  See also
Christopher Snyder, Negotiation and Renegotiation of Optimal Financial Contracts Under the Threat of
Predation , 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 325 (1996). 
          The lender's right to funding would depend on the court's determination (1) that predation148
occurred—a complex and difficult issue to prove—and (2) that the debtor's predatory losses caused the default,
as distinct from other factors.
          Moreover, there is the continuing risk that market conditions may have changed, making lending less149
attractive, such as a rise in the opportunity cost of credit, or lenders may have formed a more conservative
estimate of revenue streams.  Such developments, together with continuing agency problems means that new
credit may not be forthcoming to finance a profitable project.
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contribute funds to a debtor in default provides no restraint on agency misconduct . 147
Nor can lenders solve the financing problem by excusing default when caused by
predatory pricing.  The lender may be unable to determine whether the default stems from
predatory pricing or from the debtor’s poor performance because the lender lacks both full
information and the expertise available to a market insider.  Even if the lender could so
determine, the courts can verify that determination only through a costly and inherently
uncertain legal proceeding that few lenders would wish to confront.  Thus, the lending148
agreement cannot feasibly include a commitment based on the future occurrence of predatory
pricing.  And in the absence of such commitment the lender may not want to extend lending in
the event of  predation. 149
All this places the lender in a dilemma.  If the lender provides a continuing supply of
funds sufficient to deter predation, it invites agency misconduct.  On the other hand, if the
lender attempts to impose financial discipline on the firm with repayment obligations and
collateral requirements, it may induce predation.  There is no fully satisfactory solution to the
dilemma.  Indeed, the lending contract that minimizes agency problems will maximize the
          Contrariwise, the loan contract that minimizes predatory risk would maximize agency problems. 150
Thus, the lender can at best compromise between the two goals.
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incentive to prey.   Since lenders can scarcely afford to ignore agency problems in writing150
financial contracts, predation potentially remains a viable strategy.  The inability of creditors to
write optimal financing contracts in the presence of predation raises  the costs of debt and
lowers the return on new enterprise, thereby inhibiting the development of new competition
and possibly reducing economic welfare.  In a very real sense capital markets have failed since
these adverse effects follow even when it is common knowledge that new entry by an efficient
firm would be profitable in the absence of predation.
Perhaps the most insistent critique of a predatory pricing strategy is that even if the
prey is forced to exit the market, the predator has accomplished nothing because the prey’s
assets remain in the market.  Indeed, if the prey’s assets are sold at a low price, then the
successor may have a lower debt burden and therefore greater access to capital markets and a
lower cost of capital than the defeated prey.  Thus, it is argued, the predator now faces a
stronger and better financed rival than before, thus making recoupment unlikely.  This critique
is flawed for reasons we discuss in some detail in Part VII below.  Foremost amongst the
flaws are the likelihood that the acquired assets may be insufficient for the successor to
achieve a viable scale, and that attempts by the successor to gain additional financing may be
plagued by concerns about continuing agency problems and further predation.
A related critique is that acquisition of the prey by a well endowed creditor would
preclude financial market predation.  However, creditor acquisition of the prey is generally not
feasible because agency costs and measurement ambiguity frequently prevent the creditor from
          Nor does venture capital financing provide an effective answer to financial predation.  Venture capital151
loan agreements  often give creditors managerial participation rights and board of directors representation,
particularly in the event of default.  But it does not follow that the venture capital fund will be willing to
provide substantial additional funding to shore up a predatory victim.  Fund investors typically contribute
capital in staged increments, limit the fund’s investment in any single enterprise, and insist on broad
diversification to reduce the high risks of new enterprise investment.  These limitations inhibit the fund
manager from attempting to defeat a predatory strategy by buttressing the prey with additional funds when its
performance is poor.  That is to say, there is an agency problem in the management of the venture capital firm
itself that constrains the firm from adopting a predatory counter strategy by pouring additional money into a
losing investment. 
          One might speculate that an additional source of liquid capital is the prey itself, which conceivably152
could accumulate funds through agency misconduct during the previous financing period.  More specifically,
the prey may default on its loan, become insolvent or bankrupt, and then use funds siphoned off before default
to generate its own internal financing or to attract new external financing (and thereby foil predatory pricing). 
This scenario appears unlikely, however, since the original financing contract is designed to avoid such
managerial behavior.  As we have seen, the lending contract can be written to supply funds in relatively small
increments, with each increment payable only after the debtor has paid the previous loan installment.  Thus,
recourse to entirely new financing would be necessary to sustain the prey, and a new creditor is unlikely to find
lending attractive to a borrower with such a credit history.
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ascertaining the true profit of the prey, and thus determining whether in the absence of
predation, the prey is profitable.   Even if the creditor can observe the prey’s profitability, it
typically lacks the specialized expertise to manage the prey.  If the creditor attempts to gain
the needed expertise, it may not succeed, and at the very least faces a time lag, during which it
will sustain additional losses.  It might be objected that the creditor is in no worse position
than the predator.  But this objection neglects the fact that the predator is an insider, while the
creditor is a market  outsider.  Thus, the possibility of creditor acquisition of the prey will not
always bar financial predation.151
A  final possible avenue to further financing is bankruptcy reorganization, which
involves compromise and subordination of loans to give the bankrupt a chance to work itself
out of insolvency, under judicial supervision.  But the inability to make additional financing
arrangements dependent on profit confronts new creditors with the same contracting
limitations that stymied the original creditors.   Nor can new creditors rely on the bankruptcy152
          See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (15  ed. rev.).  Notwithstanding reorganization, the debtor153 th
has broad discretion in the ordinary course of operation of business and is constrained generally only by a
business judgment rule; see also EPSTEIN, NICKLES & WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 10-6 (1993).
          We are indebted to Walter Miller for advice on bankruptcy reorganization.  See Walter W. Miller,154
Bankruptcy’s New Value Exception: No Longer a Necessity, 77 B.U. L. REV. 975, 1005-06 (1997).
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court to effectively constrain agency misconduct by the bankrupt debtor.  U.S. bankruptcy
reorganization procedures do little to protect against debtor or management misconduct. 
There is no trustee and no SEC supervision.  The old management often remains in control
both during and after reorganization under the broad permissiveness of the business judgement
rule, and the reorganization plan is almost always that of the debtor.   The court does not153
supervise the reorganized firm, but acts essentially as an arbiter between conflicting
interests.154
B. Proof of Financial Predation Strategy 
Proof of a plausible strategy of financial market predation would require a showing of
five essential preconditions or enforcement screens.  Fulfilment of these preconditions would
establish that financial predation could be a viable predatory strategy.  Of course proof that
financial predation is a viable strategy does not establish an antitrust violation.  Proof of
violation would require proof of all of the elements set forth in our proposed rule.  The
preconditions are as follows:
1. The prey depends on external financing.    Dependence on outside funding creates
agency problems and contractual responses that expose the prey to predation.  Such
dependency is the typical condition of the new or expanding firm, as vividly seen in venture
          Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public155
Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 436 (1987).
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capital financing.
  2. The prey's external financing depends on its initial performance.  This is an
essential condition because unless the prey’s financing depends on initial performance, the
financial relationship between the prey and its investors and creditors would be insensitive to a
strategy of price predation.  Cash flow is the most obvious performance indicator on which
outside investors are likely to focus.  Lending contracts requiring repayment or increased
capital contributions over staged intervals are a common form of financing that exhibits the
requisite dependence on cash flow.  Similarly, new investors would be discouraged by lower
than expected cash flow.    In some cases, external financing might depend on other
performance indicators beside cash flow, such as revenues or initial market penetration.   
3. Predation reduces the prey’s initial performance sufficiently to threaten the prey’s
continued financing and viability.  Predatory risk must be of sufficient magnitude and
probability to affect the supply of further financing, thereby threatening the prey’s financial
viability.  These conditions reasonably would be present in many cases, and might be
demonstrated by the prey’s business plan.
4. The predator understands the prey’s dependence on external financing.  Perhaps an
obvious point, the predator must know that the prey’s viability depends on outside funding, or
can be assumed to know, based on easily accessible facts or rational conjecture.  Sometimes
this may be common knowledge, as in airline markets, where all firms require  outside funding
to finance aircraft purchases.   Alternatively, funding dependency may be disclosed in public155
          Cf. Judith A. Chevalier, Capital Structure and Product-Market Competition: Empirical Evidence156
from the Supermarket Industry, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 415, 433-34 (1995) (highly leveraged supermarket chains
priced non-aggressively).
      An additional condition might be added for widely held firms requiring that the managers’ interests in157
pursuing a predatory price war be aligned with the long term interests of shareholders.  Short of that, the
objection could be made that subordinate managers might be unwilling to carry out a top management or
controlling shareholder’s decision to predate.  See JOHN C. LOTT, JR. supra note __.   But such a failure of
internal controls within the firm is unlikely in view of the many ways superior managers or concentrated
control groups may reward or punish subordinate managers.  Moreover, the presence of objective facts showing
a scheme of financial predation and supporting evidence, exclusion of rivals, probable recoupment, and below
cost pricing should convincingly refute any claim  that agency problems prevented predation.  Hence, proof of
such an internal agency problem should be left to affirmative proof by the alleged predator in the rare case
where it might arise. See infra text accompanying notes ___ for a more detailed discussion.
          Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 609 (Fall 1995)158
[hereafter Hazlett article].
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SEC filings or discoverable through simple investigation.  In other cases knowledge may be
inferred from the predator’s conduct or its internal documents.
5. The predator can finance predation internally or has substantially better access to
external credit than the prey.  This is a necessary assumption because unless the predator has
superior access to credit or internal funding, it would face agency risks and resulting financing
constraints similar to those that confront the prey.  Indeed, the predator might face greater156
difficulties in obtaining outside funding if predation proved more costly for the predator than
the prey.  As in the case of the prey, agency and verifiability problems would impede financing
notwithstanding the ultimate profitability of the predator's conduct.  It is reasonable to assume,
however, that the predator, typically a monopoly, dominant firm or dominant group of firms,
will be less highly leveraged than the prey (and thus raise less agency risk for the creditor).  As
a result, the predator faces little danger of credit cut-off or reduction of supply, while the prey 
will be more inhibited by the prospect of a price war .157
C.  Illustration: Cable TV
A recent case study,  involving entry into the cable TV market in Sacramento,158
          Tel. conf. with Robert M. Bramson (attorney for entrant) on August 19, 1997 [hereafter Bramson159
interview, Aug.  19,1997]
          Pacific West Cable Company v. Sacramento Cable Television, No. 88-985 (D.Cal. filed Aug. 4, 1988).160
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California provides a vivid context in which to illustrate application of the strategic approach
to financial predation.  We first briefly describe the facts, and then apply our suggested
elements of proof.
(i) Factual Summary
The monopoly cable system operator in Sacramento drastically cut price in response to
successive entry attempts by two small rivals, both of which subsequently left the cable
market, after which no further entry occurred.  The second attempt was much better financed
and persisted longer, and we confine discussion to this more substantial effort.  Entrant began
with outside financing amounting to $6 million,  which enabled it to overbuild a compact159
area (the Arden district) serving 5000 homes in Sacramento.  This was the first step in a larger
plan to build out gradually to challenge the incumbent over a 400,000 home market.  Entrant
sunk its initial investment, completed its underground conduits and cables and began to recruit
customers.
 Incumbent responded with drastic price cutting (and other predatory tactics).  At least
partly as a result of the price cutting, entrant was able to sign up only a handful of customers,
and abruptly halted its effort to connect additional customers after only eight months.  For a
time entrant continued to serve the small core of customers it had succeeded in connecting,
but eventually shut down its wired cable system, abandoning non-recoverable investment
approaching $5 million.  Entrant filed suit claiming predatory pricing,  and the case was160
          Tel. interview with Robert M. Bramson on February 5, 1999 [hereafter Bramson interview, Feb. 5,161
1999].
          Wired cable would comprise a separate market for antitrust purposes capable of being monopolized if162
a monopolist in that market could raise prices significantly above the competitive level.  The high return on
investment in cable TV systems (presumably also high in Sacramento) would tend to show market power, as
would the fact that incumbent raised prices in the Arden district after entrant withdrew from cable.  While the
case study does not discuss the issue, perhaps entrant’s subsequent entry into microwave constrained prices in
the cable market, but this seems improbable.  Entrant achieved limited market penetration through microwave
(10 percent) as compared with projected cable penetration (35 percent penetration estimated for competitive
entry).  Thus, it appears likely that a substantial group of consumers with strong preference for cable remained
to be exploited.
           Hazlett article, supra note    at 611-12 (cable systems “notably monopolistic” with market value 2.5163
to 6 times capital costs).
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settled during trial for $12 million.   After its wired cable business became dormant, entrant161
successfully entered the Sacramento market by building a microwave transmitter, but its
exclusion from the cable market had a significant impact on competition (as discussed below). 
We now show how we would apply our suggested elements of proof to these facts.
(ii) Proof of Case
(A) MARKET STRUCTURE FACILITATING PREDATION
The incumbent held a monopoly of cable system service in Sacramento.  It was subject
to competition from microwave, but this was inferior in quality and severely limited in the
number of channels.   Incumbent’s monopoly power was probably also signalled by the high162
return on investment relative to replacement cost for cable TV  firms.   Substantial entry163
barriers existed in the form of high sunk costs, as well as regulatory hurdles.  Incumbent’s
ability to raise prices in the Arden sub-market after entrant withdrew would indicate reentry
barriers (at least following successful predation).
(B) SCHEME OF PREDATION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
The facts of the case provide a vivid illustration of the relevance and explanatory
          Branson interview, Aug. 18, 1997 supra note   , and Telephone interview with Thomas W. Hazlett164
(expert economic witness for entrant ) ON AUGUST 18, 1997 [hereafter Hazlett interview].   In addition, one of
the principal investors was a co-owner of an NBA basketball team (the Sacramento Kings) and also the
Sacramento Sports Association, which the investors thought might give entrant an edge in obtaining sports
programming.  4 The Bus. Journal—Sacramento (No. 36; Sec. 1, p.  21 (Dec. 7, 1987)).
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power of modern strategic theory—here financial predation.  Proof of recoupment is
established by a showing that recoupment is plausible under soundly based economic theory
and by evidence of actual effects making recoupment probable in the light of that theory.  The
evidence clearly shows that each of the preconditions for financial predation was present.
 (1) The prey depends on external financing.
Entrant began operations with $6 million in capital.  The firm obtained the funds
through a loan, personally guaranteed by its owners, who included two wealthy real estate
developers.   This financing sufficed to build an initial system serving 5000 homes.  The costs
of expanding to cover any significant part of the Sacramento market, of which this represented
barely one percent, would be staggering, and clearly would require additional external
financing.  While the two principal investors were quite wealthy, they were essentially passive
investors and were reluctant to risk additional funds in a business in which they had no prior
experience.  Instead their business plan was to rely on bank financing to raise the capital
necessary to overbuild the Sacramento market.164
(2) The prey's external financing depends on its initial performance.  
In addition to their initial $6 million contribution, the two principal investors had
obtained a line of credit from a consortium of banks to build into other geographic areas. 
Credit was easy to obtain due to the great wealth of the principals, but as indicated  they were
reluctant to risk  their personal assets at risk beyond their initial investments and loan
          Hazlett article, supra note   , at 619.165
          Hazlett article, supra note   , at 620; see also Branson interview, Aug. 18, 1997, supra note    .166
          Bramson interviews, Aug.  18, 1997, supra note     and Feb. 5, 1999, supra note   ; Hazlett interview,167
supra note.  It is of course possible that the investors had a change of heart about the project’s viability, but this
seems unlikely since their business plan from the beginning had been to obtain bank financing, without
recourse to their personal assets.
          Bramson interview, Feb 5, 1999, supra note     .168
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guarantees.  The investors’ unwillingness to draw further on personal assets meant that
expansion relied on other sources of financing, the availability of which depended on the
prey’s initial performance.  A positive cash flow from entrant’s initial operations was
potentially a source of internal financing and collateral for bank financing.  
(3) Predation reduces the prey's cash flow sufficiently to threaten
the prey's continued financing and  viability.
The incumbent's actions limited entrant's initial customer base to 170 homes, far below
the 25-30 percent penetration needed to break even.   As a result of this “pitifully low165
penetration” entrant’s cost of capital was “climbing precipitously.”   The incumbent’s drastic166
price cutting convinced the principals that additional financing would require use of their
personal credit.  The investors did not attempt to draw on their line of credit, but instead
abandoned efforts to extend the system, despite their sunk investment.   Entrant became a far167
riskier investment as a result of its low cash flow, and in the judgement of its principal
investors could not obtain outside funding on the strength of its own credit and future
potential.
 Instead entrant simply maintained a holding operation, continuing to serve its handful
of connected customers and eventually shut down its underground cable operation, into which
it had sunk $5 million of non-salvageable investment.   Of course, other factors might explain168
the entrant’s  abandonment of the cable market, such as changes in expected  profitability,  the
          At trial the defendants raised the financing issue, arguing that the entrant would have been unable to169
obtain bank credit because of increased credit costs, liquidity problems and depressed real estate.  However,
according to entrant’s attorney and its economist, these economic conditions did not arise until after the project
had been abandoned.  Consistent with that assertion, defendant offered them in mitigation of damages, not as a
liability defense, claiming that over the next four or five years when the system would have been built,
financing would not have been possible; and thus that entrant’s damages were limited.  Bramson interview,
Feb. 5, 1999, supra note     ; Hazlett interview, supra note    .
          See Hazlett article, supra note   , at 621.170
          Interoffice memorandum from incumbent’s files, dated May 31, 1998  (Court document on file with171
U.S. District Court in Sacramento, California).
          Hazlett interview, supra note   .172
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superiority of microwave as a vehicle for challenging an established cable TV system, or a
general tightening of credit availability.  The case study notes only the latter
condition—tightening of credit—but  makes clear that the incumbent’s predatory campaign
severely reduced entrant's cash flow, and hence its continued financing and viability.169
(4) The predator understands the prey's dependence on external financing.
This element is easily satisfied since the facts showed that the incumbent was
attempting to raise entrant's cost of capital so as to exclude entrant as a rival and to deter
further entry.  The whole purpose of the incumbent's price cutting strategy was to raise the
entrant's cost of capital and discourage future contributions from its investors.   Indeed, an170
internal memorandum from the incumbent's files assesses the entrant's financial resources,
focussing on the net worth of its two principals, comparing this with the resources of a
previous entrant who had also abandoned the market after severe price cutting by
incumbent.   More striking still, another memorandum from incumbent's files speaks of171
sending a message to entrant's bankers.    172
Moreover, incumbent knew that to overbuild a significant part of the Sacramento
market would take huge amounts of capital and that the entrant's main source of external
funds was its individual investors.  Incumbent could reasonably conjecture that the initial
          See Hazlett Article, supra note    at 642.173
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investors, with no experience in cable, would be unwilling, if not unable, to make such a large
commitment without additional external financing.  Incumbent also could reasonably
conjecture that possible bank financing would depend on the cash flow generated by entrant’s
initial operations.
Finally, the fact that entrant abandoned its effort to develop its existing cable market
after only a few months of losses confirms the unwillingness of the entrant and its principals to
commit additional capital even to develop a market area where they had large sunk
investment.  If entrant and its investors were not prepared to do that, they would surely have
been unwilling to make additional sunk cost investment to expand beyond the its initial sub-
market.
(5) The predator can finance predation internally or has substantially better
access to external credit than the prey.
Incumbent clearly could finance the predation internally.  It spent only $1 million on its
predatory campaign.   Such an expenditure by a profitable monopoly serving a market of 173
400,000 homes, would clearly appear to be within its internal funding capability.  This
conclusion is not diminished by the fact that it was almost wholly owned by Scripps Howard, a
strong and well-financed national newspaper chain.
(C) PROBABLE RECOUPMENT
Proof of recoupment requires ex post evidence that the alleged predatory pricing (1)
excludes or disciplines rivals or potential rivals, and (2) thereby injures competition and
consumers by enabling the predator to raise prices or lower quality, or dangerously threatens
to do so.  The two effects are related in that the exclusion or disciplining of rivals is the
          Entrant continued to use its small cable system in the Arden sub-market until the trial and settlement,174
but shortly thereafter stopped service.  Subsequently entrant sold its cable assets together with its microwave
operation.  It appears that the purchaser abandoned the cable system.  Bramson interview, Feb. 5, 1999, supra
note   .
          The entrant did subsequently enter the Sacramento market via microwave, and it is conceivable that175
entrant abandoned the cable market because it concluded that microwave would be more profitable.  But that
business decision likely was affected by  the incumbent’s predatory campaign.  The fact that microwave was an
inferior technology (much less channel capacity,  line-of-sight difficulties and weather sensitivity) suggests that
it was a second choice investment.  The main advantage of entry by microwave may simply have been that it
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instrumentality by which competition and consumers are harmed.
While there was no specific evidence showing that the predator fully recouped its
predatory losses through higher post-acquisition prices, other evidence overwhelmingly
pointed to probable recoupment, taking into account the plausibility of the strategic theory of
financial predation, the fact that the pre-entry price was a monopoly price which predation
restored, and the future losses predator avoided by preventing competition.  
Exclusionary Effect on Rivals.  The evidence showed that the incumbent’s drastic
price reductions excluded or was capable of excluding the entrant.  Incumbent’s below-cost
prices had severely limited entrant’s cash flow by limiting its customer base to an insignificant
level, raised its costs of capital, blocked its perceived ability to obtain additional capital, and as
a result caused entrant to cease expansion beyond its tiny customer base of 170 homes and
eventually to shut down altogether.   Following incumbent's drastic price cutting, aggressive
marketing and enhanced service, entrant first halted all expansion and then withdrew from the
cable TV market.  Such withdrawal caused it to lose the bulk of its $6 million investment in
the Arden sub-market.  Most of entrant's investment in that market was non-salvageable. 
Entrant of course preserved an option to reenter the Arden cable sub-market, but it seems
reasonable to conclude that entrant lost most, if not all, of its original investment.   174
Perceiving its inability to obtain external financing, entrant abandoned its plan to overbuild the
Sacramento market .175
was less susceptible to predation.  A microwave system required only one transmitter, and once that investment
was sunk, the entrant would have the incentive to remain in the market so long as price exceeded incremental
cost for the entire system.  By contrast the sequential nature of the sunk cost investment in building a cable
system made it especially vulnerable to predation
          Bramson interview, Feb. 5, 1999, supra note   ; Hazlett interview, supra note   .  Assuming the176
correctness of this information, the tightening of future credit could affect the magnitude of damages since it
might constrain future financing of the entrant.  But it would not bar liability for the credit foreclosure that
occurred at the time of violation and that led entrant to abandon expansion plans before the credit tightening
had occurred.
          It is of course possible that other factors may have contributed to entrant’s inability to obtain financing177
and its decision to leave the cable TV market, as discussed previously.  However, proof of exclusionary injury
to the antitrust victim does not require a showing that predation was the exclusive cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.  It suffices to show under varying judicial formulations that predation was a “material cause,” “a
substantially contributing factor,” or “among the more important causes.”  2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 363a (Rev. Ed. 1995).
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While we lack the data to fully reconstruct the facts bearing on exclusion of the prey, it
appears that entrant’s losses and its foreclosure from credit markets were substantially caused
by  incumbent’s price cutting.  Since the case was settled during trial, the causation issue
cannot be definitively resolved.  However, according to the information we have received from
counsel and an expert witness  the tightening of credit and other possible non-predatory causes
had not yet occurred at the time of the violation, but came later.    Under these assumptions,176
it appears likely that the incumbent’s predatory strategy substantially deterred additional
investment, and thus was a material cause of plaintiff's injury .177
Injury to Competition and Consumers.  Injury to competition and consumers requires
a showing that the predation raised prices or lowered quality sufficient to enable probable
recoupment, or created market conditions that made such effects probable.  The evidence
shows that incumbent after having successfully withstood two entry attempts, regained its
complete monopoly of the Sacramento market, and hence the ability to price without
constraint of actual competition.  Moreover, following entrant's exit from the Arden sub-
market, incumbent promptly withdrew many discounts and special services it had offered
during the period of rivalry, and after two years cancelled its entry-induced lower rate in the
          Hazlett article, supra note   , at 623.178
          Id. at 619, 642.179
          Bramson interview, Aug. 19, 1997, supra note   .180
          It could be argued that because entrant’s cable facilities remained in the ground that reentry barriers181
were low, but successful entry requires other factors beyond the cable facilities, such as programming sources
where economies of scale exist.  In addition, the reputation effect created by the successful predation might
itself serve as a barrier to entry.
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Arden district.  178
Perhaps the most significant evidence of recoupment, however, was the incumbent's
avoidance of the losses it would otherwise have faced from competition—an issue neglected in
Brooke.  By its own estimate incumbent's successful effort to defeat new entry had avoided
losses of $16.5 million per year, with a predatory expenditure of only about $1 million.  179
Moreover, no further entrants sought to enter the Sacramento market, after the initial two
entrants were rebuffed.180
The fact that the predator was able to recapture its total monopoly of the Sacramento
market, even standing alone,  appears to satisfy Brooke’s criterion of increased concentration
and entry barriers making recoupment probable.  But even if this factor had not been present,
the other evidence of market structure, conduct  and effects,  illuminated by the soundly based
theory of financial predation (as contrasted with the more speculative theory in Brooke of
recoupment by parallel action without agreement) might have justified the finding of probable
recoupment.  No longer threatened with competition from a significant entrant, the predator’s
market power was predictably enhanced.   Incumbent’s predatory attack caused entrant to181
abandon its plan to overbuild the Sacramento market and instead to enter on a more limited
basis with an inferior technology.
In addition, it is possible that incumbent’s action created a reputational barrier to entry
discouraging future potential entrants.  We discuss reputational barriers in Part V below.
          Hazlett article, supra note    at 619 (estimated cost projections by incumbent).182
          Hazlett interview, supra note   .183
          Hazlett article, supra note    at 618, 620.184
          In our proposed cost analysis the inquiry would focus on long run average incremental cost (LAIC)185
and average avoidable cost (AAC).  Price would clearly have been below LAIC since this would include not
only operating costs but any fixed costs incurred in waging the predatory expansion, such as connection of new
or switching customers and predatory promotional costs not tied to specific sales.  Price might also have fallen
below AAC because the full operating costs and sale-specific promotional costs would have been avoidable if
incumbent had not made the predatory sales.
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(D) PRICE BELOW COST
The case study does not analyze the issue of below cost pricing, but price appears to
have been well below ATC and, at least for some sales, may have been below average variable
costs as well.  Predatory pricing and related marketing efforts to prevent entrant from gaining
a viable customer base, cost the incumbent $15 per subscriber per month, which amounted to
half of incumbent's total revenue.   Operating costs in the cable TV industry comprise 55182
percent of total cost; and the overall industry profit margin is only 20 percent on revenues.   183
A 50 percent rate reduction plus other valuable allowances could well push price below short
run costs.   In any event, sales to some customers were below any measure of cost since
incumbent reduced its monthly rate in the Arden sub-market to $1 per month for basic service
with free installation for customers who were resistant to signing up with incumbent and free
color TVs for customers who had signed up with entrant.   Thus, it appears that  prices were184
below  both ATC (and long run incremental costs), and at least some prices were below
average variable cost (and average avoidable costs). 185
(E) EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE
The case study contains no evidence supporting an efficiencies defense.  But incumbent
would be permitted to show that it had a legitimate business purpose for cutting prices below
cost.  Generally, this would require it to establish that the conduct was profit maximizing in
          Additional examples of industries where market conditions would have made financial predation a186
viable strategy include Gabel & Rosenbaum, Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons
from Wisconsin, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 581 (Fall 1995); Josh Lerner, Pricing and Financial Resources:  An
Analysis of the Disk Drive Industry, 1980-88, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. (1995) (computer disk drives); Michael
E.Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J.
REG. 393 (1987) (airlines); Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929, 6 J.
ECON & MGMT. 679 (1997) (ocean shipping); Weiman & Levin, Preying for Monopoloy?: The Case of
Southern Bell Telephone, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103 (1994) (telephones); A & P, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
SERVICES (1974) (grocery chains). 
The airline industry provides a particularly vivid example where market conditions facilitated
predation..  Following deregulation, repeated entry attempts by new airlines and small expanding airlines
provoked fierce price wars, ending in almost all cases in the entrant’s exit or its confinement to niche markets. 
Airlines must invest large amounts to acquire or lease aircraft and support facilities.  This generally requires
heavy borrowing.  Because the business is risky and cyclical, lenders face difficulty in assessing borrowing
risk.  Lending is further  complicated by agency risk in determining the future profitability of the borrower and
controlling its conduct once the loan is made.  The lending problem is likely to be acute for the new or recently
established airline, which lacks a borrowing record.  The entrant will be more dependent on outside funding
than the incumbent because the incumbent can generate strong cash flow from the many markets not involved
in the price war, while entrant may face competition in all or most of its markets.  Moreover, lenders are
reluctant to finance participants in price wars because of the difficulty of predicting outcomes (and because of
the agency problems discussed earlier).  Thus, the entrant’s staying power is limited, as compared with the
incumbent.  For the same reasons the incumbent will also have greater access to outside funding.  Strikingly,
each of the preconditions for financial predation is present.  Although we cannot conclude from this alone that
unlawful price predation occurred, the facts would certainly have warranted enforcement agency investigation. 
See Michael E. Levine, supra note    .
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absence of an exclusionary or competition-reducing effect.186
V. SIGNALING STRATEGIES: REPUTATION EFFECT 
A. Signaling Strategies
In reputation effect and other signaling predation, the predator lowers prices in order
to mislead the prey and potential entrants into believing that market conditions are
unfavorable.  These are plausible predatory strategies because a firm's decision to enter or to
leave a market is necessarily based on its evaluation of expected future revenues and costs.  
Most firms contemplating entry or exit from an industry do not have all the relevant
information to determine future revenues and costs.  To the extent that an incumbent firm is
better informed than others about cost or other market conditions, or can manipulate and
distort market signals about profitability, it may be able to influence the expectations of its
     See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, A ‘Signal-Jamming’ Theory of Predation, 17 RAND J. ECON. 366     187
(1986), David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely
Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982), David Kreps and Robert Wilson, Reputation
and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1982), Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Predation,
Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982), John Roberts, Battles for Market Share:
Incomplete Information, Aggressive Strategic Pricing and Competitive Dynamics, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC
THEORY (T. Bewley ed., 1987), Michael Riordan, Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations,
16 RAND J. ECON. 41 (1985), Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J.
ECON. 165 (1987), and David Scharfstein, A Policy to prevent Rational Test-Marketing Predation, 15 RAND J.
ECON.. 229 (1984).
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rivals through its pricing decisions or other actions.  For example, an incumbent firm may be
able to induce exit or prevent entry by setting low prices if its rivals believe that the
incumbent’s low prices reflect low costs. 
Recent economic writers have developed several signaling theories—all based on the
idea that a predator's low prices may influence the prey's and potential entrants’ beliefs about
future profitability and thus induce exit or deter entry.   These theories include reputation187
effect, cost signaling, test market, and signal jamming.
In reputation effect predation the predator reduces price in one market to induce the
prey and potential entrants to believe that predator will cut price in other markets or in the
predatory market at a later time.  The predator seeks to establish a reputation as a price cutter,
based on some perceived special advantage or characteristic.  Thus, a predator trying to
establish a reputation for financial predation cuts price when it has superior financial resources
(and when the other conditions for financial predation are present).  Observing this conduct, a
rival in another market or a potential entrant rationally believes that there is a greater
probability that the predator will engage in financial predation in the other market, or in the
same market at a later time if entry occurs.  This reputation-induced belief reduces the future
entrant’s expected return and may deter entry.  We discuss reputation effect below.  In Part VI
we discuss demand signaling and cost signaling.
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B. Reputation Effect Predation
Reputation effects may be present when the predator sells in two or more markets or in
successive time periods within the same market.  In such situations one market or time period
may serve as a demonstration market, where the predator engages in overt predatory conduct,
and the other market or time period provides the recoupment market, where the predator
reaps the benefits from its predatory plan.  The predator establishes a reputation for aggressive
conduct in the demonstration market that induces potential entrants to believe that it will price
aggressively in the future when faced with new competition.  This raises entry barriers,
allowing the predator to increase prices in the recoupment market.
Although economic theory views reputation effect predation as a separate and distinct
predatory strategy, a reputation effect theory based on irrational toughness may be too easy to
assert and too difficult to prove.  Therefore, we would limit antitrust enforcement to cases
where the reputation effect augments or intensifies another, more concrete predatory program. 
In these instances reputation predation projects the immediate anticompetitive consequences
of a main predatory strategy, e.g. financial market predation or cost signaling, into other
markets or other time periods.  By linking reputation effect with a main predatory strategy we
also illustrate that the two strategies combined are even more powerful and plausible than
when considered in isolation. 
1. Economic Theory 
When a predator faces future rivals, an additional benefit of predatory conduct against
a current rival may be to discourage entry.  Indeed, prevention of future entry constitutes  the
paradigm case of reputation effect predation.   By engaging in predatory pricing against
     The behavioral dynamic works as follows.  Potential entrants perceive a risk that an incumbent that has     188
once engaged in predation will again lower price if further entry attempts occur.  Entrants observe that the
predator has already evidenced a “tough” approach to entry, and thus conclude that there is some probability
that the predator will be tough in the future.  If a second entry attempt occurs and predator again cuts price,
potential entrants will now update and increase their probability assessment that predator is “tough” The
predator knows that entrants will act in this way, which in turn increases predator’s incentive to remain tough.
Moreover, if the predator is not the only firm remaining in the market, its rivals have an incentive also to act
“tough” even if that is not their nature, so as to avoid being perceived as “soft,” and willing to accommodate
entry. Thus, reputation effect, which may be combined with other predatory strategies, as we propose, shows
how predation can act as an entry or reentry barrier.  See David Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982), supra note
__ at 253; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts (1982), supra note _ at 303.
     A formal model showing how entrants are deterred from entering a new market when they see current     189
entrants fail , even though they do not observe the predatory action, can be found in Rafael Rob, Learning and
Capacity Expansion Under Demand Uncertainty, 58 REV. ECON. STUDIES 655 (1991). This model relies on
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current rivals the predator can acquire a reputation of being a “tough” competitor — not
irrationally tough, but tough in the sense of projecting  a perceived strategic advantage, for
example lower costs, into other markets or time periods.  Faced with the prospect of dealing
with such a “tough” competitor, an existing rival and particularly a recent entrant, may be
induced to exit, potential entrants may be deterred from entering, and financiers discouraged
from backing either existing or future rivals.   The incumbent’s predatory reputation can then188
serve as an exclusionary mechanism protecting monopoly profits.  We discuss reputation
effect predation in the context of financial predation, but a reputation effect strategy can
augment any main predatory strategy.
2. Reputation and Financial Predation
Reputation effects enhance the profitability of financial predation by making entry or
re-entry less likely. Future potential entrants observing the failure of the current entrant, can
only be more cautious in contemplating entry, whether or not they recognize the predatory
nature of the price cutting.  If potential entrants  recognize that predatory pricing has caused
the current rival’s exit, fear of facing a similar fate may deter their entry.  If potential entrants
do not recognize that predatory pricing caused the current rival’s exit, they may simply
conclude that entry is less profitable than they previously thought.    Moreover, in either case189
the idea that potential entrants do not know exactly how profitable the new market is and attempt to learn
general market conditions from the performance of current entrants.  As Rob, Kreps et al. and Milgrom-
Roberts, supra note—point out, it is critical that some characteristics of incumbent firms be private
information for reputation effects to emerge when entrants do not observe the predatory action. Such
characteristics might be an unknown cost advantage (as illustrated below), a secret marketing plan, the
manager’s hidden agenda, etc.  The basic point is that there are a wide variety of reasons why an incumbent
firm might want to meet new competition by pricing aggressively. Any of these can provide the foundation for
a reputation effect.
     See generally Bolton & Scharfstein (1990), supra note _______.     190
     That is to say, higher repayment requirements lower the entrepreneur’s anticipated profit from     191
successful operation, reducing the return to effort and inducing shirking and other moral hazard effects.  See
supra text accompanying notes ___.  
            In addition, and somewhat perversely, if the predatory victim decides not to exit, but instead tries to
fight through the price war, it faces further reputational problems that may inhibit financing.  Potential
entrants and bystanders may interpret the victim’s survival as indicating that the industry is profitable.  This in
turn may trigger new entry, making the market more competitive and reducing the victim’s expected return. 
The final result may be that the victim’s financiers, perceiving the victim to face increased competition,
withdraw their financial support sooner.
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future entrants will face a harder problem convincing customers to switch since customers are
now more likely to believe that the new entrant will experience a similar outcome.  Clearly, an
entrant will find it more difficult in these circumstances to convince lenders to finance its
project.
In addition, a reduced likelihood of entry may also have anticompetitive effects on the
predator’s existing rivals.  Far from making the current rival’s position more secure, the
reduced probability of entry may actually hasten the current rival’s exit, and this may more
than offset any gain to current rivals from increased entry barriers.  This result may occur
because the reduction in the number of potential entrants means there will be fewer
prospective buyers for the victim’s assets if it fails to meet its loan commitments.  The victim’s
financiers may then project a lower liquidation value for their holdings, and this in turn may
induce the financiers to impose more severe liquidation terms, other things being equal.  To190
break even the financiers must now raise their repayment terms to offset the fall in expected
liquidation value.  But higher repayment requirements then require a tougher and less flexible
liquidation policy because they intensify the moral hazard risks the lender faces.    191
     For more detailed discussion see infra text accompanying notes ____.     192
     As Kreps & Wilson (1982), supra note __ at 254, have forcefully demonstrated, the prey need only     193
believe that there is a small probability that the  aggressive pricing rests on real economic advantage to
establish a strong reputation effect that increases future barriers to entry.
     In a separate discussion paper we show how a reputational effect can also enhance the power of a price     194
signaling strategy.  See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic
Theory and Legal Policy, Princeton University Discussion Paper (1999).
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Nor does the chain store paradox prevent a reputation effect strategy for financial
predation (or other signaling strategy).  As long as there is no well defined final period, or the
precise business motive behind the incumbent’s aggressive pricing is not perfectly known, the
“chain store paradox logic” breaks down.   Under these conditions entrant cannot exclude192
the possibility that aggressive pricing by incumbent may be an efficient business practice, as
opposed to a predatory move, and hence reputation effects may be present.  193
  In sum reputation effects may enhance the power of financial predation whenever the
predator faces successive entry, whether in a single market or across multiple markets.  In
such a situation the predatory action has a demonstration effect, which increases the
predator’s payoff, and at the same time lowers the existing rival’s payoff from attempting to
ride out the price war.194
3. Proof of Reputation Effect Strategy
Proof of a reputation effect strategy would require a showing of the following essential
preconditions. 
(1). The predator, a dominant multi-market firm, faces localized or product-limited
competition or potential competition; or alternatively, operating within a single market, the
predator faces probable successive entry over time.  Reputation effect predation always
involves two markets or two time periods: a demonstration market, where the overt predatory
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conduct occurs, and a recoupment market (or later time period), where the reputation
consequences follow.  The predator exhibits its predatory character (e.g. its feigned low costs)
in the demonstration market (or current time period) in order to induce the victim and
potential entrants to believe that predator will cut price in another market (or later time
period), thereby injuring actual or potential competition.
(2). The alleged reputation effect reinforces an identified predatory strategy pursued
by the predator, such as financial market predation, cost signaling, or test market predation. 
Reputation predation never stands alone in our proposal.  Instead it serves as an augmenting
or aggravating factor which intensifies a main predatory strategy.  We thus avoid the more
controversial use of the reputation effect theory, which would allow a predator to establish a
predatory reputation based on projecting a slightly irrational “toughness.”  In our usage
reputation effect predation always involves a projection of the immediate anticompetitive
consequences of financial market predation or other predatory strategy from the
demonstration market into other markets or time periods.
 (3). The predator deliberately pursues a reputation effect strategy.  To prevent the
legal rule from being over inclusive it is also necessary to show that the predator knowingly
adopted a reputation effect strategy.  Evidence tending to prove knowing adoption includes:
(1) proof of a corporate plan to engage in reputation predation, (2) publicizing or
disseminating information likely to induce a reputation effect, such as information showing
failure of new entry in a particular sub-market due to price cutting by the predator, (3)
suppression of information that might reveal bluffing by the predator, for example the payment
of large amounts to settle a predatory pricing suit (particularly if the settlement amount is
secret), or to acquire a complaining victim in the demonstration market, and, perhaps most
     See supra text accompanying notes ___.     195
     David Gabel & David I. Rosenbaum, Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital: Lessons     196
from Wisconsin, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 581 (Fall, 1995) [hereafter Gabel & Rosenbaum]; David F. Weiman &
Richard C. Levin, Preying for Monopoly?  The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Co., 102 J. POL. ECON. 103
(1994).
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note __ at 587.     197
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importantly, (4) repetition of the predatory action in multiple markets or over successive time
periods, which strengthens the competition-reducing belief the predator seeks to induce.
(4). The potential entrant victim observes the exit or other adverse effect experienced
by the predator’s existing rival in the demonstration market; and such knowledge is to be
presumed if it is commonly known in the industry.  Finally, the potential entrant victim must
observe the adverse effects of the predatory conduct in the demonstration market if its future
competition is to be inhibited.  Note that the potential entrant need not be aware that a
predatory strategy has caused these effects.  It is sufficient if the potential entrant simply
knows that the predator’s existing rival  has been forced from the market or has suffered other
serious economic harm.  Exclusion or other economic injury to the predator’s existing rival is
bad news for the potential entrant, even when the cause is not known, since it likely indicates
low market profitability.   Knowledge that the predator’s existing rival has left the market or195
sustained serious injury can be presumed if it is commonly known in the industry.
4. Illustration: Entry into Local Telephone Market
Two recent case studies,  involving entry into local telephone markets during the196
formative period of the Bell Telephone system, illustrate the strategic approach to reputation
predation.  While these examples occurred some time ago, they have modern implications
because they involved a network industry in which failure of initial competition led to long
enduring monopoly (later sustained by regulation).  We focus on the efforts of an independent
telephone company to enter the local market in Madison, Wisconsin in competition with the
established Bell System company.197
     See id. at 590.     198
     See id. at 591.     199
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(i) Factual Summary
Wisconsin Telephone [hereafter “Bell”] entered the Madison market in 1879.  Sixteen
years later, after the Bell patents had expired, an independent telephone company, Dane
County Telephone  (the “entrant”) sought to enter.  The market appeared attractive for entry
because  Bell had obtained only 236 customers, and these customers appeared far from
satisfied. Customers had complained of high prices and poor service, but Bell was
unresponsive.  Founded by local citizens and politically well connected with organizers, who
included Robert LaFollette, later Governor, Senator and a Presidential candidate, entrant
offered service at only one-half the price previously charged by Bell.  After only seven months
entrant had signed up 400 customers on three-year contracts, 140 more than Bell had
recruited in 15 years.  Entrant was well managed, offered good service and from the beginning
attempted to integrate the local telephone service into state and regional markets, and
eventually the national market.198
Bell responded by cutting price drastically.  Indeed, three months before entrant began
service Bell reduced price by 25 percent.  In the three months following entry Bell reduced its
rates to one-quarter of their original level and offered free service to the city government,
railroads, many other businesses, and indeed to any existing Bell customer who would agree
not to remove its Bell telephone.199
Despite these inducements, entrant continued to thrive.  After three years entrant had
850 customers to Bell’s 240.  After ten years entrant provided service to 2500 Madison
subscribers, while Bell served only 900.  Expanding into the 30 mile radius around Madison,
entrant served 3500 additional subscribers to Bell’s 250.  Thus entrant now served 7000
     See id. at 594.     200
     For example, Bell pursued a public relations campaign to undermine the financial viability of     201
independent telephone companies.  David Joshua Gabel, The Evolution of a Market: The Emergence of
Regulation in the Telephone Industry of Wisconsin, 1893-1917, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin,
1987) [hereafter Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation], pp. 157, 169.
     See Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation , supra note    , at 153-154, Weiman & Levin, supra note    , at 112.      202
These authors state that price was below the local Bell company’s average operating costs, including
equipment rental charges from the parent, American Bell (see Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note _ 149-
150).
     See MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); 3     203
AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶741e2.
     Entrant sold its assets to Bell, shortly after telephone industry in Wisconsin was brought under state     204
public utility regulation in 1907.  Bell has lobbied hard for state regulation to gain protection from
competition.
     See Weiman & Levin, supra note ___, at 119.     205
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customers in the greater Madison region to Bell’s 1150, increasing its relative market share. 
But entrant’s success was not assured.  It realized its future depended on construction of a full
toll network connecting with regional and national markets.  Lack of capital constrained these
plans.  Entrant had consumed its existing liquid capital in upgrading and expanding its local
network and had difficulty in raising additional funds.   200
Entrant’s financial problems were substantially caused by Bell’s low pricing policies
and other efforts to block entrant’s financing.   Bell maintained its low rates in Madison (and201
other competitive markets) at levels almost surely below its long run average incremental
cost,  which is the correct measure of avoidable costs for dynamically expanding high sunk202
cost industries, such as telephone markets, where short run marginal costs may be close to
zero.   Stymied in its efforts to raise additional funds, entrant was able to pay a dividend of203
only about one percent a year.  After 13 years of operations, entrant sold out to Bell at a price
that was substantially below its shareholders’ investment cost.   The buyout of local204
competitors on terms that would discourage further entry was a practice followed elsewhere
by the Bell System.205
The problems the entrant faced in Madison confronted other independent telephone
companies.  Bell followed similar pricing practices in other sections of the country, including
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note ____, at 606;  Weiman & Levin, supra note ___, at 116.     206
     See Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note _ at 247-54.  Bell also took other steps to discourage     207
financing of the Milwaukee group, including contacting J.P. Morgan, the Bell System investment banker, to
deny the group access to Eastern financial markets.  Id.
     Most of the other elements of proof appear to be readily satisfied, and in any event pose no unique     208
problems not previously discussed.  The market structure facilitated predation.  Bell held a monopoly in the
relevant Madison market.  There were entry and reentry barriers, evidenced by high sunk costs and the absence
of new entry after Bell had acquired its only existing rival, which itself never attempted to reenter the market. 
This might of course be explained in Madison by the fact that Bell maintained its low price for several years. 
But relevant to the reputation effect, entry did not occur in other markets, such as Milwaukee, where price had
not been reduced.  As for the remaining elements, price was clearly below at least some measure of
incremental cost in a dynamically expanding industry where AVC would have been a singularly poor cost
standard, and the economic case studies suggest no business justification for the below cost pricing.
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Ohio, Illinois, Upstate New York and the Southern United States.  Such practices tended to
deprive entrants in local telephone markets of the cash flow needed to finance expansion.  206
Thus, when another independent telephone company obtained a franchise and sought to
construct a rival telephone network in Milwaukee, the organizers found they were unable to
raise the needed capital.207
(ii) Proof of Case
Reputation effect predation potentially provides a supplemental basis for establishing a
predatory scheme and probable recoupment.  Therefore, we confine  our discussion to proof
of these elements.208
(A) SCHEME OF PREDATION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
The evidence showed that each of the preconditions for reputation effect predation
was present.
(1). The predator, a dominant multi-market firm, faces localized or product-limited
competition or potential competition; or alternatively, operating within a single market, the
predator faces successive entry over time.
The predator, Wisconsin Bell, was the dominant multi-market firm in Wisconsin.   No
other company had Bell’s widespread network and presence in multiple Wisconsin markets. 
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note ____, at 604.     209
     See Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note __ at 153-54.     210
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Bell held a monopoly in Wisconsin’s major city, Milwaukee, as it did in most major U.S. cities. 
At the same time the Bell system faced localized competition in many of its Wisconsin
markets, centered in small to moderate sized communities.  At one point Bell faced actual
competition in 50 percent of its local Wisconsin markets and potential competition in many
more.  In these communities, as in Madison, Bell had held a monopoly of telephone service
prior to independent entry.  While there was some coordination of entry by independent
telephone companies into  individual cities, entry did not occur simultaneously, but over time,
dependent on the action of local groups. 
(2). The alleged reputation effect reinforces an identified predatory strategy pursued
by the predator,  such as financial market predation,  cost signaling, or test market
predation.
Bell’s price cutting practices appeared to reflect a strategy of financial market
predation, reinforced by a reputation effect.  Entrant was cash constrained and dependent on
outside financing for expansion.  Bell’s price cutting tactics threatened entrant’s viability since
future success depended on expanding its network connections beyond the local area.  Bell
was surely aware of this financial need, since it faced large capital requirements itself in
expanding its network.  Clearly Bell could finance predation internally, continuing to pay a
healthy dividend throughout the predatory period.209
(3). The predator deliberately pursues a reputation effect strategy. 
Several factors support the conclusion that Bell deliberately pursued a reputation effect
strategy.  First, Bell held its Madison rates below cost for 13 years  — conduct which210
appears inexplicable in absence of an anticipated reputation effect.  Second, Bell followed a
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note __, at 607.     211
     See Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note _ at 154-55, 157-169.     212
     See id. at 153-96.     213
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conscious strategy of buying out independents only at low prices that would discourage new
entry.   Third, Bell pursued other exclusionary tactics that would have enhanced its211
predatory reputation, including a public relations campaign that implied that the independents
were not financially solvent, made wasteful investments and were overcapitalized; denial of
interconnection with the Bell system even to non-competitive independent companies;
attempts to influence local regulatory policies to weaken rivals; and at least in other sections
of the country, expansion ahead of demand.   Thus, it appears that Bell sought to discourage212
independents from new entry and expansion by establishing a reputation for price cutting and
other predatory and exclusionary actions.
(4). The potential entrant victim observes the exit or other adverse effect experienced
by the predator’s existing rival in the demonstration market; and such knowledge is to be
presumed if it is commonly known in the industry.  
Managers of local telephone companies actively exchanged information.  Indeed,
entrant’s president took the lead in attempting to establish a regional and national network of
independent telephone companies. He was in frequent contact with officers of other
independent companies in Wisconsin and throughout the Midwest, exchanging information on
the relation between the independents and Bell.  Moreover, the rate wars and bitter contests
between the independents and Bell were widely reported in the press.  Thus, the adverse
effects of the price cutting on Bell’s existing rivals were widely known within the telephone
industry, and the independent rivals easily perceived that Bell’s low pricing policy was a
principal cause of their plight.213
(B) PROBABLE RECOUPMENT
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note    , at 602.      214
     Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note at 153-54.     215
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Proof of recoupment requires ex post evidence that the alleged predatory pricing (1)
excludes or disciplines rivals or potential rivals, and (2) thereby injures competition and
consumers by enabling the predator to raise prices or lower quality, or dangerously threatens
to do so.  As we have seen, the two effects are related in that the exclusion or disciplining of
rivals is the instrumentality by which competition and consumers are harmed.
Exclusionary Effect on Rivals.  Bell’s below cost pricing excluded its existing rival in
Madison  and excluded or was capable of excluding future rivals, both in Madison and in other
Wisconsin communities.  In Madison, sustained below cost pricing, extending over 13 years,
prevented Bell’s existing rival from raising the necessary capital to expand service and
construct a toll network.  As a result the rival ultimately sold out to Bell on unfavorable terms,
receiving only a fraction of its original investment.   The rival’s financing difficulties were214
substantially caused by the low pricing, which drastically reduced the rival’s return, allowing
only a one percent annual dividend, and blocking additional financing.  To be sure, other
factors impeded the Madison rival, such as the refusal of the Bell system to interconnect, but
almost surely the below cost pricing was a significant and material cause of the Madison
rival’s exit.
The exclusion of the Madison independent was an intended mechanism to carry out
Bell’s reputation effect strategy.  The Madison independent was a prime predatory target
because its president was a leader among independents, not only in Wisconsin but throughout
the Midwest and because Madison was the state capital where legislators could observe the
benefits of competition first hand.  The sustained below cost pricing served as a “dire
warning” to potential entrants in other cities.   A later attempt by an independent group to215
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note _, at 604.     216
     For example, to impede the financing of entry in Milwaukee Bell induced J.P. Morgan to use its     217
influence to obstruct financing.  See Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note    , at 248.
     See David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 54 J. ECON. HISTORY     218
543, 567 (independents in Midwest vanquished by strategic moves “not least of which was predatory pricing”):
Kenneth Lipartito, System Building at the Margin: The Problem of Public Choice in the Telephone Industry,
49 J. ECON. HISTORY 323 (1989) (AT&T’s monopoly stemmed from managerial strategy, compromise with
rivals and ability to influence state regulators, not natural monopoly).
     Bell management estimated losses of between $10,000 and $15,000 per year.  The discount at which     219
Bell finally acquire the prey’s assets amounted to $62,000, probably not sufficient to overcome these long years
of losses.  See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note ___, at 602-03; Gabel Ph.D. Dissertation, supra note _ at 154
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enter Milwaukee failed for inability to obtain financing; and similar effects occurred in other
markets.   Thus, Bell’s intended predatory strategy both excluded its existing rival in216
Madison and excluded or was capable of excluding potential rivals in Madison and elsewhere.
While the low pricing in Madison was a substantial cause of such reputation effect
exclusion, there were other causes as well.  These included pressures by Bell on banks and
investment bankers to block financing of independents,   Bell’s purchase of telephone217
equipment manufacturers who supplied independents, and poor accounting practices by the
independents themselves.  However, whatever the impact of the other effects, economic
studies generally agree that the predatory pricing was a significant cause of the widespread
exclusion of the independent telephone companies from Bell’s markets.218
Injury to Competition and Consumers.  Reputation effect predation injures
competition and consumers because it raises entry barriers into the recoupment markets and
thereby enables higher prices or reduced quality sufficient to enable probable recoupment, or
created market conditions that made such effects probable.  A striking feature of reputation
effect predation is that recoupment occurs, not in the predatory market, at least not right
away, but primarily in other markets or in the predatory market at a later time.  The Wisconsin
Telephone case provides a vivid example.  Bell maintained its low prices in Madison for 13
years before acquiring the entrant’s assets, possibly delaying recoupment to the point where it
was doubtful that predation could be profitable in Madison itself.   Moreover, the advent of219
n.2.
     Bell actively sought regulation after passage of the state anti discrimination law for telephone service     220
(see Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note ___ , at 601), perhaps suggesting that Bell’s expected return under
regulation exceeded its anticipated return under the competition that might be induced if it could not
discriminate in local markets.
     See David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry, supra note _, at 567.      221
     Id. at 567-68 (1994); Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note __ at 604-05.  The survival of the lower cost     222
independents would surely have reduced Bell’s profits significantly.
     See Gabel & Rosenbaum, supra note___, at 597.     223
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state public utility regulation probably limited Bell’s ability to raise prices subsequently.  220
Nevertheless, viewed through the lens of a highly plausible theory of reputation effect
predation,  the evidence strongly points to additional recoupment in other markets, stemming
from reputation effects.
The dominating fact is that following the below-cost pricing by Bell in Madison and in
other markets, Bell was able to raise prices to a supracompetitive level without inducing
significant entry.  Evidence that Bell’s prices increased to supracompetitive levels appears
from the facts that Bell’s returns in competitive markets were only a fraction of its returns in
monopoly markets. and far exceeded its cost of capital.  After the collapse of the independent
telephone movement, over the period 1913 to 1935, Bell’s cost of capital was between five
and six percent, while its average return was 11 percent.  In the monopoly markets of
Milwaukee, New York and Chicago Bell’s returns were, respectively, 10 percent,  14.6
percent and 16 percent.   These large discrepancies strongly suggest a monopoly return,221
especially since following the demise of the independents, the growth rate for new telephones
fell from 20.6 percent during the price wars to 5.5 percent, comparable to the growth rate
before the independents attempted entry.   Further evidence that Bell could maintain222
substantially higher prices in its monopoly markets appears from the independents’ vigorous
lobbying effort in Wisconsin to obtain legislation to limit price discrimination by telephone
companies, which Bell vigorously opposed.223
Despite the high prices Bell charged in its monopoly markets, there was no waive of
     See David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry, supra, at 567.      224
     See id., supra, at 568.     225
     It is occasionally argued that network or other efficiencies in telephone service make monopoly service     226
more efficient.  See Markus Mobius, Death through Success: The Rise and Fall of Independent Telephony at
the Turn of the Century (MIT working paper, Feb. 17, 1999) (but see Kenneth Lipartito, supra note ___).  If
so, Bell might have had an efficiencies defense based on lower costs.  An alternative output expanding
efficiencies explanation might be that under the regime of competition existing in Madison, it is possible that
Bell achieved efficiencies warranted by a more extensive infrastructure such that the low pricing in early years
was output expanding and in later years not below cost.  Under either of these alternatives, if established by the
facts, and if no less restrictive means existed to achieve such efficiencies, Bell would have had an efficiencies
defense.   This might prevent a finding of unlawful recoupment in Madison, as well as in other markets since
recoupment would rest on lower costs achieved through rapid expansion.
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new entry into such markets.  On the contrary the high growth rate for new telephones during
the competitive period when the independents challenged Bell fell back to levels that prevailed
before the rise of the independents.    Bell regained control of the industry as the224
independents either sold out to Bell or accepted sublicensing agreements they had previously
rejected.   While Bell’s ability to maintain high prices without attracting new entry rested on225
more than one factor, predatory pricing was, as we have seen,  an important contributing
cause.
Thus, the below-cost pricing in Madison and elsewhere established a prima facie case
of probable recoupment because (1) the alleged scheme of predation was based on a highly
plausible reputation effect strategy and the factual preconditions for such a strategy were
present, (2) the predatory scheme excluded or was capable of excluding rivals or potential
rivals, and (3) the likely effect was to induce a reputation effect that raised entry and reentry
barriers in other local markets, enabling Bell to maintain its monopoly and charge high prices,
and thereby injured competition and consumers.226
VI.  COST SIGNALING, DEMAND SIGNALING AND OTHER STRATEGIES
Other signaling strategies likely to involve predatory pricing include cost signaling and
demand signaling designed to induce the prey to mistakenly believe that demand is low in a
market the prey seeks to enter.  We begin with demand signaling.
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A. Demand Signaling: Test-Market and Signal-Jamming
1. Economic Theory
In demand signaling a better informed predator reduces price to convince the prey that
market conditions are unfavorable and that aggregate demand is too low to justify either the
continued presence of both firms in the market or a major expansion drive by the prey.  The
prey, falsely inferring a weak level of demand from the predator’s low price, may be deterred
from expanding or even induced to leave the market.  While demand signaling as a general
phenomenon appears less plausible than other predatory strategies, such as financial predation
and reputation effect, test market and signal jamming predation stand on a stronger basis. 
Demand signaling generally is implausible because it is unlikely that one firm can have superior
information about aggregate demand, or that, even if that were so, a less informed firm could
not retrieve this information from price and market share information.
  We therefore confine our discussion to test market and signal jamming predation—the
situations where the predator is especially likely to have an information advantage.  Here a
predatory signaling strategy becomes quite plausible.  The victim, lacking knowledge and
experience in the market, seeks to introduce a new product or brand to compete with an
existing product.  Rather than enter all available markets, the victim may probe market
response by entering a limited “test market.”  The established firm (the predator) may attempt
to frustrate this market test by either of two predatory strategies.
In test market predation the predator secretly cuts price to reduce the entrant’s sales in
the test market, and thereby induce the entrant to believe that demand is too low to justify
market entry.  The entrant, incorrectly believing that demand for its product is low, or unable
to determine how strong the demand is, abandons further entry attempts, or enters the market
on a smaller scale.  By contrast, in signal jamming the predator openly cuts price in order to
          See generally, Steven C. Salop & Carl C. Shapiro, A Guide to Test Market Predation, 1980 (Mimeo); 227
J. Roberts, A Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 75 (Supp. 1986); Janusz A.
Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization & Antitrust, supra note ____, at 558-59.
          In numbers:  0.7 x $10,000 + 0.3 x $50,000 = $22,000.228
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distort the test market results.  As a result the entrant cannot ascertain market demand under
normal conditions, but instead is able to observe demand for its product only under the
exceptional circumstance of an ongoing price war.  Thus, the entrant’s market test is foiled,
and the entrant is unable to determine whether market demand for its product is sufficient to
support entry.227
To analyze these strategies systematically, economic theory focuses on the following
simplified story.  An entrant is trying to decide whether to launch a new product to compete
with an established brand.  The entrant does not know whether demand is high or low.  If
demand for the entrant’s new product is high, entry is feasible.  However, if demand is low,
entrant will lose money.  To enter the market at full scale is expensive.  Thus, if entrant must
make its decision without additional information, it would stay out of the market because
possible losses are too high to justify the gamble of new entry over the whole market. 
However, by test marketing its new product on a limited basis, entrant can gain sufficient
information about future sales to determine whether entry will be profitable.  The potential
gain from successful entry fully justifies the cost of the market test.  A simple illustration
illuminates the entrant’s dilemma.
Let us suppose the entrant believes that the probability of high demand is only .3, while
the probability that demand is low is .7. If demand is high, the present value of the entrant’s
expected operating profit is $50,000, while if it is low it is only $10,000.  The costs of the new
production facility are $30,000, all of which costs are sunk.  Thus, in the absence of any 
information about demand, the entrant’s expected return from entry, factoring in these
probabilities and payoffs  is $22,000,  which is less than the cost of entry $30,000.  Thus,228
92
based on this information entry does not appear attractive.
The entrant may attempt to obtain more information about demand by test-marketing
the new product at a cost of only $5,000. If the entrant could determine that demand is strong,
it would enter the market so long as its expected profit exceeds the cost of test marketing.  If
the incumbent responds passively to the test-market campaign, the entrant will be able to
ascertain demand for its product and will enter when demand is high.  However, new entry
will not please the incumbent since following entry, it earns only duopoly profits, which are
less than its previous monopoly profit.  By pursuing a strategy of either test market or signal
jamming predation, the incumbent can block or impede entry either by misleading the entrant
into believing that demand is low or distorting the data that the entrant receives from its test
market experiment so that entrant cannot determine whether demand is high or low. 
Suppose for example that the entrant’s product is of higher quality than the
incumbent’s product such that customers would be willing to pay more for the superior
product.  If incumbent can secretly cut price below its cost, a significant fraction of customers
who would have bought the new product will now stay with the old.  The entrant, unable to
see the discounts, would then be led to believe that demand is low and decides not to enter.
Even if the entrant observes the price cut, the incumbent may be able to garble the
information the entrant receives from the test market, and by that means block entry.  Entrant
seeks to determine whether customers will pay more for its high quality product.  As before,
incumbent cuts price below cost, but does so openly.  As a result, customers prefer the
incumbent’s old product.  Even if the entrant knows the incumbent’s price is below cost and
not sustainable on a market-wide basis, entrant is nevertheless unable to judge what fraction of
customers would purchase its higher quality new product under normal market conditions. 
Entrant’s test market experiment would then be frustrated and entrant may decide  not to enter
          The recent DOT Guidelines on predatory pricing follow this approach in comparing the predator’s229




2. Proof of Test Market Strategy
(1). The predator observes that the victim is attempting to enter a limited product or
geographic market with a new product or brand.  The first element is rather obvious.  The
victim must be attempting to test the market response to its product on a limited basis and the
predator must know that this is occurring.
(2). The predator secretly offers below cost prices on its own competing product or
brand, either following or in anticipation of the victim’s entry.  In test market predation the
price cutting must be secret, for otherwise the victim will not be misled into thinking that
market demand is low.  The secret price cuts include those made in anticipation of entry, as
well as following entry.  Price cuts made before entry must be included in order to prevent
easy evasion of the rule.
(3). The predator’s secret price cutting in the test market differs from its pricing
conduct in other markets where it faces competition on a sustained basis.  The significance of
the predator’s secret price cutting in the test market is illuminated by a comparison with the
predator’s pricing conduct in other markets.   It is highly indicative of test market predation229
if predator engages in secret price cutting only in the test market.  On the other hand, if the
predator’s generally engages in secret discounting in other markets, the victim should not be
misled in any anticompetitive way.  However, when the test market alone is subject to secret
discounting, the victim may have difficulty in probing market demand precisely, and may
therefore decline to enter the market.
(4). The victim could rationally believe that demand for its product may be weak in
          See David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin, Validating the Conjectural Variation Method: The Sugar230
Industry 1890-1914 (NBER Working Paper 5314, Oct. 1995) (unreliability of reflective evidence of corporate
knowledge or purpose,  as compared with internally credible evidence of corporate plans and conduct).
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the test market.  Test market predation will not injure competition unless the victim is misled
into believing that demand for its product is weak.  The victim’s own testimony is not credible
since it would have an inducement to misrepresent.  Moreover, such evidence may involve
subjective or reflective  testimony by managers about what they or their predecessors
perceived at a past time—a particularly unreliable form of evidence.   But even past230
documents from the victim’s files may be biased with a view to future litigation.  Instead, we
would test the victim’s belief by the rational firm standard: whether the secret price cutting
would mislead a representative firm in the industry.  Thus, the price cuts must not have been
disclosed publicly; the incumbent must have some “price leadership” role in the industry; and
the victim could rationally think that incumbent has an informational advantage in assessing
demand conditions.
3. Proof of Signal Jamming Predation
(1). The predator observes that the victim is attempting to enter a limited product or
geographic market with a new product or brand.  This element is the same as in test market
predation.
(2). The predator offers below cost prices on its own competing product or brand,
either following or in anticipation of the victim’s entry.  In contrast to test market predation,
in signal jamming it is unnecessary to prove secrecy since the object is simply to obfuscate the
test market results by severe price cutting.
(3). The predator’s price cutting in the test market differs from its pricing conduct in
other markets where it faces competition on a sustained basis.  This element is similar to the
third element in test market predation, and the analysis there applies here.  If the predator
          See In re General Foods, 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984).231
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normally engages in similar price cutting in markets where it faces competition, the entrant can
effectively gauge market response to its product since it faces normal competitive conditions
in the test market.  Thus, there is thus no signal jamming effect.  
(4). The victim could rationally believe that the price cutting prevents it from
effectively ascertaining demand for its product in the test market.  This element is similar to
the fourth element under test market predation except that instead of being mislead into
believing that demand is weak, the victim is unable to assess the demand for its product due to
the signal jamming effect.  The victim’s disability should, as in the test market case, be
measured by whether a representative firm in the industry would be able to assess demand
under the conditions caused by the predator’s below-cost pricing?
4. Illustration: Entry into Eastern Coffee Market
In the 1970's General Foods, the dominant seller of coffee in the eastern United States,
sought to defeat or delay entry of a rival brand by severe price cutting in selected markets.
While the Federal Trade Commission in a 1984 decision,  (made before publication of the231
first economic paper on signal-jamming) ultimately found the low pricing to be lawful, the
facts nevertheless provide a useful scenario to illustrate application of our proposed approach
to signal jamming predation.  
(i) Factual Summary
General Foods, through its well known Maxwell House brand, dominated the eastern
coffee markets with a market share of 43 percent in the East as a whole, and market shares in
various eastern metropolitan areas of up to 60 percent.  In 1971 Procter & Gamble (“P&G”),
which had not previously sold coffee in the East, sought to test market its Folger brand
          See In re General Foods, 103 F.T.C. 204, at ¶423 (1984);  see also, Hilke & Nelson, Strategic232
Behavior and Attempted Monopolization: The Coffee (General Foods) Case, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION
208, 222 (Kwoka & White ed. 1989) (hereinafter Hilke & Nelson, Strategic Behavior). The price also
appeared to be below average avoidable cost since the cost of the unprocessed bean would appear clearly to be
an avoidable cost. 
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through entry into a few, carefully selected eastern metropolitan areas.  General Foods
responded by cutting the price of Maxwell House below average variable cost in each of the
test markets Procter & Gamble was attempting to enter.  The price cutting was intense. 
Maxwell House was sold below average variable cost for a year or  longer in various markets,
and at times below the cost of the unprocessed green coffee beans.  232
Procter & Gamble had a practice of carefully test marketing brands before undertaking
large scale entry.  Following the drastic price reductions on Maxwell House coffee, P&G
made no attempt to enter other eastern markets for several years.  However, the FTC majority
dismissed the case on a finding that General Foods lacked market power.  The Commission
held that General Foods did not have market power because the relevant market was not as
FTC Complaint Counsel argued—particular metropolitan areas—but the entire nation where
General Foods held only a 24 percent market share.  In addition, the Commission found that
high excess capacity existed in coffee production; entry barriers were low; and accordingly
General Foods had no ability to exclude competitors or raise consumer prices. 
(2) Proof of Case 
(A) FACILITATING MARKET STRUCTURE
As stated, the FTC found absence of a monopolistic or facilitating market structure. 
The negative finding on market structure was not inevitable.  In fact it was highly arguable
that the relevant markets were the local metropolitan areas, which P&G was attempting to
enter.  General Foods set different prices in different metropolitan markets depending on the
strength of competition, and Maxwell House coffee commanded a premium price at the
          The high wholesale price reflected the “featuring advantage” that Maxwell House coffee commanded233
as the largest selling brand.  See Hilke & Nelson, Strategic Behavior, supra note    , at 215, n.25; see also In re
General Foods, 103 F.T.C. 204, ¶¶ 13-19.
          See In re General Foods, 103 F.T.C. at 240-42 ¶ 155-70.234
          See id. at 340-41.235
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wholesale level, catapulting General Foods’s coffee profits into the top 5 percent of profitable
firms.   However, our purpose is not to dispute the FTC’s findings on market definition and233
market power, but to illustrate application of our approach to signal jamming predation. 
Thus, we will assume for purposes of discussion that General Foods had market power in
eastern metropolitan markets.
(B) SCHEME OF PREDATION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
(1)  The predator observes that the victim is attempting to enter a limited product or
geographic market with a new product or brand.  This element is easily satisfied.  The alleged
predation is General Food’s response to the test market entry of Folger into four eastern
metropolitan markets.  General Foods reduced the price of Maxwell House in direct response
to Folger’s entry into particular markets, but did not reduce prices in other markets.  This of
course did not occur by accident, but was based on General Food’s observed entry of Folger
into the test markets.  Indeed, General Foods’s price reduction was a deliberately chosen
corporate strategy.234
(2) The predator offers below cost prices or discounts on its own competing product
or brand, either following or in anticipation of the victim’s entry.  Following P&G’s entry
into the Cleveland, Pittsburgh and Syracuse markets, General Foods priced Maxwell House
below its average variable cost (and presumably short run incremental cost) over a sustained
period.  In Syracuse price was held at this low level for seven out of nine successive
quarters.   Thus, this element is also easily satisfied.235
(3) The predator’s price cutting in the test market differs from its pricing conduct in
          See Hilke & Nelson, Strategic Behavior, supra note ____, at 224.236
          In re General Foods, 103 FTC at 297 ¶ 438.237
          See Hilke & Nelson, Caveat Innovator, 8(2) J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 213, 221 (1987) (the article238
was written after the decision).
          Id.239
          Id. at 225 n.59.240
98
other markets where it faces competition on a sustained basis.  General Foods faced long-
standing competition in all of its eastern markets since its largest market share in any
metropolitan area was 60 percent.  Yet it only reduced prices in markets that Folger sought to
enter.   Moreover, it was only within the Syracuse test market that General Foods introduced236
a “fighting brand” (“Horizon”), which had, according to the Administrative Law Judge “the
sole function to blunt Folger’s Syracuse entry by imitating its packaging.”   Folger of course237
presented a serious challenge to Maxwell House since Folger was the most popular coffee
brand in the West and was backed by a strong company.  But that only cements the proof of
this element, showing that the price reduction, targeted against the new entrant, differed from
its pricing conduct in other competitive markets.
(4) The victim could rationally believe that the price cutting prevents it from
effectively ascertaining demand for its product in the test market.  General Foods drastic
price reductions on Maxwell House appear to have clouded test results and delayed entry,
according to the FTC’s economic witnesses.   P&G was known to be a careful marketer that238
followed the practice of requiring its test markets to stabilize and show satisfactory returns
before it would expand sales—certainly a rational business approach.   General Foods priced239
Maxwell House below cost for sustained periods, thereby distorting test market results.
Moreover, the introduction by General Foods of a new brand (Horizon) further disrupted test
market sales.   Thus, it appears that P&G could rationally have concluded that the below-240
cost pricing prevented it from ascertaining market demand in its test markets.  
The other elements necessary to sustain a violation, exclusion of rivals, probable
          Id. at 224.241
          Id. at 217.242
          Id.243
          See In re General Foods, 103 F.T.C. at 250 ¶¶ 209-210.244
          See Hilke & Nelson, Strategic Behavior, supra note     at 224.245
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recoupment, price below cost and the efficiencies defense, require little discussion in view of
the record.  The FTC never reached these issues since it disposed of the case on a failure to
prove market power.  However, assuming the presence of market power, Complaint Counsel
presented evidence that would have supported findings on these remaining elements.  The
below-cost pricing has its intended exclusionary effect on rivals.  The FTC economic witnesses
in their post-predation article claimed that P&G delayed further entry into the East in part
because of these “test-market distortion effects,”  which led P&G to conclude that further241
market tests were needed.   In fact, P&G delayed wider entry, beyond its initial test markets242
for several years so that it took a full eight years from P&G’s first test market entry to
complete its planned expansion into the East.   Indeed, internal business documents showed243
that delaying the entry of the Folger brand was General Foods’s explicit goal.244
Probable recoupment was supported by evidence that after the price cutting in the
Cleveland and Pittsburgh test markets, General Foods was able to restore higher prices with
only modest loss of market share.   The resulting deferral of P&G’s entry in the East for245
several years should easily have enabled General Foods to fully recoup its predatory
investments in the limited test markets, injuring consumers by increased prices in the broader
Eastern markets  and denial of a new brand.  Below-cost pricing was established by proof that
General Foods maintained price below its average variable cost for long periods.  Thus, the
burden of proof shifted to the defendant to establish an efficiencies justification.
The alleged predator offered an efficiencies defense, asserting that it had reduced price
to meet competition from the Folger brand.  But since the predator cut price below its own
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In cost signaling a predator drastically reduces price to mislead the prey to believe that
the predator has lower costs and to exit the market.  More specifically, a predator trying to
establish a reputation for low cost cuts price below the short run profit-maximizing level. 
Observing the predator’s low price, the prey rationally believes that there is at least some
probability that the predator has reduced costs.  This lowers the prey's expected return and
causes the prey to exit. Cost signaling predation is best explained by an illustration.
Consider an industry that has only two firms. Both firms have the same costs initially,
but one firm (Firm 1) may be able to reduce its production costs through an important
technical innovation, management change, exclusive access to a cheap input, or similar means. 
If any of these events occur, Firm 1 will be able to charge much lower prices.  Suppose further
that the cost reduction will be so great that even if Firm 1 acts as a monopolist and raises its
prices to the full monopoly level, the second firm cannot compete, and must leave the market. 
A predatory problem potentially arises when Firm 1, having failed to achieve a cost
breakthrough, misleads the second firm into believing that it has succeeded in reducing its
costs.  To convince its rival, Firm 1 reduces its price to what it would have charged had it
actually made the cost breakthrough.  The potential victim suspects that Firm 1 may be
bluffing, but it can't be sure.  Indeed, if it knew for certain that Firm 1 was bluffing, it would
remain in the market, and if it knew for sure that Firm 1 had achieved the cost breakthrough, it
would quit the market because further competition would be fruitless.  But the victim lacks
certain knowledge.  Instead the intended victim must make a probability assessment, based on
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available information to determine whether its expected return from staying in the market
exceeds its expected return from leaving (and investing its capital elsewhere). 
A strategic analysis of cost signaling shows that under a range of plausible conditions,
the victim will leave the market even though it strongly suspects the predator is bluffing. 
Pursuing our illustration, suppose that if Firm 1 had made a cost breakthrough it would have
been able to reduce its previous market price from say $60 to $40, causing its rival to exit.  In
fact, Firm 1 has achieved no cost breakthrough, but still lowers its price to $40 in an effort to
mislead its rival and induce it to leave the market.  The rival, unable to observe Firm 1’s costs,
sees only that Firm 1 has reduced its price below the rival’s cost. 
The victim, observing Firm 1’s price reduction from $60 to $40, can only guess
whether this rests on a cost breakthrough.  In forming its estimate the victim will rationally use
all available information.  One important piece of information is Firm 1’s price.  If the price is
low, the victim may reasonably assume that there is some increased likelihood that Firm 1 has
been able to reduce its costs.  The victim will add this to other information, for example, the
fact that Firm 1 has recently hired a new management team, in order to make an overall
assessment.  
To see why this predatory strategy may succeed, even though the victim is skeptical
about Firm 1’s cost breakthrough, we must put ourselves in the shoes of the potential victim. 
The victim must decide whether to leave the market or stay.  The victim knows that if it leaves
the market, it can pursue other investment options.  While the victim finds these options less
desirable than its present business, they are nonetheless profitable.  Moreover, they can
presumably be pursued without risk of predatory strategies.  On the other hand, the victim
recognizes that if it remains in the market, one of two things will happen.  The victim will find
that Firm 1 has indeed achieved a cost breakthrough, in which case it stands to lose everything
  
          This conclusion necessarily rests on specific factual assumptions.  Suppose the victim’s gain from247
staying in the market when the predator is bluffing is $95,000, its loss from remaining in the market when
predator has made a cost breakthrough is - $5000, and its profit from withdrawing its capital and investing in
the next best alternative is $55,000.  In our discussion paper we show that if the victim believes the two
events—bluffing or cost  breakthrough —are equally probable, it will leave the market since the expected
payoff from leaving is $55,000, while the expected payoff from staying is only $45,000.  It is only when the
probability of bluffing exceeds 60 percent that the victim will choose to stay.  See id.
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through bankruptcy.  Or, the victim will discover that Firm 1 is bluffing, in which case it will
be able to remain in its existing profitable market.  
The victim must consider  the probability that Firm 1 has made a cost breakthrough
and its expected returns if it stays or leaves the market.   This example shows that if the246
victim has an alternative (but less profitable) investment available if it withdraws its capital, the
victim may chose to leave the market even when it thinks it probable that the victim is
bluffing.   The only way that the victim and consumers can attempt to rectify this outcome is247
by bringing, or persuading the government to  bring, a predatory pricing suit.
A limiting factor in applying a cost signaling theory is the possible inconsistency
between the low price, predatory bluffing strategy and subsequent recoupment.  Under the
recoupment requirement of Brooke, as under our proposed approach, it must be probable that
the predator can recoup its losses by raising price after the prey leaves.  However, an attempt
to do so risks revealing the signaling strategy to the prey and other potential entrants, causing
them to upgrade their estimates of market profitability.  In the absence of substantial entry and
reentry barriers, the prey or other entrants would then have an incentive to enter or reenter the
market, preventing recoupment.  Under these circumstances the threshold structural
requirement that predatory markets  have high entry and reentry barriers assumes particular
importance. 
We trace out the analysis of cost signaling in greater detail using a numerical illustration in the
appendix. A detailed analysis of how reputation may magnify the effects of cost signaling can
          The relevant cost  is variable cost, or more specifically marginal or average avoidable cost, because a248
reduction in fixed cost does not impel the firm to reduce its price, while a reduction in marginal or avoidable
cost necessarily leads the profit-seeking firm to reduce price and expand output.  In the latter case the profit
maximizing price where marginal cost equals marginal revenue is reduced due to the fall in short run marginal
cost (marginal revenue remaining constant), leading to lower price and increased output. Thus, in this instance
a price reduction may most convincingly signal reduced cost.
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also be found there. 
2.  Proof of Cost Signaling Strategy
Proof of a strategy of signaling predation would require a showing of the following
essential preconditions.  As in the case of financial predation, fulfillment of these preconditions
would establish a viable predatory strategy, but would not in itself prove an antitrust violation. 
Proof of violation would require proof of the other elements, as set forth above in our
proposed rule.
(1). Some event has occurred, known by the victim, that could have enabled the
predator to significantly reduce its variable costs.  Cost-signaling is most plausible when
there has been some development in the industry that could have reduced the predator’s
variable costs.    For example, the predator may have made an important innovation, hired a248
new management team or CEO, engaged in extensive downsizing, obtained  exclusive access
to a cheap source of foreign supply or other scarce input.  Such development would normally
be common knowledge in the industry and thus known to the victim.  However, if the event is
kept secret, the plaintiff would have to prove that it had actual knowledge of the new
development.  While cost signaling might occur without such a triggering event, we would
limit proof of cost signaling to those cases where the strategy is most likely to have been
present.
(2) At or about the same time the predator significantly reduces its price.  The timing
of the price reduction must be sufficiently close to lead an outside firm to strongly suspect that
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the price reduction stems from the observed cost-reducing event.
(3). As a result of such price reduction the victim could rationally believe that the
predator may have lowered its costs, e.g. in the past the predator has reduced price when
costs fell significantly.  The victim must have believed that the defined event could have
caused the price reduction, but the victim’s own testimony at trial is not credible since it
would have an incentive to misrepresent, and because, as we have emphasized throughout,
proof of predatory pricing should not rest on reflective evidence of subjective belief. 
Moreover, because of its self-serving nature, even  contemporaneous documents prepared by
the victim might be biased, designed to influence possible future litigation.
Thus, we suggest that the victim’s belief be tested by the standard of a reasonable firm:
Would a representative firm in the industry reasonably believe that the observed event
significantly caused the price reduction?  Such belief would be reasonable if either  (i) the
predator has in the past actually reduced its prices when costs fell, or (ii) the price reduction
followed an announcement by predator that it had reduced its costs.  Such a belief would not
be reasonable if it is commonly known in the industry that the predator’s costs have not fallen
or if the victim itself knows this fact.  Of course, the rational firm need not have reason to
believe with certainty that the predator has achieved a cost breakthrough, only that it is
significantly probable.
More incriminating evidence may sometimes be available, which would strengthen the
victim’s belief that the price reduction is predatory.  Such evidence includes (i) false
announcements of a cost breakthrough, R&D development, or other event that could
significantly reduce predator’s costs, (ii) biased cost reports or similar accounting distortions
made available to the public or to the industry, or (iii) proof of a corporate plan to engage in
cost signaling.
          See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 263249
(1981) [hereafter Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies].
          It is important to state the limitations of the counterstrategies argument and of our rejoinder.  Unlike250
the strategic theories considered in this paper, the counterstrategies that assertedly foil predation do not rest on
an equilibrium analysis—an exhaustive and logically rigorous analysis that works out all moves and counter-
moves to the described strategies.  Instead the argument is simply that the counterstrategies are plausible. 
Since no equilibrium analysis or model is typically offered, we can of course present no counter-model.  The
best we can do is to show why the asserted counterstrategies are not plausible and identify problems that the
asserted counterstrategies could overcome only by an analysis as rigorous as that contained in the economic
theories described in our paper.  Absent this, the counterstrategies do not provide basis for rejecting our
proposals.  We are indebted to Alvin Klevorick for pointing this out.
      JOHN C. LOTT, JR. supra note __, at 29-30. 251
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(iv) The possible cost reduction is of sufficient magnitude to require the victim to exit
or to limit its expansion into other markets.  The price reduction must have reasonably caused
the victim to leave the market or restrain its future growth or expansion.  The best objective
indicator of whether the price reduction had this effect is the reasonably anticipated size of the
price reduction.  Would a reasonable firm of comparable size to the prey deem the price
reduction to be large enough to induce the prey’s market exit or constrained operations?
See the appendix for an illustration of how we  apply  these criteria to the facts of a specific
case. 
VII.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND COUNTER STRATEGIES
Critics of strategic analysis suggest a variety of objections and counter strategies by
which either the prey or consumers, or market conditions, can foil predation.    These include249
(1) coalitions between the predatory victim and its customers bypassing the predator, (2)
coalitions among victims coordinating a defensive strategy,  (3) counter-threats by the victim
to enter the predator’s other markets, (4) the classic “chain store paradox” that assertedly
makes predatory strategies non-credible,  (5) customer stockpiling, (6) mutual ignorance of
the predator and the prey about market conditions, and (7) sale of the victim’s assets to a
successor firm if the victim fails.   In addition, a recent critique asserts that managerial250
compensation contracts provide no incentive for managers to engage in predation.251
     See generally, Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV.252
515, 528-38 (1985) [hereafter Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly].
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A. Possible Counter Strategies
A fundamental weakness of the asserted counter strategies is that they implicitly
assumeI. that market participants have full information or at least symmetric information.  The
consequences of assuming perfect and symmetrical information are striking.  If market
participants are fully and equally informed, and if credit markets are similarly well informed, 
for example as Judge Easterbrook generally assumes, then there is no need to pursue elaborate
counter-strategies.  The prey and its investors will see through the predator's strategy and
simply remain in the market, drawing funds if necessary from willing financial institutions.  
But this assumption rejects a fundamental premise of modern economic theory that firms
typically act on the basis of imperfect information, and that a firm is likely to know more about
its own costs and strategies than an outside rival.
In addition, the counter strategies thesis faces other impediments, including  the
possibility of effective counter moves by the predator, the limiting constraints that transaction
costs place on coordinated  group action, the free rider problem that hampers coalition
formation by predatory victims and their customers, the fact that in any customer bidding
contest the predator can generally outbid the prey since the predator earns monopoly profit if
it retains its monopoly, while the prey presumably earns only a competitive return in
competition with the predator.  Finally, a counter-coalition involving rival firms may in some
cases raise antitrust problems and may also be difficult to enforce.252
To illustrate the difficulties, the counter strategy thesis holds that an entrant can foil
predation by entering into long term contracts with its customers.  Assertedly, customers have
an incentive to sign such contracts because the entrant offers them a lower price than the
          Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note ___ at 271.253
          See Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388,254
396-97 (1987) and Joseph F. Brodley and Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies,
and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1993).
          Zvika Neeman, The Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem (B.U. Dept. Econ. Working255
Paper, 1997).  See generally, Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81
AM.  ECON. REV. 1137 (1991); Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, AM  ECON.
REV. (forthcoming).
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monopoly price they would otherwise pay.  Further, entrant can overcome any customer
reluctance to sign by making the contracts contingent on the signing of enough other
customers to assure entrant’s viability.   However, this scenario becomes doubtful when253
information asymmetry and other factors are taken into account.  To begin with, information
asymmetry may block coalition formation.  For example, in the case of cost signalling, if a
poorly informed prey is misled by the predator’s low price into believing that the predator has
low costs, why wouldn’t customers be similarly deceived, in which case the coalition will not
form?  If somehow customers are better informed, why can’t the prey discover the same
information on its own, for example by asking customers, in which case there is no
information asymmetry?
Second, the predator may have anticipated the entrant’s counter strategy by binding its
customers to long term contracts before the entrant begins marketing its product, possibly
reinforced by penalty provisions for breach.    Moreover, the predator need not bid against254
entrant for all future customers, but only for sufficient customers to make entry non-viable. 
As a recent economic paper shows, as the number of customers increases, the probability that
any individual customer is "pivotal" to the blocking of the prey becomes smaller and smaller. 
As a result the amount the predator must pay to each contested customer shrinks drastically,
so that the predator may need to pay customers very little to foil the entry attempt.  255
Moreover, as outlined above, the ability of the predator to outbid the prey and especially to
capture pivotal customers may allow it to frustrate the entrant’s contingent contract strategy.
          See Aghion & Bolton, supra note at 398; Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly, supra note     at 531-536;256
Rasmussen et al., supra note __, at 1141, 1144.
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Third, persuading large numbers of customers to sign long term contracts may involve
substantial transaction costs and encounters a free rider problem.  Each customer has an
incentive to hold back from signing the contract, preferring to let others take the risk of
provoking the predator, who is likely to be the dominant, if not the only supplier.  Customers
will naturally prefer to let others take such risks, while sharing the benefits of competitive
suppliers if entrant becomes viable.   Free rider problems are lessened, but not removed even256
if entrant makes its contracts with customers contingent on signing of enough other customers
to assure entrant’s viability.  Until the entrant has actually established its sustainability in the
market, a customer’s risk-preferred strategy is to stay out of the coalition.  Moreover, as
outlined above, the ability of the predator to outbid the prey and especially to capture pivotal
customers increases its ability to frustrate the entrant’s contingent contract strategy.
Similar problems confront other asserted counter strategies.  A coalition between the
entrant and its rivals, for example other potential entrants, such that each enters one of the
predator’s several markets, faces formidable transaction costs that hinder coordination of entry
by other entrants into multiple markets, each subject to its own particular local conditions.  In
addition, coalition formation encounters a free rider problem because each member would
prefer that others take the risk of entering the predator’s market, including antitrust risks since
the coalition divides the entry markets between competitors, and enforceability is doubtful
because an injunction compelling market entry is not feasible and damages appear highly
speculative.
A similarly unlikely counter strategy is a threat and binding commitment by the prey to
enter the predator’s other markets in response to the predator’s low price in the prey’s home
          See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note    , at 285.257
          Id., at 285-86.258
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market.   It is unclear how the entrant is to make such a binding commitment, other than by257
simultaneously entering both markets, but then it would have  doubled its potential loss and
also doubled it difficulty in raising capital.  Further, as Judge Easterbrook acknowledges, the
predator can respond, by itself making an equally binding commitment not to accede to the
multiple entry counter strategy.  Finally, if the predation is based on reputation effect, for
example reputation as a low cost firm, asymmetric information makes the strategy doubly
doubtful.  If the prey is deceived or uncertain about the predator's costs in its home market,
why would it know more about the predator’s costs in other markets or wish to increase
investment and expected losses by entering the predator's other markets?
Customer stockpiling of a price-reduced product is an unlikely counter strategy
because if  customers believe the predator's low price reflects  a sustained cost breakthrough,
why would they invest in unneeded inventory?  Even if customers recognize the price as
predatory, they may lack storage facilities or the capital to support stockpiling.  Nor will
customers know whether the price will fall further or how long the low price will endure.  The
same limitations apply to wholesale suppliers.   Such intermediate suppliers, for whom the
product may be but a small part of their operations, are likely to be even less inclined to
speculate on whether the low price is based on a cost reduction or is predatory.  Finally,
services, such as cable TV and telephone service, cannot be stockpiled at all (although long
term supply contracts are a possible substitute).
The objection is also made that the “chain store paradox” would cause multi-market
predation strategies to unravel.   The idea here is that it would not be rational for the258
predator to take losses in the last market the prey enters because at that point the predator has
          Indeed, in reputation predation if the chain is of indefinite length, there is no last period or market259
where the predator has no future reputation to maintain. In every market or period he has the same reputation
to maintain, so that if it is rational to incur losses in any one period to maintain future reputation, it is always
rational for the predator to incur these one time losses.  Note that indefinite length is not infinite length; it just
means that there is no defined last period or last market in which the interactions takes place.
          See Thomas Palfrey & Richard McKelvey, An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game,260
ECONOMETRICA (1992); Yim Joo Jung et al., On the Existence of Predatory Pricing:  An Experimental Study
of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain Store Game, 25 RAND J. ECON. 72 (1994).
          Judge Easterbrook also argues that mutual uncertainty as between the predator and prey breaks down261
the predictiveness of strategic theories and prevents predation.   But this objection neglects the strategic power
of commitment.  Taking Judge Easterbrook’s example, if the predator acts first, reducing its price to signal low
costs, it has committed itself.  It can only reverse its low price policy by revealing its own weakness (its high
costs).  Thus, the predator now has a greater incentive to maintain its low price to avoid becoming worse off
than before it initiated the price cut.  Under these conditions the prey realizes that it is futile to fight back
unless its costs are low because this would simply lead to a mutually destructive price war.  Thus, a signaling
strategy may under conditions of sequential action be as effective, or even more effective against a high cost
entrant under an initial state of mutual ignorance than when the predator has an information advantage.  On
the other hand, when the prey truly has lower costs, a prolonged price war might benefit consumers.
John Lott also raises the mutual uncertainty objection, arguing that the entrant may have an
informational advantage over the incumbent since it typically has private information on its own strategic
intentions: if entrant plans to enter, it can gain by shorting the incumbent's stock, and if it plans to exit it can
gain by buying incumbent stock. The gains the entrant can obtain through such stock trading would then tend
to introduce a countervailing effect in standard strategic entry deterrence models.  See JOHN C. LOTT, JR. supra
 note ___, at 96-116. However, there appear to be virtually no known instances of such stock speculation and it
remains unclear how important such an effect can be.  Moreover, it would apply to all private information held
by a firm about its operations and business strategy.
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no future reputation to maintain; so the prey would not be deterred from entering the last
market.  By similar logic, called backward induction, the prey would come to the same
conclusion in the next to last market, and indeed in all earlier markets.  This logic is now
questioned if there is no well defined final period in which interaction takes place  or the259
precise motive behind the predator’s aggressive pricing in not perfectly known, and controlled
experiments have failed to validate the conclusions of the theory.   For these reasons the260
counterstrategies objection is not persuasive.261
B. Acquisition of Prey’s Assets by Successor Firm
Perhaps the most insistent critique of a predatory pricing strategy is that even if the
prey is forced to exit, the predator has accomplished nothing because the prey’s assets remain
in the market.  Indeed, the prey’s assets are apt to be sold at a low price, giving the successor
lower costs than the defeated prey.  Thus, it is argued, the predator now faces a stronger rival
          See Paul Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 937; 3262
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 723a (Rev. Ed 1996) ( “drives out, excludes or disciplines
rivals”).
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than before.  But this critique is flawed.
First, the objection does not apply to predation that disciplines, rather than excludes,
the prey.  Predatory pricing properly includes cases where the entrant does not withdraw from
the industry, but is discouraged from making additional investment or developing new
products, or where other firms are deterred from entering the market.   In either case, the262
prey’s assets are not available for purchase.
Second, the prey’s sunk assets may be insufficient to achieve an efficient scale of
operations, so that the successor would not be viable without further financing even if the
assets were transferred at zero price.  An example, might be the Sacramento cable TV case
where the entrant’s built out facilities were probably not viable for a stand alone cable
competitor, due to pecuniary scale economies in purchasing programming.
Third, as a separate but related point, the objection will often not apply in network
industries, where the predator’s product has become predominant or the industry standard.  A
successor firm seeking to acquire the prey’s assets would have to reverse that developed
consumer preference, as well as perhaps assemble its own network of outlets and a specialized
work force.  This is unlikely to be an attractive investment after the industry has reached the
tipping point, favoring the predator’s product as the industry standard.
Fourth, the objection will not apply to fixed cost assets without large sunk cost
components, such as aircraft, ships, buses, and other mobile assets where reputation and brand
recognition are essential to local market success and are not available for purchase.  For
example, if a small airline is excluded from a local market, but remains in business elsewhere, it
will not wish to sell its brand name and associated reputation.  On the other hand, if the small
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airline is forced out of the industry entirely, what will its reputation and brand name be worth,
after it has suspended its flight schedule, frustrated consumers and left ticket holders with
subordinated bankruptcy claims in lieu of tickets?  In such cases the physical assets of the
failing firm may be offered for sale, but they will not be available at a reduced price.  Instead
the assets will  be sold in a wider market, perhaps national or international in scope.
Fifth, successful predation raises a reputational barrier to further entry and potential
entry since the predator’s prior predatory conduct exhibits its predatory character  to other
market entrants.  This in itself may deter an acquiring firm from exposing itself to what is now
a greater perceived risk than the original entrant faced.  The perceived risk is greater because
of the predator’s conduct.
Sixth, closely related to the last point, the successor entrant may face a customer free
rider problem.  Customers having once had their supply interrupted, may not wish to suffer the
same inconvenience again before a successor is well established.  In informational terms
customers receive new information from the demonstration of incumbent’s predatory conduct. 
The resulting uncertainty about the successor’s duration causes the customers to reduce their
estimates of the benefits of switching to the entrant.  For example, customers of a failed airline
who have lost their frequent flyer miles may not wish to take a second chance with a newly
established airline.  Thus, customers may hold back from dealing with the successor, preferring
to let other customers take the risk of interrupted supply.  But when everyone acts this way,
the successor entrant never assembles the critical mass of customers necessary to support
entry.
Finally, the objection does not apply to the firm that has the greatest incentive to
acquire the prey’s assets—the predator itself.  The prey’s assets will always be worth more to
the predator than to any other acquirer because the predator gains market power, while other
          See supra, text accompanying notes ___; see also Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the263
Acquisition Cost of Competitors, supra note ______ (price cutting by American Tobacco to force rivals to sell
out to trust at low prices); cf. Granitz & Klein, Monopolization by Raising Rival’s Costs: The Standard Oil
Case, supra note __ (purchase of rivals weakened by predatory conduct at distressed prices).
          In the Sacramento Cable TV case a prior entrant seeking to compete with incumbent cable company264
was purchased by incumbent, as part of settlement of predatory pricing suit (which also included a 5-year
noncompete clause).  Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, supra note     at 616-617.  See also
Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Bladholm Bros. Culvert Co., 498 N.W.2d 274, 1993-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
(Minn.App., April 6, 1993 (purchase of predatory victim’s assets in non-price case)).  
          International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S.291 (1930); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.0; see265
generally, 4 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW (Rev. Ed, 1998) ¶¶ 953, 954.
          See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §18a.266
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potential buyers can expect to earn only a competitive return on the acquired assets. 
Certainly, predation followed by predator acquisition of the prey has happened in the past, as
we discuss above in the Wisconsin Telephone illustration.   But current examples also263
occur.  264
While it  might appear that the antitrust laws would bar predator acquisition of the
prey, the failing company merger exemption may shield otherwise objectionable acquisitions. 
The exemption overlooks competitive risks inherent in such acquisitions in the interests of
creditors, employees, and other corporate constituents, provided a good faith effort has
elicited no alternative offers presenting less anticompetitive risk and certain other conditions
are met.   To be sure, the acquisition would have to be prenotified to the antitrust agencies265 266
and the agencies would certainly not clear the acquisition if aware of the predatory conduct. 
But they may not be aware.  The proceeding is entirely administrative, and it is unclear who
would inform the government that the failing firm’s plight was caused by predation.  Surely
not the predator, who would have no desire to scuttle the transaction.  The prey itself is a
consenting party, attempting to salvage what it can from a failed venture, so it would also lack
incentive to reveal the predation.  Indeed, the acquisition agreement would probably require
the prey to release all claims against the predator.  Possibly a competitor might complain, but
no other competitor may exist, or existing competitors might welcome increased
          See 15 U.S.C. at §18a(2)(A).267
          See JOHN C. LOTT, JR. supra note ___, ch. 2.268
          This type of contract is now standard for executive compensation. Lower level managers also269
increasingly have  similar compensation packages, but the lower one goes down the hierarchy the more
implicit incentives in the form of promotion or bonuses matter.  See, e. g., PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, ch. 10 (1992).
          Nowadays managerial incentives are unlikely to be a critical issue since most publicly traded firms do270
have compensation packages in place which are designed to align their objectives with those of shareholders.
Admittedly, in Lott’s empirical work this issue may be more important as his sample includes a large
proportion of observations from the pre-1975 “populist” antitrust enforcement  era, at a time when managerial
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concentration, tacit collusion and anticipated higher prices.  Even if the government knows the
industry has sustained a price war, in the absence of complaint, it might simply conclude that
the market is highly competitive.  Finally, acquisition of stock or assets of less than $10 million
need not be reported at all.   Thus, acquisition of the victim by the predator is not an267
impossible outcome.
C.  Managerial Incentive to Predate
In a recently published critique of strategic analysis (which does not rest on an
assumed  world of perfect information) John Lott questions the credibility of predatory actions
by large widely held corporations when their managers do not have any apparent financial
incentive to engage in predation.   Lott is concerned that managers' compensation may be268
primarily a function of short run profit, in which case they may not be willing to incur
predatory losses. In practice, however, managerial compensation packages are designed to
align managers’ objectives with those of shareholders.  Compensation packages typically
contain a fixed salary component, a percentage of short run profits, and a participation in the
firm’s stock (through stock option plans) .   269
While managerial incentives may be a relevant consideration in assessing the
plausibility of a predatory action by widely held firms, it does not follow—as Lott
claims—that all modern strategic theories of predation are flawed because they fail to consider
managerial incentives.  270
incentive compensation was primitive. See JOHN C. LOTT, JR., supra note ___, at 29-30. 
          See Giacomo Bonanno & John Vickers, Vertical Separation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 257-265 (1988);271
Chaim Feshtman & Kenneth Judd, Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 927-940  (1987).
          Even if managers’ explicit financial interests do not appear to be in line with those of shareholders, 272
managers’ overall objectives (taking into account implicit and explicit incentives) may still be.  As is often
stressed in the managerial compensation literature, a large fraction of managerial incentives is  implicit so that
a calculation based only  on explicit contractual compensation could be highly misleading.  See e.g., PAUL
MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS, supra note __, ch. 10.
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At best his evidence casts doubt on existing theories of entry prevention relying on an explicit
commitment to reward managers for keeping entrants out (or punishing them should entry
occur) .  Besides the lack of evidence supporting these theories—as revealed in Lott's271
empirical research—there are also theoretical difficulties relating to the lack of commitment
power of such contracts (when shareholders and managers can easily change the contract
following entry if it suits them),  which cast doubt on their plausibility.  This is why we do not
discuss these entry prevention theories in our paper.  
Apart from these theories of entry prevention, which rely on the existence of explicit
managerial contracts to engage in predatory pricing,  all the strategic theories discussed in this
paper (including reputation effect theories)  are immune to the Lott critique. Indeed, these
theories only require that managers act in the interest of shareholders, when there is separation
of ownership and control. If the managerial incentive package aligns the manager’s interest
with those of shareholders, then there is no longer a meaningful distinction to be drawn
between managers and shareholders. Predatory strategies can then be considered solely from
the viewpoint of the shareholders’ interests. Thus,  as long as there is no clear evidence that
managers’ financial interests were not in line with those of shareholders and that, contrary to
shareholders, managers had no implicit or explicit financial incentive to engage in predation,
there is no reason to be concerned that managers may not want to execute a strategy that is in
their shareholders’ interest.  272
Even over the sample period considered by Lott it is not possible to find any
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statistically significant evidence that managers’ objectives in firms found to engage in
predatory pricing were not in line with those of shareholders.  Lott’s main statistically
significant finding is simply that compared with a sample of firms that were not found to
engage in predatory pricing the sensitivity of managers’ compensation to short run profits in
firms that were guilty of predation was slightly higher. That is not the same as saying that
managers in those firms had no interest in pursuing a predatory strategy.
CONCLUSION
The challenge for predatory pricing policy is to develop a legal rule that is neither
seriously over inclusive nor excessively under inclusive.  Present legal policy  is deliberately
under inclusive, and for understandable reasons.  Until recently economics had no rigorous
explanation of how predatory pricing could be rational business behavior.  Courts, applying an
ad hoc approach during an earlier time of expansive antitrust enforcement, sometimes
condemned as predatory conduct that was doubtlessly competitive.  Following Areeda-Turner,
the courts fell back on the economics that was known – static analysis in a world of perfect
information, which theory as  well as empirical studies appeared to support.  Accordingly,
courts adopted a short run cost rule that was deliberately underinclusive.  These under
inclusive tendencies became more acute, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke
when the difficulty of proving predatory pricing in the lower courts amounted to a virtual per
se rule of non-liability.  Yet at the same time Brooke with its emphasis on closely analyzing the
scheme of predation and recoupment had identified the key elements needed for a more
balanced approach.
Economic development over the last 20 years of a rigorous analysis of predatory
pricing provides the tools required to achieve a more effective legal policy.  Economics can
now explain when predation can be rational, or in Brooke’s terms when it can enable profitable
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recoupment, casting new light on earlier examples of predatory pricing.  The further challenge
for legal analysis is to develop workable legal rules to guide enforcement agency policy and
judicial decisions.  To accomplish this we propose a structured rule of reason, including a fully
specified efficiencies defense.  Under such an approach enforcement would focus on cases
where market structure and conduct makes predation plausible and where anticompetitive
effects have occurred, or are dangerously probable.  Equally important, the finding of
predation would be subject to an efficiencies justification where below-cost pricing is
necessary to achieve significant efficiencies, including dynamic efficiencies.  Such an approach,
not dissimilar in scope to what courts now apply under the Rule of Reason and non-price
predation, offers increased promise of achieving a  balanced legal policy that more effectively
protects competition.
VII. APPENDIX
 1. Cost Signaling: Theory
As developed in the text, a strategic analysis of cost signaling shows that under a range
of plausible conditions, the victim will leave the market even though it strongly suspects the
predator is bluffing.  A simple example demonstrates how this striking result may occur.  Two
firms are in competition and at the outset each has the same costs.  Each occupies a certain
market niche, for example each firm may have a core of dedicated customers or a distinct
geographic location that assures the firm's continued presence in the market despite its lack of
cost advantage over its rival.  While each firm has alternative investment options, these are
less favorable than remaining in the market.
More specifically, suppose that each firm has the same unit costs of $50.  Taking
advantage of its niche advantage, each firm sells at a price of $60, earning a profit of $10 per
unit.  Assume that each firm sells 1000 units at that price, and thus each currently earns
     Thus, suppose that to invade its rival's territory Firm 1 must incur added costs of $5 per unit, which273
would reduce unit profit from $10 to $5.  At that reduced level of profit Firm 1 would lose its incentive to
invade its rival's market if we assume each firm has alternative investments that would earn more than $5 per
unit.
          Firm 1's decision to lower price and take all of its rival's customers is straightforward.  By cutting274
price to $40, Firm 1 earns unit profit of $20 ($40 - $20), which is a smaller margin than it would have earned
had it maintained the old price of $60.  But Firm 1 earns increased profit on its expanded customer base ($20
X 3000 = $60,000).  This is its maximized profit.  If it charged a higher price, its total profit would fall (even
though its unit profit rises).
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$10,000 (1000 X $10). The competitive situation is quite stable.  If one firm sought to invade
the territory of the other, it would have to overcome the home firm's niche advantage and
would incur costs which would make such an invasion unprofitable.273
To make the signaling strategy explicit we consider two alternative scenarios,
depending on whether Firm 1 makes a cost breakthrough.  In the first scenario Firm 1 achieves
a cost breakthrough, which its rival observes.  In the second scenario, Firm 1, unable to
achieve a cost breakthrough, attempts to bluff its rival through cost signaling.  In both cases
the price reduction may induce the potential victim to leave the market.  But in the first case
— where there is a cost breakthrough — exit is economically desirable, while in the second —
where no cost breakthrough occurs — exit harms consumers and reduces economic welfare. 
We analyze the two alternatives in turn.
Case 1:  Cost Breakthrough Observed by Rival
Firm 1 makes a major technological breakthrough, such that it is able to slash unit
costs from $50 to $20.  The cost reduction overwhelms the other firm's niche advantage.  As a
result Firm 1 is able to cut price to a level that enables it to exclude its rival even when
charging the profit maximizing monopoly price.  Thus, under its new cost structure Firm 1's
price falls from $60 to only $40,  Firm 1 now captures all of its rival's customers and also
attracts new customers, expanding its total sales from 1000 to 3000.274
Case 1 provides an example of socially desirable cost signaling.  While Firm 1 has
          However, competition between customers may be distorted.  The customers of the excluded firm must275
incur the cost of switching to Firm 1, while other customers do not bear such costs.  But of course, even
switching customers benefit from the price reduction, if to a lesser degree.
     At a price of $40 Firm 1 with unit costs of $50, loses $10 per unit, or $10,000 per year in its home276
market, and up to $10,000 per year in its rival's market, depending on the fraction of the market it captures
before the rival capitulates.  However after the price war, it stands to increase its future earnings by $100,000
through its sales in the victim's market ($10,000 X 10).  (To keep the example as simple as possible, we
assume the firms only operate for two periods, the present and the future.  Discounted future profits are 10
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excluded its rival from the market, this outcome is in all respects desirable since now the
whole output is produced at a unit cost of $20 and market price has declined from $60 to $40. 
Even customers of the excluded firm are better off since they receive a price reduction greater
than the $5 dislocation or switching costs they bear in shifting to Firm 1.  Moreover,
innovation is fully rewarded by allowing Firm 1 to capture a monopoly rent legitimately
earned.  Finally, even if the second firm's exit leads Firm 1 to raise price above the old price of
$60, so that consumers are worse off, the cost saving achieved by Firm 1 may still produce an
overall increase in total economic welfare or surplus (depending on elasticity of demand).  275
Case 2:  Bluffing or Signaling Strategy
We now assume that Firm 1 has achieved no cost breakthrough, but still lowers its
price to $40 in an effort to mislead its rival and induce it to leave the market.  The rival, unable
to observe Firm 1's costs, sees only that Firm 1 has reduced its price below the rival's cost. 
The rival must now decide whether Firm 1 has indeed achieved a cost breakthrough, in which
case it should cut its losses and quit the market; or whether Firm 1 is bluffing, in which case
the rival should stay in the market.
Firm 1 has every motivation to bluff.  If it can induce its rival to leave the market, it
can double its earnings by capturing its rival's customers and returning the price to $60
(assuming entry and reentry barriers).  To be sure, Firm 1 must bear the costs of the predatory
price reduction.  But in our example the future monopoly profit will far outweigh the cost of
the price war if it is of limited duration.   Moreover, the victim, if it has other investment276
times present earnings).
           If victim leaves the market, its best alternative investment will allow it to earn $5 per unit or a total of277
$5000 in the current year (period 1) and income of $50,000 (10 X $5000) in the future (period 2), or a total of
$55,000.  
           If victim stays in the market in the face of a cost breakthrough by Firm 1, it loses $5000 in the first278
year, and thereafter goes bankrupt, earning no profit.  
           If victim stays in the market when Firm 1 is bluffing, it loses $5000 in period 1 (during the price279
war), and thereafter earns $100,000 (10 X $10,000), resulting in a net gain of $95,000.
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options (as we assume), may find it advantageous to decide quickly whether to leave the
market. 
In order to think about its decision systematically the victim might prepare a simple
table of the possible outcomes from its decision to leave the market or stay:
      Victim's Payoff
Leave market     $55,000277
Stay in market when predator has 
achieved cost breakthrough       -5,000278
Stay in market when predator is
bluffing       95,000279
Examining this table the victim sees that if it leaves the market it can earn $55,000,
which is less than its current profit, but it is free of any strategic risk.  On the other hand if the
victim remains in the market, it can either do much worse (losing $5000) if its rival has
lowered its costs or much better (earning $95,000) if its rival is bluffing.  The problem is that
the victim does not know which event has occurred.  The best it can do is to try to estimate
the probabilities (however roughly) and calculate its expected payoffs in light of those
            The expected payoff from remaining in the market when the two possible outcomes (cost280
breakthrough or bluffing) are equally probable is .5 X -5000 + .5 (-5000 + 100,000) = $45,000.  This is of
course smaller than the expected payoff from leaving ($55,000).
            The victim's expected value from remaining in the market is the sum of the expected loss it281
encounters if Firm 1 has achieved a cost breakthrough plus the gain it will realize if Firm 1 is bluffing, which
together total $55,000: (.4 X -$5000) + .6 X (-5000 + 100,000) = $55,000).  As before, the victim's expected
value in leaving the market is $55,000.  Assuming the victim will remain in the market only if its expected
value of staying exceeds its expected value from leaving, victim will exit since the two expected values are now
equal.
          See  United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184 (1911); see also,  Report of the282
Commissioner of Corporations on the Tobacco Industry, U.S. Bureau of Corporations 1909, at 13.
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probabilities.  Suppose the victim believes that the two events -- bluffing or cost breakthrough
-- are equally probable.  In that event it will leave the market, since the expected payoff from
leaving is $55,000, while the expected payoff from staying is only $45,000 (which is the
average of the two remaining outcomes if we assume each is equally probable).   Indeed,280
even if the probability Firm 1 is bluffing is as high as 60 percent, the victim will leave the
market.   281
What this analysis shows is that the merely probable belief by the victim that the
incumbent has reduced its cost can induce exit or prevent entry despite the substantial
likelihood that the incumbent is bluffing. 
  2. Illustration: Bogus Competition in the Tobacco Industry
The American Tobacco Company engaged in many predatory and anticompetitive
activities while building the tobacco trust from 1890 to 1911—the date the Supreme Court
finally ordered its dissolution.   One of American’s predatory strategies involved the use of282
“bogus independents” in the plug tobacco market, which provides an interesting example of a
possible cost-signaling strategy, and allows  illustration of our proposed approach for cost
signaling.
(i) Factual Summary
In 1893, American Tobacco, which already controlled 85 percent of the cigarette
          See American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 161.283
          See American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 162.284
          See Brief for the United States at 249, United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911)285
(hereinafter Brief, American Tobacco).
          See Brief American Tobacco, supra note     at 269.  In addition, the secretary of the association,286
Friedlander, of the Day & Night Company, secretly sold out to the trust.  These and others were apparently
used to keep the trust advised.  Id.
          See Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Costs of Competitors, 94 Pol. Econ.287
266, 271 (1986) (hereinafter Burns, Predatory Pricing).
          Id at 271.288
          Id at 271-272.289
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market, entered the production of plug tobacco by merging five of the largest plug
manufacturers into one corporation, Continental Tobacco.   The trust grew by acquiring
competitors—allegedly after lengthy and often severe price cutting.  For example, when
American’s initial attempts to combine the plug tobacco producers failed, American engaged
in below-cost pricing which resulted in losses of over $ 4 million.   As many as thirty283
acquired competitors were simply closed down.  The trust would preserve the name,
organization, and products of the acquired company, and when questioned, would persistently
deny having control over them.   Trust members used fictitious names and unusual addresses284
in correspondence to conceal the relationship among the companies.     Compounding the285
intrigue, bogus independents actually gained entry into an association of bona fide
independents that had been formed to provide protection from the trust.286
The use of bogus independents probably reduced the costs of acquisition.  287
According to Malcolm Burns, “[i]f the trust effectively disguised its misconduct by initiating
the price cutting from a secretly controlled subsidiary . . . the ensuing decline in the profits of a
targeted competitor probably will be attributed to intensified and enduring competition,”  288
lowering earnings projections, diminishing growth opportunities and curbing investment—all
of which should reduce the prey’s market value and lower the amount required to acquire the
prey.   As we suggest below, the use of bogus independents may have also served to induce289
actual independents to believe that the bogus rival had been able to reduce costs.
          See U.S. Supreme Court 1911, United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106, testimony of C. C.290
Dula, 2:545.
          See id. at 2:528.291
          See id. at 4:116.292
          See Brief, American Tobacco, supra note    at 269.293
          See Brief, American Tobacco, supra note    at 243.294
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The original petition filed by the United States includes numerous examples of bogus
independents, four of which were allegedly used to launch predatory pricing campaigns.  We
focus on one such example, Nall & Williams Tobacco Company of Louisville, a producer of 
plug tobacco.  American used Nall & Williams as a so called “commercial wolf” to launch a
predatory pricing campaign against the Nashville Tobacco Works of Nashville Tennessee. 
The scheme was discussed in a letter written from American Tobacco’s vice president sent to
the president of Nall & Williams, a secretly owned subsidiary.    In this letter the American290
Tobacco executive asks Nall & Williams to introduce a new brand of tobacco to compete with
Nashville Tobacco Works.   Nall & Williamson is to market the new brand as soon as possible. 
Sales, not profit is to be the goal.  The subsidiary is to “ enter upon a vigorous campaign, to
be kept up until the desired end is accomplished.”   Regarding profits, the Tobacco executive
writes,  “.... while I would like you to show as much [profit] as possible, my idea is that you
should not make money at expense of trade, providing, of course, that you are getting this
business from certain people.”291
Nall & Williams advertised that it had no connection with the trust,  and it was even a292
member of the association of independents formed to provide protection from the trust.  293
The United States claimed that Nall & Williams’ attack was “ferocious” and that the owners
of the Nashville Tobacco Works “became convinced that they must either sell out to [the
trust] or be destroyed.”   In April 1906, under pressure from the predatory attack, the294
Nashville Tobacco Works secretly sold out to the trust.  Nor did the deception stop at this
point.  Instead, following acquisition, the trust continued to operate Nashville Tobacco as an
          See id.295
          See Burns, Predatory Pricing, supra note    at 268 n.5 (citing U.S. Bureau of Corporations 1915, pp.296
49, 84, 127, 138).
          Id at 153, table 52.297
          American Tobacco, at 175.298
          Id at 190.299
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independent up until the time the United States filed its antitrust suit.   295
(ii) Proof of Case
(A) MARKET STRUCTURE FACILITATING PREDATION
From 1900 to 1910, the trust held the following average market shares: plug, 77.2%;
smoking, 68.8%; snuff, 90.7%; and fine cut, 73.9%.   American Tobacco had an average296
market share in cigarettes of 86.1% from 1891-1910,  and controlled about 95% of the297
licorice root market, a key ingredient to plug tobacco.   Moreover the Supreme Court found298
that defendants had gradually obtained control over “all the elements essential to the
successful manufacture of tobacco products,” and that “placing such control in the hands of
seemingly independent corporations serv[ed] as perpetual barriers to the entry of others into
the tobacco trade.”299
(B) SCHEME OF PREDATION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
The evidence showed that each of the preconditions for signaling predation was
present.
(1) Some event has occurred, known by the victim, that could have enabled the
predator to significantly reduce its costs
The “event” in this case study is the introduction by American of a new brand of
tobacco into the territory of the Nashville Tobacco Works through its disguised subsidiary, 
Nall & Williams .  The introduction of a new product sold at a low price could have reflected
a lower cost process.  New products may result from new production techniques or the
          See supra TAN_____ .300
125
acquisition of a cheaper source of supplies—both of which would qualify as an event that
could have enabled the predator to reduce costs.  The new product entered the market at
reduced prices and thus the price reduction coincided with the “event.”  Of course, there could
be other explanations for the price reduction, but the launching of a new product qualifies as
an event capable of signaling a cost saving.
(2) At or about the same time the predator significantly reduces its price
Here the event and the price reduction coincide, so this requirement is easily met.
(3) As a result of such price reduction the victim could rationally believe that
the predator may have lowered its costs 
It is important to note that the Nashville Tobacco Works need only believe that it is
significantly probable that Nall & Williams had achieved lower costs for it possibly to be
induced to leave the market..   Applying this element, we would ask whether a reasonable300
firm would find it significantly probable that Nall & Williams had achieved cost savings?  As
mentioned, the introduction of a new product at very low prices could be indicative of some
cost saving event.  The prey might believe that Nall & Williams had achieved a new
production technique or perhaps found a new, cheaper source of supply.  Because of the great
pains American took to conceal its relationship with Nall & Williams,  Nashville Tobacco had
little reason to suspect that Nall & Williams was an American Tobacco subsidiary, receiving
subsidies from the trust to engage in predatory pricing.  That left two remaining alternatives:
Either Nall & Williams had launched a self-financed promotional or predatory pricing
campaign, or it had achieved a significant cost saving.
Focusing on these alternatives, the self-financed promotion or predatory pricing
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explanation appears unlikely.  Self-financed promotion is unlikely if the price cutting was as
ruinous as the government claimed.  A predatory price explanation is unlikely if, as seems
plausible, the victim was ignorant of the deception and believed the predator to be a small
independent firm.  The victim would likely recognize that a predatory pricing strategy by a
small independent could not be sustained.  In that event, the intended victim, Nashville
Tobacco, could simply ride out the attack, realizing that its adversary had limited assets.  So
neither of these alternatives would seem a likely explanation for the low pricing.  Of course,
Nall & Williamson might have obtained the support of a well funded financial backer, but why
would the financial backer be interested in investing large resources in excluding another small
rival when it would then face future competition from American, which was rapidly expanding
its control over the entire tobacco industry?  
The remaining possibility was that Nall & Williams had achieved significant cost
savings.  How else could a small independent producer of tobacco sell its product at such a
low price for a sustained period of time?  It seems reasonable that Nashville Tobacco would
conclude that it was at least significantly likely that Nall & Williams had achieved a cost
savings.  To be sure this is only a probability, but as the cost signaling strategy shows, a
substantial probability of cost reduction can drastically change the expected profit of remaining
in the market.
(4) The possible cost reduction is of sufficient magnitude to require the victim to exit
or limit its expansion into other markets
As mentioned, in April 1906, the Nashville Tobacco Works sold out to the trust due to
the below-cost selling of Nall & Williams.  The United States claimed that Nall & Williams’
attack was “ferocious” and that the owners of the Nashville Tobacco Works “became
          See Brief, American Tobacco, supra note    at 243.301
          American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 175.302
          See Burns, Predatory Pricing, supra note    at 271 n.12.303
          See Malcom R. Burns, New Evidence on Price Cutting, 10 Managerial & Decision Econ. 327 (1989).  304
Burns quotes three letters introduced into the record that support the proposition that American raised prices
after a rival had been eliminated.  One such letter includes the following statement, “It seems to me now with
R. & W. [Rucker & Witten Tobacco Company, acquired by the trust after an alleged predatory attack] out of
the way, is the time to make some money . . . .”  Id. (citing United States Supreme Court 1911, supra note    at
2:581-582).
          In his study of predatory pricing in the tobacco industry, Malcolm Burns found that American’s price305
cutting campaign “created a notorious reputation that intimidated other competitors into selling out cheaply,”
leading to an estimated 25 percent discount due to reputation effects alone. Burns, Predatory Pricing supra note
at __. Since the signalled costs were the bogus independent’s costs, they would not enhance American’s
reputation as a low cost firm..
127
convinced that they must either sell out to [the trust] or be destroyed.”   Thus, the magnitude301
of the cost reduction clearly suffices to have substantially caused the victim’s exit.
(C) OTHER ELEMENTS
The other elements necessary to sustain a violation need only brief discussion.  The
price cutting forced the prey to sell out secretly, thereby achieving the predator’s exclusionary
and deceptive purpose.  Probable recoupment is supported by several factors.  The predator’s
price cutting was part of a pattern of price cutting activity that led to its dominance of the
tobacco and plug tobacco markets with high market share and what the Supreme Court
described as “perpetual entry barriers.”  .  The cost of the predation was limited since the302
buyouts were typically made at low prices and the price cutting  was restricted to the local
operating area of the prey.   While ex post evidence of pricing effects is  lacking,  letters303
exchanged by trust members indicate that the trust intended to raise prices after the demise of
rivals,  which certainly reinforces a conclusion of probable recoupment.  Finally, reputation304
effects also enabled recoupment (but these effects do not appear to have stemmed from the
cost signaling described here).305
Price was below ATC and may also have been below long run incremental cost since
the petition charged that Nall & Williamson sold “below the cost of production” and American
          See Burns, New Evidence, supra note _____ at 327 & n.5 (1989).306
          American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 161.307
128
suffered heavy losses during the predatory campaign.   While the record allows no306
conclusion  whether price fell below AVC,  that would not be an essential finding under our307
proposed approach.  A business justification defense was apparently not raised.  But had it
been asserted, American would have faced a heavy burden in explaining its bogus competitor
strategy and the great lengths to which it went in concealing its relation to its acquired
subsidiaries.  Such deception is consistent with the predatory cost signaling strategy developed
above and cannot easily be reconciled with any legitimate business purpose.
3. Cost Signaling Combined with Reputation Effect: Theory
A cost signaling strategy is even more powerful and plausible when combined with a
demonstration or reputation effect.  This may involve successive rivals within a single market
or either current or successive rivals engaged in multiple markets.  
We illustrate how reputation effects can facilitate cost signaling by two examples. The
first example involves the same situation as the cost signaling case described immediately
above, with the addition of a potential future entrant.  The second involves a multi-market
extension where the two initial rivals compete in two separate markets and where a price cut
in one market has demonstration effects in the other market.
A.  Reputation effects within a single market:  the efficient potential entrant
Consider the cost signaling case described earlier.  As the reader will recall, we
assumed the industry had only two firms, each having the same costs.  Predatory cost signaling
was possible because there was some probability that one firm (Firm 1) had made an important
cost breakthrough.
 We now introduce an additional player: an efficient potential entrant.  Suppose that
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the potential entrant has a cost advantage that would make entry profitable under current
conditions, but would make entry unprofitable if Firm 1 has achieved a cost breakthrough.  In
such a situation possible reputation effects give Firm 1 an added incentive to engage in
predatory cost signaling.  If Firm 1 can convince its rivals and potential rivals that it has
achieved a cost breakthrough, it can not only induce the exit of its existing rival, but also
prevent entry of a future rival. That is to say, successful cost predation against an existing
competitor may create a reputation for low costs that deters entry by future rivals. 
We describe the competitive interaction in words and then illustrate with a simple
numerical example.  Focusing first on the predator’s existing rival, the presence of an efficient
potential entrant reduces the existing rival’s return from remaining in the market.  This occurs
because the existing rival’s gain from continued market participation (the continuation benefit)
will be diluted by future competition from the efficient entrant.  Turning to the entrant, if the
predator induces the existing rival to leave the market, this almost surely raises the entrant’s
estimate that the predator has achieved a cost breakthrough.  As a market insider, the existing
rival presumably knows more than the entrant, and thus the  existing victim’s exit powerfully
reinforces the predator’s  cost signal.  As a result, the predator’s expected gain from predation
under simple cost signaling is enhanced by the additional effect that cost signaling both induces
the victim  to exit and creates a reputation effect that deters future entry (including possible
reentry by the excluded victim).
To illustrate this more exactly consider this simple numerical example, based on the
facts used in our earlier discussion of cost signaling.  As already mentioned, two firms
compete in an industry in which each firm has the same costs.  In the absence of a cost
innovation each firm has unit costs of $50 and sells 1000 units (one unit each to 1000
customers) at a price of $60, thus earning $10,000 ($10 X 1000 = $10,000).  If Firm 1
     If the incumbent reduces its price to $55 and is able to keep all of its customers, it earns only $5000.    Each incumbent now sells its308
1000 units at a price of $55 at a unit cost of $50 and earns profit of  $5 000 ($5 X 1000) .  But its alternative use for its capital (slightly) exceeds
$5000.   (The incumbent has already borne its fixed set up cost so it does not take this into account.)
     Thus, the predator increases its net welfare in the first year following the price war by $20,000 ($10,000 in increased earnings from309
eliminating its existing rival and $10,000 in the avoidance of losses had the potential entrant entered the market).  Capitalizing this yearly return
by a factor of 10 yields net benefits of $200,000 before discounting, much exceeding the predatory investment.  See discussion of cost signaling,
supra XXXX.
130
achieves a cost breakthrough, it is able to reduce unit costs dramatically, from $50 to $20, and
to cut price to $40 (its profit maximizing price).  At that low price Firm 1 captures all of its
rival's customers and also attracts new customers (expanding its sales from 1000 to 3000).
Now introduce a potential entrant who enjoys a cost advantage over the two
incumbent firms.  Assume this efficient entrant has a low  unit cost of $45 and a fixed entry or
set up cost of $10,000.  With a unit cost below the incumbent’s $50 cost, the efficient entrant
is ready and willing to enter the market, charging a price of $55.  At this price neither
incumbent has an incentive to stay in the market since, as assumed in our earlier cost signaling
discussion, each incumbent has alternative uses for its capital that would enable it to earn more
than the reduced profit now available.   In that event both firms would exit and the efficient308
entrant earns $10,000 ($10 each from its 2000 customers less its fixed set up cost of $10,000).
Suppose now that one of the incumbents (the predator), having made no cost
breakthrough, follows a bluffing or signaling  strategy, reducing its price to $40, which is $10
below its cost of $50.  Assuming the other incumbent matches the price reduction, predator
now loses $10 per customer or a total of  $10,000 per year ($10 X 1000). 
If the bluffing strategy succeeds, the predator benefits not only from the increased
future earnings it gains by inducing its existing rival to exit, but also from the losses it avoids
by deterring entry.  Since these benefits are continuing, the predator  recoups far more than
the cost of the price war.   This simple example illustrates how a predator has an even309
greater incentive to engage in predatory pricing when its actions have reputation  effects on
new entrants.
          To illustrate more exactly, suppose that entry costs are $5000, that entrant can produce only 900 units, and that entry takes place at a310
price of $55.  In that event the two incumbent firms could continue to charge $60, while retaining a (diminished) market share of 1100
customers, or 510 customers each, so that each incumbent would earn post-entry profits of $5100.  Since, as previously assumed, each incumbent
has an alternative investment that would yield profit of $5000, this is just enough to encourage them to remain in the market and accommodate
the new entrant.  The entrant would have profits of $9000 minus the $5000 fixed entry cost, or a net of $4000 under this scenario.
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Under these conditions both the existing rival and the entrant, observing the predator’s
price reductions, face a difficult choice whether to compete with the predator.  Indeed, for the
existing rival the prospect of continued competition with the predator is likely to be even less
attractive than in the simple cost signaling case.  Consider first the existing firm’s decision
whether to remain in the market.  Irrespective of whether the predator has been able to reduce
costs, the existing victim now has even less to gain by remaining in the market.  Indeed, even if
the victim discovers that the predator is bluffing, it now faces the threat of entry by the
efficient entrant, which lowers the existing firm’s expected future profit after the predator
withdraws its price cut.  Thus, Firm 1's predatory actions are even more likely to induce the
victim to exit than before.  In fact, in our numerical example the existing firm would want to
leave the market under all circumstances.       
A less drastic and more plausible outcome arises if the efficient entrant has limited
production capacity and, as a result, lower fixed set up costs.  In that event both incumbents
may be content to remain in the market, accommodating the entrant and exploiting the residual
demand curve.   Thus, after the efficient entrant has disposed of its full output, the two
incumbents, following an accommodating strategy, continue to charge their previous $60
price, serving a reduced base of customers.   310
Under this more plausible scenario the existing rival would stay in the market if it is
absolutely certain that the predator is bluffing. However, any small doubt concerning a cost
breakthrough by the predator would be enough to induce exit.  The modest profit the existing
victim earns on its reduced volume of sales if the predator is bluffing would then be
outweighed by even a small risk of the heavy loss the victim would sustain if the predator has
     If entrant now decides to enter despite Firm 1's price reduction and it turns out that Firm 1 was bluffing, entrant gains $10,000. In that311
event the entrant, facing only the competition of the predator, sinks the cost of entry of $10.000, sets a price of $55 and obtains a margin of $10
on 2000 customers, thereby earning $10,000. But if Firm 1 is not bluffing and has achieved a cost breakthrough, the entrant loses its fixed entry
costs of $10,000.  Thus, if the entrant’s gain when the predator is bluffing is just equal to the entrant’s loss when predator has made a cost
breakthrough, the potential entrant will stay out of the market as long as the event of bluffing is not more likely than a cost breakthrough.  That is
to say, a 50% chance that the predator has achieved a cost breakthrough will deter entry.
     The chain store paradox imposes no obstacle to these conclusions.  The reputation strategy just described is effective even if the312
market is profitable only for a limited number of periods.  That is to say when the incumbent’s costs are not perfectly known to its rivals, there is
no longer a “chain store paradox”.  The entrant cannot confidently predict that predator will raise its price in the last period, by backward
induction, also in the next to last period, and by similar reasoning in all previous periods. See discussion supra _______.
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achieved a cost breakthrough. This example illustrates that the presence of a potential entrant
increases not only the benefits of predatory action but also the existing victim’s incentive to
exit. These are very general effects arising in almost any situation where there is a possibility
of future entry.
Moreover, the exit by the predator’s existing rival also affects the likelihood of future
entry.  If the predator’s price reduction causes the existing rival to leave the market, the
immediate effect is to reduce competition, making the market more attractive for entry. 
However strikingly, there is now an offsetting possibility that the potential entrant will be less
likely to enter even though it could now enter at full production capacity.  The existing rival’s
exit will almost surely raise the entrant’s estimate that the predator has achieved a cost
breakthrough.  As previously discussed, the existing rival as a market insider, ought to know
more about the predator’s costs than a potential future entrant.  The observed exit of the
victim may therefore increase the entrant’s belief that the predator has a cost advantage,
discouraging entry.311
The reputation effect theories emphasize that the longer predatory action is pursued,
for example the more often the incumbent firm responds with price cuts when its
competitiveness is tested, the more potential entrants are inclined to believe that incumbent
actually has low costs and is not bluffing.  Thus, over time an incumbent can build a reputation
for low costs by engaging in predatory pricing, making future entry less likely.  312
          It is plausible that an innovative cost breakthrough can be implemented only gradually since investment in new producing facilities is313
risky until an innovation has been successfully produced and marketed.  Only if there are arbitrage opportunities would it be likely to expect a
simultaneous price cut across all markets.  Note  that cost signaling would not be credible if a cost breakthrough applies to both of the predator’s
markets, but the predator reduces price in only one market.
     While the prey may not exit immediately from Market 2 if it can earn an interim profit, it will leave when it perceives that the314
predator’s cost reductions in Market 1 will be replicated in Market 2.  Thus, the predator need not engage in a second costly price war in Market
2, although of course it must by some means inform the prey that the perceived cost reductions in Market 1 have been diffused to Market 2.
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B. Reputation Effects in the Presence of Multi-market Contact
Demonstration effects may also arise when there is multi-market contact just as in the
situation where there is a potential entrant in the same market.  In both cases the introduction
of a third party changes the incentives of the participants such as to induce reputation
strategies.  The only difference is that now the demonstration effect is directed towards the
victim’s other markets.  
To see how demonstration effects arise when there is multi-market contact consider
again the cost signaling situation described above, but now with two identical markets in
which the predator and victim operate. Moreover, suppose that when the predator achieves a
cost breakthrough, it can only gradually implement the cost reduction across the two markets. 
Thus, predator lowers its costs in Market 1 to begin with and in Market 2 only in the next
period.   Under these conditions, the predator can reduce its price in Market 1, thus limiting313
the cost of its predatory action to only one market.  Then, if the reduced price causes the
victim to conclude that predator has lower costs, the victim will exit not only from Market 1,
but eventually from Market 2 as well, so that the predator gets enhanced benefits from its cost
signaling predation.  314
Multi market reputation effects inhibit potential competition by the same dynamic that
we described in a single market.  Observing the exit or losses of the predator’s existing rivals,
potential entrants in both markets are induced to believe that the predator may have made a
cost breakthrough.  They are then less likely to attempt entry.
